367. Editorial Note
At the 400th meeting of the National Security Council on March 26, 1959, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed developments in Tibet during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion of that date by S. Everett Gleason reads as follows:
“The Director of Central Intelligence said that he would report first on the situation in Tibet as it had developed up to this hour. Beginning on March 10 at Lhasa there had occurred a series of events which led to the flight from Lhasa of the Dalai Lama whom the Chinese Communists were about to kidnap and carry off to Peiping. When the people of Lhasa became aware of these plans, thousands of Tibetans flocked to the city and took the Dalai Lama into protective custody. Disorders followed in Lhasa. A Chinese Communist strongpoint was captured. The Lama supported the rebel activity. Peiping at first tried a policy of leniency but subsequently was obliged to take strong measures. The rebels had abandoned Lhasa on March 24.
“While these events do not constitute any real threat to Peiping’s control of the main towns of Tibet, the Chinese Communists will certainly be obliged to face guerrilla operations by rebellious Tibetans. The situation will also be awkward because the Chinese Communists wish to avoid drastic action in Tibet lest such action offend India.
“Mr. Dulles followed these remarks by citing statistics on Chinese Communist military strength in Tibet together with statistics of the population of Tibet proper and of Tibetans living in areas bordering on Tibet.
“Thereafter Mr. Dulles pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek was much encouraged by the uprising in Tibet and had been extremely anxious to do something to encourage its continuation. To this end he had issued a pronunciamento today which went pretty far. On the other hand, Chiang does not have much influence in Tibet because in the past he himself has consistently opposed independence for Tibet. Prime Minister Nehru was very worried about these developments. He fears frontier clashes if the Tibetan rebels attempt to flee into India. While he has publicly declared a hands off policy for India, he has let it be known privately that he will give religious asylum to the Dalai Lama. Publicly he has declared that India will not admit fleeing Tibetan rebels to cross over into India. We have every reason to hope that the Dalai Lama will get out of Tibet fairly soon.
“[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]”
[Page 752]A further exchange relating to Tibet between Dulles and United States Information Agency Director George V. Allen is recorded in Gleason’s memorandum as follows:
“At the close of Mr. Dulles’s briefing, Mr. George Allen asked the President’s permission to comment on the subject of the U.S. public position with respect to the revolt in Tibet. Mr. Allen stated that the Tibetan revolt was not so much anti-Communist in character as it was anti-Chinese. The Tibetans would probably dislike the Chinese Nationalist Government as much as they disliked the government at Peiping. Accordingly, he felt that we should try to tone down Chiang Kai-shek. He said he hoped of course that the Tibetan revolt against the Chinese Communist domination would be successful [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
The text of Chiang Kai-shek’s March 26 message to the Tibetans is in telegram 1041 from Taipei, March 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/3–2659) The text of a statement issued on March 26 by Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, page 1162.
For accounts by the Dalai Lama of his flight from Tibet and its background, see Freedom in Exile: The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1990), pages 123–143, as well as My Land and My People (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962), pages 155–216.