93. Telegram From the Embassy in Poland to the Department of State0
Warsaw, September
15, 1958, 10 p.m.
410. USUN for Robertson. Have following comments on today’s meeting.
- 1.
- As was to be expected, Wang made no concession whatsoever on fundamental position that Taiwan and offshore islands are Chinese territory and that ChiComs have every right “liberate” them by whatever means they choose, without foreign interference.
- 2.
- He was firm in his repeated statement that the “question of a cease-fire does not arise.” While following logically from ChiComs basic position, this does not necessarily mean that they may not decide at some point to cease firing. Whether they do or not will presumably depend in large part upon their estimate of the military risks involved in continuing this type of pressure. However, the position they took today probably does mean that they will avoid any express agreement to a cease-fire.
- 3.
- Wang appeared genuinely disappointed that, although I indicated specific proposals would be considered after a cease-fire, I did not present them today. He referred to Secretary’s press conference September 9 and pressed several times for concrete proposals, only after determining that we were not prepared to present anything further, and following a ten-minute recess at his request, did he bring forward his “agreed announcement.”
- 4.
- “Agreed announcement” is obviously for propaganda purposes. They could not have expected us to accept such a document, even as basis for negotiation. They probably consider when it is made public it will make good impression on neutralists and others inclined accept basis ChiCom position, since it contains elements they can portray as concessions, such as agreement to unopposed GRC withdrawal from offshores, and agreement to “strive for peaceful liberation” of Taiwan and Penghus and refrain from use of force for “certain period of time.”
- 5.
- Wang’s presentation, while doctrinaire and uncompromising, was not threatening or belligerent. He adopted air of aggrieved party, firmly rejecting statements conflicting with ChiCom interpretation of issues, but taking attitude he willing work patiently for solution.
- 6.
- Wang’s statement that “as soon as provocations cease prospects will be good for relaxation of tension in Taiwan area” seems worth exploring further. It was extemporaneous, rather than part of prepared statement, and may not mean, as it suggests, that if we would refrain from certain actions their pressure on Quemoy would ease. However, it could be probed at next meeting.
- 7.
- From manner in which Wang and his staff consulted regarding date of next meeting, it appeared they had reservations about being prepared in time for meeting by Wednesday morning, rather than that they had firm instructions not to meet again before Thursday.
Will telegraph later tactical recommendations for next meeting.1
Beam