Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

394. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to Secretary of State Herter ⁰

Washington, October 14, 1959.

SUBJECT

• United States Position on the Status of Tibet

Our Embassy in New Delhi has reported (Tab A)¹ that the Dalai Lama has requested United States support for hearing the Tibetan case in the United Nations on the basis of aggression and that the Tibetans are pressing for recognition of the independent sovereign status of Tibet. I consider it important that we come to an early decision on the question of the status of Tibet, both to enable us to reply to the Dalai Lama’s request and to prepare for conversations with Gyalo Thondup, brother of the Dalai Lama. Thondup is now in New York in connection with the Tibetan item in the United Nations General Assembly. He plans to come to Washington, perhaps next week, and hopes to call on you. I recommend that you receive him and use the opportunity to explain our position on the status of Tibet.

FE has completed a study (Tab B)² of the question of United States recognition of the independence of Tibet in which the considerations both for and against such action are examined in detail. Taking these factors into account, we have concluded that on balance the arguments against recognition of Tibetan independence under present conditions are stronger than those in favor. I consider this conclusion valid from the standpoint of both United States national interest and from that of the Tibetans. We share with the Tibetans the objectives of keeping the Tibetan cause alive in the consciousness of the world and maintaining the Dalai Lama as an effective spokesman of the Tibetan people. I believe that United States recognition of the Dalai Lama’s government as that of an independent country would serve neither purpose well. Since very few countries could be expected to follow our lead, our recognition now would make the Dalai Lama the leader of a government-in-exile obviously dependent on the United States for political support. This would almost certainly damage the prestige and influence he now enjoys as one of Asia’s revered leaders and would hamper his activities on behalf of the Tibetan people.

Nonetheless, there remains the need for the United States to appear responsive to the Dalai Lama’s appeal and take a stand conforming to our historic position as a supporter of the principle of the self-determination of peoples. The Republic of China might feel that by taking such a stand we would be going too far. However, President Chiang Kai-shek has already said that his government would “assist the Tibetan people to realize their own aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination” after reconquest of the mainland from the Communists and is himself thus committed to the ultimate realization of Tibetan self-determination. Also, unless the Tibetans are given some definite indication of our sympathy for their cause, there is the danger that the morale of the resistance movement will flag. As pointed out in the study, for the United States to ignore the Dalai Lama’s appeal altogether might weaken his determination to keep pressing the Tibetan case before the world and might damage the reputation of the United States as an upholder of international morality. We therefore have reviewed the other courses of action open to us and have taken note of the fact that in December 1950, when the Chinese Communists began their conquest of Tibet, we had come to a policy decision on Tibet as follows:

1) We recognized that Tibetans have the same “inherent right” of self-determination as any other people;

2) Should developments warrant, consideration could be given to recognition of Tibet as an independent state;

3) We did not desire to formulate a definitive legal position on Tibet at that time; and

4) It was adequate “for present purposes” to state that we recognized “the de facto autonomy that Tibet has exercised since the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, and particularly since the Simla Conference.”

This position was communicated to the British and Indian Governments in a note of December 30, 1950 (Tab C)³ and a copy was made available to the Canadians.

I believe that this position could be used as the basis for your discussions with Thondup. In response to his request for recognition of Tibetan independence, you could tell him that, while we cannot accord Tibet recognition as an independent country at this time, we do wholly support the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny and that we would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to the end that the Tibetans might realize self-determination should a change in the situation make this practicable. You could also inform him that at an appropriate time after the General Assembly had completed its consideration of the Tibetan item we would be prepared to issue a public statement supporting the right of Tibetans to self-determination.

The Tibetans will probably be unhappy at our failure to go all the way toward recognition of Tibetan independence. Nonetheless, I think Thondup could be made to see that recognition under present conditions would not serve the best interests of the Tibetan people and that in offering to state publicly at an appropriate time in the future our support of the right of the Tibetans to self-determination we are moving in the direction that he desires us to take. However, so long as the Chinese Communists occupy Tibet self-determination is not practicable and the struggle of the Tibetan people for control of their own political destiny is likely to be a long one. If Thondup should appear persuaded of the merit of our position, you could tell him that we plan to communicate it formally to the Dalai Lama through our Embassy in New Delhi. On the other hand, if Thondup’s reaction to the suggestion should be adverse, you could refrain from telling him that we had made a final decision in the matter.

If you approve this course and if the interview with Thondup proves satisfactory, I recommend that the Governments of the Republic of China, India, and the United Kingdom be informed of our intentions before we send a formal notification to the Dalai Lama.

Recommendations:

1) That you receive Gyalo Thondup when he comes to Washington for the purpose of explaining to him our attitude toward the status of Tibet.⁴

2) That you⁵ inform him that, while the United States cannot accord recognition to the Dalai Lama’s government under present circumstances, it

a) fully supports the right of the Tibetan people to have the determining voice in their political destiny,

b) would be prepared to consider appropriate assistance to this end should a change in the situation make this practicable, and

c) would be prepared to make a public statement, after completion of General Assembly consideration of the Tibetan item, affirming our support of Tibetan self-determination.

3) That, if Thondup’s response is encouraging, you authorize our Ambassador in New Delhi to inform the Dalai Lama formally of the above position.

4) That you authorize the notification of the Governments of the Republic of China, India, and Great Britain of our decision prior to sending formal notification to the Dalai Lama.⁶

0. Source: Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Tibetan. Secret. Drafted in the Office of Chinese Affairs by Bennett and John H. Holdridge; cleared by Green and Bacon and with IO, NEA, EUR, SOA, and S/P; and sent through Murphy. Filed with a memorandum of October 28 from Parsons to Murphy on a scheduled call by Gyalo Thondup.
1. In telegram 1120 from New Delhi, September 25, which reported a conversation between Ambassador Bunker and Gyalo Thondup; not attached to the source text. (Ibid., Central Files, 793B.00/9–2559)
2. Not printed.
3. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 612–613.
4. A memorandum of October 15 from Murphy to Herter recommended that Thondup be received at a lower level. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.93B11/10–1559) Herter initialed disapproval of this recommendation.
5. On the source text, the word “you” was crossed out and the words “the Dept” were inserted, apparently by Herter, in the margin.
6. Herter initialed approval of recommendations 2–4.