348. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research0
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Although the Chinese Communists, with several notable exceptions, have dropped their public attacks against Soviet policies and pronouncements since the June Bucharest conference, there are indications that the rift between the two major bloc powers is widening rather than narrowing.
Since August 12 a series of reports from newsmen and diplomatic missions in Peiping have noted what appears to be an unusual exodus of Soviet technicians from Communist China in recent weeks. For example, a news agency has reported that sources close to the Soviet Embassy in Peiping have admitted that more experts are leaving now than in recent years. The Indian Ambassador to Peiping has said that “several hundred” are leaving, adding that the Chinese explain the departures on the grounds that Chinese progress makes the presence of these experts no longer necessary. There are also several intelligence reports that Soviet Presidium member Suslov, at a recent Party meeting in Moscow, said that in view of the state of Sino-Soviet relations, further Soviet aid may no longer be justified, although existing commitments should be honored.
It is estimated that there are 2–3,000 Soviet technicians in Communist China. Their withdrawal would be a serious but not crippling blow to the Chinese economic effort. More important, if the Soviets are attempting to exert this sort of pressure on Peiping to force it to retreat in its controversy with Moscow, Sino-Soviet relations could reach an almost complete impasse. At present, however, there is no firm evidence that such withdrawals as may be occurring are related to the general Sino-Soviet dispute.
A whole series of intelligence reports has described the bitterness between the Soviets and Chinese at the Bucharest conference, in which, according to one account, Khrushchev directly criticized Mao Tse-tung and was himself directly attacked by the chief Chinese delegate at the meeting. The Soviets distributed a long document attacking Peiping,1 and the Chinese delegation retorted sharply. A committee was apparently established to prepare for another conference late in 1960—perhaps [Page 714] on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution—at which time the whole question is to be reviewed again. Moscow has begun rallying support for its position already and is believed to have circularized a letter within the CPSU along the lines of the document it used at Bucharest. Several non-bloc communist parties have been holding discussion meetings to refute and criticize the Chinese Communist position. Within the bloc, at least the Bulgarian Party has also apparently started such discussions. The joint vacations of Khrushchev and the Party first secretaries of Hungary, Poland, East Germany, and possibly Rumania in the Crimea for the last few weeks, and the unexplained mid-August appearance in the Soviet Union of North Vietnam leader Ho Chi Minh, may be connected with preparations for a forthcoming Sino-Soviet showdown. Khrushchev publicly announced that he will visit North Korea early in October. (There are unconfirmed reports that he may also go to North Vietnam.) This visit could be to safeguard Soviet interests and to hold a meeting with Mao on “neutral” territory.
Moscow has sharply stepped up its press and radio attacks on Peiping, leveling a number of harsh editorial blows, all indirect but obviously aimed against Peiping’s interpretation of international trends and its disruption of bloc unity. Several Soviet articles have strongly reaffirmed the obligatory nature of the Soviet system as a model for other bloc states, a view which Peiping has categorically rejected. Moscow has also commenced broadcasts in Mandarin, beamed to mainland China, of commentaries on the ideological issues in dispute. At the same time, Moscow Radio’s home service since early July has maintained an unprecedented silence on developments in the CPR.
During August Peiping leaders, beginning with Chou En-lai’s resurrection of a proposal for an atom-free zone in Asia and a collective peace pact in the Asian-Pacific area, including the U.S., have given increasing emphasis to “peaceful coexistence” and Sino-Soviet solidarity. This public stance suggests that Peiping is attempting to give an impression of greater moderation both to the outside world and within the bloc in order to strengthen its defense against Moscow’s charges that it has been “warmongering” and disrupting the solidarity of the communist movement.
As a corollary, Peiping’s press and radio have given extensive coverage to alleged instances of U.S. “war preparations” and attempts to suppress nationalist movements. However, Peiping’s handling of news stories, its commentaries on current events and at least two important magazine and newspaper articles suggest that its views on international affairs and its appraisal of Soviet policy remain essentially unchanged. A People’s Daily editorial of August 13 attributed to “modern revisionists . . . who parrot the U.S. imperialists”2 the same charges made by [Page 715] the Soviets and observed that “the Chinese people hold all these blasphemous words in contempt.” A major article by Politburo member Li Fuch’un in Red Flag, August 15, decried the attacks by “imperialists, revisionists, and those who echo them” on Peiping’s domestic programs since 1958 and reaffirmed Peiping’s intention to adhere to these programs.
Further concrete manifestations of the continuing cooling of Sino-Soviet relations are: (1) Chinese Communist failure to participate in the International Orientalist Congress recently held in Moscow, although a large delegation had been expected; (2) suspension in late June of distribution within the USSR of the Russian-language weekly organ of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Society published by Peiping; and (3) the reported refusal of TASS to handle New China News Agency releases in India after the latter’s representative had been expelled by India.
In summary, Sino-Soviet relations appear to resemble in important respects the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations before their break in 1948. Even if Peiping backs down somewhat (Moscow shows every intention of maintaining its stand), fundamental differences will remain and future relations between the two will be colored by considerable suspicion and bitterness.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/8–2660. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Sent to Herter with a covering memorandum of the same date from Acting Director of Intelligence and Research Allan Evans.↩
- See Tab A. [Footnote in the source text. Tab A is not attached.]↩
- Ellipsis in the source text.↩