Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

374. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 29, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Attitude of GRC Toward Independent Tibet

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Edwin W. Martin, Director, CA

Ambassador Yeh called on Mr. Robertson at his own request. He said that he had reported the views expressed by Mr. Robertson during their conversation of April 23 and had just received a telegram from Taipei in reply According to this message, if the Dalai Lama were to proclaim a provisional government of Tibet, the GRC would make a statement 1) recognizing the Dalai Lama’s government as the Government of Tibet under Article 120 of the Chinese constitution, which provides for safeguarding of Tibetan self-government, 2) asserting that the GRC would continue to pursue with the Tibetans their aim of achieving self-determination, and 3) supporting the heroic struggle of the Tibetan people against the Communists for religious and cultural freedom. The Ambassador said that the statement probably would not use these exact words but would be along these lines.

Mr. Robertson asked if the GRC had not always recognized the Dalai Lama as the government of Tibet? Dr. Yeh replied in the negative. He said that the statement proposed by the GRC would be consistent with the statement made by President Chiang on March 26 concerning self-determination for the Tibetans. Mr. Robertson asked whether the proposed statement could not make a reference to Tibetan independence. Ambassador Yeh replied that this could not be done because of the constitutional difficulties involved in changing China’s boundaries.

Ambassador Yeh then requested, on behalf of his Government, that the United States endeavor to seek assurance from the Dalai Lama that he would react favorably to a GRC statement along the lines suggested above. He said that it was important for his Government to know that its proposed statement would be well received by the Dalai Lama before making the statement. His Government did not want to be slapped down by the Dalai Lama after making such a statement. Ambassador Yeh also indicated that following the issuance of the GRC’s statement, it would like to establish contact with the Dalai Lama.

Ambassador Yeh further requested that if the United States were to make a statement regarding any provisional government setup by the Dalai Lama that this statement not be too much different from that of the GRC. He suggested that the United States might simply declare that it gave recognition to the Dalai Lama’s government as the Government of Tibet. Mr. Robertson said that we did not know at present whether the situation would arise, but if it did, we would consult the GRC before taking any further steps. He then asked Ambassador Yeh whether it would involve any embarrassment to the GRC if the United States recognized the Dalai Lama’s government as an independent one. Ambassador Yeh asked whether it would not be satisfactory for the United States to recognize it simply as the Government of Tibet. Mr. Robertson said that he didn’t know but that it might be that the United States would want to recognize a declaration of independence by the Dalai Lama. It would depend upon circumstances at the time and in any case we would certainly consult with the GRC before making a decision. Ambassador Yeh said that the United States must exercise leadership in these matters and if it felt it must make a statement of this kind, it should of course do so.

Ambassador Yeh said he was startled by reports of thousands of refugees in India [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. Dr. Yeh felt that this number of refugees could only mean that the Khamba tribesmen, who had been the main anti-Communist fighting force in Tibet, had fled to India. He thought it was vital to set up some organization which would enable these people to rally around the Dalai Lama. He was certain that Nehru would resist the setting up of a provisional government and therefore he had thought of alternative places, such as Ceylon or Thailand. Kandy, in Ceylon, would be ideal, since it was a center of Buddhism and also offered a high altitude suitable to the Tibetans. Mr. Robertson referred to the statement of the Prime Minister of Ceylon that the Tibetan revolt was a Chinese internal affair. Ambassador Yeh said that this statement was discouraging and that perhaps Thailand was the only alternative. He did not have much confidence in the willingness of the Thais to take bold action, however.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/4–2959. Secret. Drafted by Martin.