Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

361. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Ambassador to the Republic of China (Drumright)⁰

Washington, December 2, 1960.

Dear Drum: We have been giving much serious thought to your long and thoughtful telegram no. 201.¹

Subsequent reporting by the Embassy and [less then 1 line of source text not declassified] has supported your judgment regarding the attitude of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT toward the development of any genuine opposition movement. In this connection, we have found discouraging Ching-kuo’s remarks to [less then 1 line of source text not declassified] relating to the necessity to “stop Lei Chen”² from working with Taiwanese politicians, that some of the GRC’s difficulties on the mainland were attributable to misguided application of American methods and resulting popular misunderstanding of the government’s policies.

We share your view that we should not pursue “liberalization” at the expense of security and stability in Taiwan. However, we are concerned that these objectives may actually be jeopardized unless steps are taken in good time to prevent an explosion such as took place in Korea. We wonder whether a considerably freer political atmosphere and a stable, militarily secure Taiwan are not in the long run compatible objectives.

We have in the past taken the long view of Taiwanese-mainlander relations and hoped that gradually increasing representation of the Taiwanese in the government, and the effects of time, were acting to blur Taiwanese-mainlander differences and ease the causes of political tension. We agree with you that there has been considerable over-all improvement since the low point of 1947. In recent months, however, we have had reason to question whether the underlying forces at work in Taiwan and in the world outside will permit a gradual, evolutionary resolution of the problem, and whether GRC policies relating thereto are moving in the right direction at the right pace. The Department has received indications recently of continuing and even intensified anti-mainlander feeling. Ed Martin’s recent discussions with American missionaries familiar with Taiwanese attitudes have revealed deep pessimism among them as to the future. Some of them reported a rising tide of Taiwanese resentment against the GRC and foresaw serious trouble unless steps were taken to satisfy Taiwanese aspirations. Discussions that Department officers have had with [less then 1 line of source text not declassified] indicated considerable doubt on his part that the KMT will remain able to control the situation in the future as it does now. The burgeoning independence movement among Taiwanese students in the Unites States is an additional source of concern to us and to the Chinese Embassy.

To these domestic considerations must now be added the damaging impact of international developments on the position of the GRC, the major one of which is the erosion of support for the GRC in the United Nations. To the extent that these developments have the effect of increasing world sentiment and pressures for a “two Chinas” settlement, they can be expected to encourage the Taiwanese to press for fulfillment of their political aspirations and thus to affect the stability of the GRC. I might note also that GRC handling of the Lei Chen case has seriously damaged its reputation among some of the most important people in the Congress and among some of the staunchest supporters of the GRC in the United States.

We agree that the Taiwanese are inexperienced in government, and that many of the Taiwanese now in politics are self-seeking, disputatious and possibly corrupt. It seems to me that this argues for a broadening of the base of Taiwanese participation in government. If we want a smooth evolution toward stable democracy in Taiwan, more must be done to build up a Taiwanese stake in the government and to give them responsibility and experience. In this connection we have often cited statements by GRC officials that more than half of the executive-level positions in the Provincial Government are now held by Taiwanese. A study of the latest GRC Statistical Abstract and of the “Taiwan Tung Lan”, however, throws doubt on the accuracy of these claims. According to these sources, 58% of the Provincial Government employees are mainlanders, and only 42% are Taiwanese. Of 39 Department Directors and Deputies, 31 are mainlanders. Of 34 Commission Chairmen and Deputies, 28 are mainlanders. Of 155 Bureau Chiefs and Deputies, 112 are mainlanders. Of 323 local Government officials of the rank of Section Chief and above, 254 are mainlanders.

We certainly would not want to open the gates to “untrammelled” political activity that might lead to chaos and disaster. What we seek is measured and steady progress toward representative, democratic government in Taiwan. We endorse your view that the situation is substantially different from that which prevailed in Korea in the period preceding Rhee’s downfall, but we must be continuously conscious of those elements in the situation (chief of them being the continued suppression of Taiwanese political aspirations) which could lead to another Korea-type explosion.

In view of the considerations set forth in your telegram, we concur in the view that we should not at this time again present our explanation and analysis of developments in Korea to GRC officials, but rather leave such action to your discretion should the Chinese again raise the subject. However, we would appreciate your further views and comments on the various aspects of the longer-term problem which are discussed in this letter. Your suggestions as to ways in which we might appropriately and feasibly act to guide the GRC along a more forward-looking and hopeful course than that it now seems embarked on would be particularly welcome.

Sincerely yours,

J. Graham Parsons³

0. Source: Department of State, CA Files: Lot 67 D 579, 1960—Chinese Nationalist Internal Affairs. Top Secret; Official–Informal. Drafted by Arthur H. Rosen of the Office of Chinese Affairs.
1. Document 354.
2. Lei was tried by a military court, convicted of sedition, and sentenced on October 9 to 10 years’ imprisonment. Merchant expressed U.S. concern with the case in a meeting with Yeh on November 28; a record of the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 993.62/11–2860; see Supplement. Records of similar conversations between Parsons and Steeves and Yeh on September 13 and October 24 are in Department of State, Central Files, 993.62/9–1360 and 993.62/10–2460.
3. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.