380. Editorial Note
At the 409th meeting of the National Security Council on June 4, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief exchange followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by S. Everett Gleason reads as follows:
“Mr. Dulles said that the Dalai Lama was planning to make a public statement on June 6 denouncing Communist China’s action in Tibet and calling for a campaign to free Tibet. While Nehru was trying to stop this public statement, it was thought that the Dalai Lama might make it nevertheless.
“Mr. Gray observed that there existed very strong feeling in some parts of the Department of Defense that our current U.S. ‘hands off policy with respect to Tibet needed re-examination. Mr. Gray suggested that this matter not be discussed at the Council meeting at the present time but that it might be brought up later. The President commented sharply that he thought the State Department should take the lead in such matters.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
Three unsigned and undated memoranda concerning Tibet, which had been sent to Gray with a covering note of June 3 from Deputy Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates are filed with a covering memorandum of June 15 from Gray to Gates. One of them, an unsigned memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, reads in part as follows:
- “1. In its regular meeting of this date, the Collateral Activities Coordinating Group of which I am Chairman, expressed its deep concern over the situation in Asia as a result of the Chinese Communist aggression in Tibet. We believe that the United States Government should take positive action to denounce the Communist action as additional evidence of the inevitable course of international communism. Concurrently, we believe that the United States should openly proffer assistance to the Tibetans in every way possible in order to capitalize on the present climate in Asia.
- “2. We do not accept the view of some who may feel that it is wise for the West to refrain from action while the Indians and other Asians work out their own immediate destiny. Inaction, at this time, by the West can be interpreted by the Asians as an indication of weakness, indifference, and a lack of dynamic leadership. We are convinced that the question of the security of India and the remaining free nations of Asia is at stake.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 63 A 1574, Tibet 1959)