363. Editorial Note
At the 469th meeting of the National Security Council, December 8, 1960, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed Sino-Soviet relations during his briefing on significant world developments, and a brief discussion followed. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by Marion W. Boggs, December 8, reads as follows:
“Mr. Dulles said the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders had adjourned after three weeks of wrangling. Eighty-one Communist Parties had been represented at the conference. Six Communist Parties had not been represented. Mr. Dulles did not know which Communist Parties were missing. The conference had issued a manifesto which re-affirmed the positions on which Moscow and Peiping have been able to agree. The manifesto contained an attack on imperialism, alliances, the U.S., Adenauer, and the ‘imperialist-colonialist world’. The manifesto also contained a mixture of the positions on which the Chinese Communists and the Soviets have not been able to agree, a mixture not a reconciliation of these positions. CIA experts have isolated seventeen issues dividing Communist China and the USSR. The manifesto indicates that the Soviets won six rounds, the Chinese Communists won four rounds, and seven rounds ended in a draw. On the question of war and peace the manifesto leans to the Soviet side. On the question of emphasizing imperialist preparations for war and on the idea that the Socialist camp is so strong that it can deter or win a general war, the manifesto leans to the Chinese side. On support for local wars, the manifesto is evasive. On peaceful co-existence and economic competition, the manifesto leans toward the Soviets; but on the harsh nature of the peaceful struggle, it leans toward the Chinese. The manifesto is ambiguous on the question of discipline in the world Communist movement but it leans toward Peiping in a statement that Moscow is the vanguard of the world Communist movement rather than the ultimate authority. Certain sensitive matters such as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians from Communist China are not discussed at all in the manifesto. Mr. Dulles thought that the compromise arrived at in the manifesto had required long hours of struggle. The chief Chinese Communist delegate to the conference was said to have made a four hour speech attacking Khrushchev personally. Khrushchev was alleged to have lost his temper twice. In Mr. Dulles’ view, the manifesto settled nothing; the document can be cited by both parties to substantiate the ideological views they have previously held. The Chinese Communist and Soviet newspapers started interpreting the manifesto differently almost as soon as it was issued. Mr. Dulles pointed out that it was possible a secret agreement had been reached between the USSR and Communist China at this conference. Assessing the effects of the conference on the West, Mr. Dulles estimated that the anti-Western [Page 743] tone of the manifesto may reduce Khrushchev’s freedom of maneuver toward the West and make it difficult for him to pursue his pre-summit 1960 tactics. The manifesto commits the USSR to maintain an aggressive line against the West. Mr. Dulles believed that Khrushchev now intends to return to the tactic of negotiation with the West while vigorously pursuing an anti-colonialism campaign. Mr. Dulles thought consideration should be given to ways in which the manifesto might be exploited.
“Secretary Herter said a telegram from Ambassador Thompson in Moscow had suggested that the U.S. should characterize the manifesto as a redeclaration of the cold war and a charter for the Communization of the world. The telegram also pointed out that the manifesto also contains a large number of blatant lies which might be exploited, e.g., the lie that the West never grants freedom to a colony. Ambassador Thompson also believed that we should endeavor to put the Soviets on the defensive by drawing attention to the inconsistencies in the manifesto and by pointing out the concessions the Soviets were compelled to make to the Chinese Communists. Secretary Dillon wished to point out one of the concessions of the manifesto in the economic field. In one place the document declares that automation is the means by which the Western capitalists are endeavoring to enslave the worker. A few pages later the document declares that the Socialist countries must promote the maximum automation. Mr. Dulles felt that pure Communism would require a great deal of automation. Concluding the discussion of this subject, Mr. Dulles noted that Ambassador Thompson was having a talk with Mikoyan to ask him whether the manifesto stated the policy of the USSR or merely the policy of the Communist Parties of the world.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)
An analysis of the Moscow Statement prepared in the Department of State, sent to the President with a covering memorandum, December 9, from Secretary Herter, is ibid., Dulles–Herter Series; see Supplement.