Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

377. Draft Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

Washington, May 5, 1959.

SUBJECT

• United States Position on Recognition of an Independent Tibetan Government and United Nations Consideration of Tibet Issue

Judging by intelligence reports and in the light of developments in Tibet during the past few months, it is a real possibility that the Dalai Lama will shortly 1) proclaim the existence of an independent Tibetan state and government in exile; 2) request United States and free world recognition of this state and government; and 3) appeal to the United Nations to consider Tibet’s case against Communist China. If the Tibetans do take such steps, or if some other government should seek to submit the issue to the United Nations in Tibet’s behalf, the United States will have to decide quickly whether it is in our interest to support the Tibetan cause by affirmative action.

There is attached a staff study (Tab A) prepared by FE in coordination with NEA, IO, and L, which states United States objectives with respect to the Tibet issue; examines the attitudes, intentions, and interests of the parties chiefly concerned with the issue; and discusses the two problems of recognition of an independent Tibetan state and government and United Nations action in terms of historical background, factors relevant to a decision in the present case, and the potential benefits and disadvantages to the United States of positive action. On the basis of this analysis of the situation and the policy problems posed by it, it is believed that our policy with respect to the questions of recognition and United Nations action should be as follows:

1) Recognition

We should at once discreetly sound out friendly states including the United Kingdom on the attitude they would take if the Dalai Lama requests recognition of Tibet as an independent state, adding our view that such a request if made publicly should be given sympathetic consideration.

We should not encourage the Dalai Lama to make such a request until and unless we can be certain that it will be well received.

If the Tibetans publicly appeal for international recognition of an independent state of Tibet headed by the Dalai Lama,

a) We should give the Tibetans prompt assurances that we are giving their appeal sympathetic consideration and encourage them to seek the support of other free world nations.

b) We should extend our consultations with other free world nations on an urgent basis, seeking to persuade them to respond favorably.

c) Provided we are able to obtain the cooperation of a number of free world nations including Asian nations, we should extend recognition. If such cooperation is not forthcoming, we should reassess the situation to determine what course we should take. The attitude of India and other uncommitted Asian states should be considered, but would not be decisive.

d) If as a result of seeking international recognition for Tibetan independence the Dalai Lama should have to leave India, we should try to assist him to gain asylum in some other free world country and, if appropriate, offer him asylum in the United States.

e) If we extend recognition, we should seek to induce the GRC to join us. If the GRC feels unable to do so, we should seek to induce it at least not to challenge the validity of United States and other free world recognition.

2) United Nations Action

We should at once discreetly sound out friendly states including the United Kingdom on their attitude toward possible United Nations consideration of the Tibetan problem and on the best procedure if it appears desirable to seek such consideration.

If the Tibetans publicly appeal to the United Nations,

a) We should extend our consultations with other free world nations on an urgent basis, informing them that we support inscription of the appeal and urging support.

b) We should seek to determine the most promising form of United Nations action and the most appropriate sponsorship, keeping in mind the desirability of as broad sponsorship as possible.

c) Depending on developments, we should favor an invitation to the Dalai Lama to appear before the Security Council or the General Assembly.

d) In the event India and other uncommitted Asian nations should oppose any prospective United Nations action, we should give consideration to their objections and the implications for the success of such action, but their attitude should not be decisive.

In the absence of action by the Tibetans themselves to appeal to the United Nations,

a) We should not, in the present circumstances, ourselves take an initiative in submitting the matter to the United Nations, but should keep the question under constant review.

b) We should, insofar as feasible, seek to determine the desires and intentions of the Dalai Lama with respect to United Nations action.

c) We should consult fully and on a continuing basis with other free world countries to ascertain their views regarding possible courses of United Nations action.

d) Depending on the circumstances, if another free world country, especially an Asian one, should indicate to us an interest in taking an initiative in the United Nations, we should discreetly encourage it to do so.

e) If it appears that the Dalai Lama would welcome consideration of the Tibetan issue by the United Nations and that there would be adequate support, we might wish to stimulate another government, especially an Asian one, to take the matter to the United Nations.

0. Source: Department of State, FE/EA Files: Lot 66 D 225, Tibetan. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins, Martin, and Bacon on May 5. The memorandum was never sent to the Secretary. It was sent to IO and NEA for concurrence, but neither bureau concurred. Their responses were set forth in memoranda from Walmsley and Rountree to Robertson, dated May 18 and 21, respectively, which indicate that they felt Robertson’s policy recommendations did not reflect the staff study which had been prepared by an interbureau working group. Rountree attached suggestions for revisions in the recommendations concerning the recognition question, and Walmsley suggested revisions in the recommendations concerning possible U.N. action. (Ibid.; see Supplement) A handwritten note by Lutkins on the source text states that at a meeting with Murphy in late May, it was decided that “we should act to have matter raised at U.N.” The staff study, attached to the source text, is not printed.