Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

372. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, April 23, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Tibetan Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. George K.C. Yeh, Ambassador, Chinese Embassy
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Acting Director for Chinese Affairs

Ambassador Yeh observed that while the situation in Tibet is generally evolving favorably from the GRC’s point of view, Taipei is somewhat concerned that Nehru may attempt to pressure the Dalai Lama into returning to Tibet. The unsettled status of the Indian-Tibetan border is involved in this matter. The Ambassador explained that the GOI bases its position on the McMahon line¹ which it inherited from the British, while the Chinese Communist claims are based on the Chien Lung line (on the basis of which the Kalimpong–Darjeeling area of Sikkim and the Towang area of Assam fall within Chinese territory). Nehru is reportedly under strong pressure from the Indian Parliament to obtain Peiping’s formal recognition of the McMahon line, and might be tempted to sacrifice the Dalai Lama as a means of gaining a quick settlement of the border issue. The GRC considers it important that the Dalai Lama enjoy real freedom in India and not be held as a prisoner by the GOI.

Mr. Robertson said that it would help a great deal if the GRC could publicly renounce suzerainty over Tibet and recognize its independent status. Ambassador Yeh commented that the GRC cannot do this since Tibet is described as part of China in the GRC Constitution, and for practical purposes it is virtually impossible to amend the Constitution under present conditions. A Constitutional amendment requires approval by at least two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Yuan or by three-quarters of the members of the National Assembly. The number of members of these two bodies presently living in Taiwan barely exceeds the required figures, so that in effect unanimous votes would be needed. The Ambassador’s opinion was that neither body would be willing to assume the responsibility of giving up Chinese territory. He said that the GRC has already made a forthright declaration on the subject in the form of President Chiang’s statement of March 26² promising the Tibetans that when the GRC recovers the mainland it will assist the Tibetans to realize their aspirations in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Mr. Robertson observed that President Chiang’s statement was certainly a good one, but that it did not go far enough to meet the needs of the present situation. In order to have any real psychological impact what is needed is not a promise of action at an unspecified future date, but forthright, unambiguous action now.

According to Ambassador Yeh, one complicating factor is that of the roughly 4 million Tibetan people only about 1.2 million live in Tibet proper. The rest are located in neighboring areas including Sikang, Tsinghai, and Kansu. The Panchen Lama can probably obtain statements from leaders of the latter group taking the line that they are loyal citizens of China and that Tibet should be part of China. Such statements, of course, would have a strong appeal for any Chinese. Mr. Robertson commented that this difficulty like the others mentioned by the Ambassador would apply equally when the GRC returns to the mainland. Returning to President Chiang’s March 26 statement, he said it seemed to him, by deferring action until recovery of the mainland, to leave the impression of imposing self-limitations on the GRC’s authority to speak as the government of the whole of China. Therefore, the position taken in it is a weak and undesirable one from the GRC’s point of view. Our own view, of course, is that the GRC represents the whole of China and therefore can take and announce a position regarding a part of mainland China at any time without having to await recovery of the mainland.

Mr. Robertson concluded by stating that we recognize the type of action suggested by him presents real problems for the GRC, but it would make things much more difficult for Peiping and he hoped the GRC would give our views careful consideration. Ambassador Yeh said he would report our views to Taipei.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793B.00/4–2359. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins.
1. Reference is to the boundary line between Tibet and northeast India agreed upon by British and Tibetan representatives in March 1914 and confirmed by the Simla Convention, initialed July 3, 1914, by British, Chinese, and Tibetan representatives but never signed or ratified by the Chinese Government. The text is in Tibet and the Chinese People’s Republic: A Report to the International Commission of Jurists by its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1960), pp. 330–333. A map showing the McMahon Line is appended to Notes, Memoranda and Letters Exchanged Between the Governments of India and China, September–November 1959: White Paper No. II (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, [1959]).
2. See Document 367.