Office of the Historian

36. Memorandum From the Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons)0

Washington, August 18, 1958.

SUBJECT

  • Questions re Defense of Quemoy and Matsu

You will recall that before last Friday’s special State–JCS meeting on the Taiwan Straits,1 Gerry Smith had submitted five questions to the Joint Chiefs for answer. These questions are attached.2 The Chiefs’ answer to the first question3 was “yes, but difficult”; to the second,4 “no.” They refused [Page 60] to answer the remaining three.5 I understand from a friend in the Pentagon that their refusal to answer was not based on secrecy or orneriness but simply due to the fact that the JCS has not yet agreed upon plans to meet the points and contingencies we had projected.

In addition to the attached questions which Gerry, Bert Mathews and I had worked up, I consider it important that we get answers to the following questions:

1.
What is the pattern of Chicom shelling of Quemoy and little Quemoy? Do the Chicoms have the capability of cratering the airfield or shelling port installations? If so, why has this capability not been implemented?
2.
Do we have any plans to take over the air defense of Taiwan and Penghus so as to release GRC aircraft for other missions? How effective would this be in expanding GRC capabilities to withstand a Chicom interdictory campaign?
3.
U.S. air or sea escort of GRC resupply operations might be effective in warning the Chicoms against further interdiction. How might such an escort operation be implemented so as to involve us in a minimum way yet produce the desired psychological impact?
4.
What are the relative capabilities of our latest TAC aircraft in comparison to MIG 15’s and 17’s. Could we achieve anything like the superiority we enjoyed in Korea?
5.
To what extent do the Chicoms depend upon their Amoy area fields? If they were to be knocked out, would Chicom capabilities to control the skies above Quemoy and Matsu be seriously reduced? Could these fields be knocked out effectively with conventional bombs?
6.
How many military warning stages could we expect to have between now and, if each warning failed in its effect, a selective nuclear bombardment of Chicom airfields?

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/8–1858. Top Secret. Drafted by Green.↩
  2. See Document 35.↩
  3. See Supplement.↩
  4. “Can we keep open, without using nuclear weapons, supply lines to Quemoy and Matsu in the face of a local ChiCom blockade? In general, what methods would be available?”↩
  5. “Can we defend the Offshore Islands with conventional weapons, assuming the Chinese Communists’ intent is limited to taking the islands?”↩
  6. The remaining three questions asked, if the answer to question 2 was “no,” for information concerning the type of targets, range of weapon yields, and the number of civilian casualties which might be expected under three contingencies: if Communist action was restricted to the vicinity of Quemoy and Matsu, if it included conventional air strikes against the Seventh Fleet, Taiwan, and other base areas, and if it included nuclear strikes.↩