Office of the Historian

385. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State0

New Delhi, September 5, 1959, 7 p.m.

812. Reference: Embtel 792.1 In my talk this morning with Foreign Secretary Dutt, I told him Dalai Lama had informed me of decision to appeal to UN and had asked me convey to USG his request we give him every possible support in getting case heard by UN and in securing some satisfactory action. I added I had promised Dalai transmit his request and, while I had no specific instructions on the point, I was sure request would receive prompt and sympathetic consideration.

Dutt commented:

(1)
India does not feel it appropriate bring Tibetan matter before UN since Communist China not member;
(2)
“No one is going to war with China over Tibet” and so no effective action would result and were harsh words passed in debate, only likely effect would be to incite ChiComs to reprisals against Tibetans;
(3)
(In reply question) Soviets have been very quiet over Tibet and Sino-Indian border problems, which might indicate they do not approve of ChiComs actions and statements, particularly regarding India, but if they were forced to take position by item being debated in UNGA they would certainly have to side completely with ChiComs;
(4)
Re human rights approach (which I raised), UN might take cognizance but this would depend on what could be proved.

[Page 781]

Above points follow closely what we understand Nehru told Dalai and Dutt told Japanese Ambassador several days ago. Regarding (3), Dutt left impression on my mind without being explicit that he would regard as regrettable anything which forced USSR openly side with CPR. He mentioned that Soviet representatives “in various capitals” have been quietly indicating they deplored some things ChiComs had been doing. It is not clear in this case whether Dutt would regret closing of some possible breach between USSR and CPR or was only fearful USSR might be led or forced into anti-Indian statements. In talks with Japanese Ambassador Dutt expressed fear that forcing of USSR take position might create difficulties between it and US and impair chances of détente possible through Eisenhower-Khrushchev talks.

I reminded Dutt I had told Prime Minister, under instructions, that we hoped we could avoid working at cross purposes with Indian delegation in any debate on Tibet. USG realized India’s special even primary interest in question. I expressed hope to Dutt that even if GOI unable sponsor case in UNGA, at least it would not oppose its being considered and would be able support a proposal for constructive action. Dutt said much would depend how case presented and what action proposed. Indian GA delegation would not indulge in strong words but “you never know what Krishna Menon will do”. Menon would be “under very strict instructions in this case”. Tibetan item “very delicate situation” because there were also “strong feelings” in India that case should be heard by UN. India prepared be firm on certain points but “we have to be friends with powerful country with whom we have border of 2680 miles.”

Dutt confirmed Menon still going to lead delegation.

Brown
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/9–559. Secret; Priority. Received at 11:52 p.m. Repeated to London and Hong Kong.↩
  2. Document 384.↩