Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

38. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles ⁰

Washington, August 20, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Recommended Action to Meet the Taiwan Straits Issue

The time has come, I believe, when it is essential that we make a decision on whether or not to defend the Offshore Islands under all circumstances. The Joint Chiefs of Staff at our meeting with them last Friday urged that such a decision be reached.¹ They pointed out that the military situation in the Straits has reached a stage where it is highly advisable to convey some warning to Peiping that if it attempts to seize Quemoy or Matsu by assault or interdiction, Peiping runs the clear risk of U.S. military countermeasures to keep those Islands in GRC hands. However, if we do so warn Peiping, we must be prepared to make good on our warning. That is why it is so important that a decision on the defense of the Islands be made as soon as possible.

If it is our decision not to defend the Islands under all circumstances, then I believe we must plan accordingly—politically, militarily and psychologically. Such a decision might call for intensive efforts on our part to persuade the GRC to withdraw its forces from the Offshore Islands. For example, it might be better to induce a withdrawal before those Islands were blockaded and starved out, resulting in the loss of its present defenders (one-third of the GRC fighting effectives) and a probable collapse of free China. The Chinese Communists already have the capability and probably the general intention to impose such a blockade.

If it is not our policy to defend the Islands under all circumstances, then we should also not make statements that would deepen our commitments and enhance impressions that we will defend them. We should not take military moves we were not prepared to carry through, moves that might lead to an ignominious retreat when it came to the showdown. We should not even issue warnings to Peiping via private diplomatic channels that we would intervene, because sooner or later our bluff might be called with disastrous consequence.

If, on the other hand, we consider it essential in the over-all situation to hold on to Taiwan and prevent the collapse of free China, then I believe we must now decide to defend the Offshore Islands under all circumstances.

I am not suggesting that that decision be announced. On the contrary, I believe it should be closely held. But such a decision would enable us to make a series of diplomatic and military moves to dissuade and deter the Communists from attempting to seize the Islands by assault or interdiction. In this connection, a draft National Intelligence Estimate² has just reached my desk, which states that the Communist Chinese may believe that the U.S. is less resolved than in 1956 to assist in the defense of the Offshore Islands; they will probably attempt progressively to increase present military and psychological pressures, testing our reactions.

A decision to defend the Islands must nevertheless be taken only with a clear understanding of the possible military consequences. The JCS maintain that, in either the event of a Chicom assault or interdiction, effective U.S. intervention against a determined and undeterred enemy [6-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].

I fully recognize the grave risks involved in defending the Islands. However, I believe the risks of not being prepared to defend them are greater. I therefore recommend that the decision be in favor of our being prepared to defend them under all circumstances, it being borne in mind, however, that our objective is not retention of these Islands but of Taiwan and free China. My reasons for the above recommendation are several:

1. You will recall all our unsuccessful efforts in late 1954 and early 1955 to induce the GRC to withdraw from Quemoy and Matsu. Since that time, the GRC has lavished efforts and substance in building up the defenses of the Islands; and it has become even more strongly confirmed in its view that these Islands, which they are prepared to defend to the last man, are vital to free China. I doubt that we could pressure them to withdraw.

2. Regardless of whether or not we could persuade the GRC to withdraw, our very efforts to do so would shatter confidence in the U.S., severely undermine morale on Taiwan and jeopardize the position and cause of free China. Worse, our efforts might conceivably precipitate a do-or-die GRC attack against the mainland, involving Chicom counterattacks on Taiwan. Unless we were to stand by the GRC at that moment, Taiwan would be seized by the Communists.

3. It is true that neutralists and even others would welcome the removal of this powder keg, but it is a matter of some practical importance that we not convey the impression of thus “clarifying” our commitments and contracting our area of responsibility. Other exposed small countries along the Sino-Soviet periphery would wonder if they, too, might be considered expendable by the U.S. when the heat was really on. There would be particular concern in Korea, Viet-Nam, Laos and among Overseas Chinese communities throughout Southeast Asia. The Communists would be confirmed in their view that the exercise of military power and threat pay off handsome dividends.

4. A withdrawal from the Offshore Islands would not liquidate the crisis. Peiping is sworn to seize Taiwan, by force if necessary. With the Offshore Islands in their hands and with a resulting severe decline (if not collapse) of morale on Taiwan, Communist aggressive appetites would be whetted, not appeased.

5. There is a long accumulation of evidence to show that the Soviets seek to avoid war—in particular a nuclear war with the United States— in pursuing their expansionist aims. They would undoubtedly exercise strong restraints on Peiping if the latter were to probe so far as to invite a shooting war with the U.S. Peiping has equal cause to avoid war with the United States and in recent years has shrewdly abstained from provoking us into open battle, seeking rather to gain its objectives through more subtle and devious means. The Joint Chiefs consider it quite possible that the Chinese Communists will keep closing in on the Offshore Islands, probing to test U.S. reactions. If it appears that we will defend the Islands, the Communists may well be persuaded to hold off. But if we give any indication we will not defend them, the chances are far greater that they will attack the Islands either by assault or an accelerated interdictory campaign.

6. It is true that we are becoming perilously dependent upon nuclear weapons. We may have already lost that degree of conventional capability which, supplementing nuclear power, would permit us to pose a graduated series or counters to enemy military actions to dissuade him from further aggression and to clearly forewarn him of the nuclear consequences of any persistence on his part. I am no expert in these matters but I understand that, if we were to make clear our intent to Peiping to resist Communist interdiction of the Offshore Islands and if that failed to deter, it does not necessarily follow that even today we would be led into a nuclear conflict. We still have the capability to pose certain graduated deterrents using conventional weapons. Challenging the Chinese Communists in the air or on the sea while assisting in GRC resupply operations might be sufficient deterrent. If the Chinese Communists were not fully dissuaded, we could bomb certain airfields in the Amoy area using conventional weapons. [2 lines of source text not declassified] All these steps would be supported by parallel diplomatic efforts to stop or contain hostilities, which we would have shown by our actions to have been the result of persistent Communist aggressiveness in the face of repeated warnings.

Summary and Recommendations

In summary, I am proposing a course of action which involves the risk of deepening military engagements and which may have adverse reactions in Japan, in the neutral countries and elsewhere. But, as I have said before, the alternative of yielding the Offshore Islands would in my opinion lead sooner or later to the loss of Taiwan which would breach our defense line in the West Pacific and, what is even more serious, would weaken our whole position in Asia. Moreover, yielding the Islands does not liquidate the crisis; indeed it would whet Peiping’s aggressive appetite.

Meanwhile the Chinese Communists are closing in on the Islands. Every day that we let this process continue, they score limited gains which they will not relinquish, making their situation ever more favorable and our decisions tougher. Also every day that passes involves the danger of rash GRC actions. It therefore stands to reason that, once a U.S. decision is reached to protect these Islands against assault or interdiction, we will be in a position to proceed with a series of moves designed to warn the Chinese Communists, to improve U.S. and GRC military capabilities for defense and to impose calmness and restraint on our Chinese allies.

I therefore recommend that steps be immediately taken with a view to reaching a high-level, closely held decision within our government to defend the Offshore Islands under all circumstances.

• Secondly, I recommend that Peiping be warned via a quiet diplomatic channel of our intention to prevent the seizure or interdiction of the Offshore Islands. This might most advisedly be done via the Russians for I think we could assume that Moscow, which seems genuinely concerned lest Peiping at some point drag them into a war, would get the full impact of our warning and would pass it on to Peiping in terms and in a manner that might be more effective than any we could devise.
• Thirdly, regardless of whether or not the above recommendations are approved, I recommend that a generally worded U.S. statement should be made to the effect that “a Communist attack of the Offshore Islands would be disturbing to the peace of Asia.” This would indirectly warn Peiping and reassure Taipei. It is almost inevitable that questions about the Offshore Islands will be put to you or to the President at press conferences and something will have to be said. The above language (suggested by George Yeh) seems moderate and non-committal. If any further questions are asked, you could fall back essentially on the language in the Formosa Resolution.
• Fourthly, I recommend that we continue to clarify our intentions to Peiping through (a) firm well-timed public assertions of support for the GRC, (b) speeding up the modernization and improvement of the GRC force, (c) sending more of our latest and best aircraft to Taiwan bases, (d) concentrating the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan vicinity.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/8–2058. Top Secret. A notation on the source text reads: “Sec saw,” but there is no indication of Dulles’ approval or disapproval of the recommendations.
1. See Document 34.
2. Apparently a draft of SNIE 100–9–58, Document 47.