324. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0
3399. From Parsons. Toward close of call with Barbour on SELWYN LLOYD 7th (Embtel 3398)1 I took occasion to say that I had not given rationale our China policy at length during talks with FonOff officials because this had been done in detail with Rob Scott in Washington in Nov 1958.2 However, I did not want any reticence on this aspect of subject to be interpreted as a sign of change or weakening in our position. Secondly, I did not wish to leave London without querying British as to whether there were any differences between us or new factors in China equation which should be ventilated. Thirdly, I wished express appreciation to Lloyd for past support on moratorium procedure in UN and to [Page 647] express hope for its continuance with particular emphasis on key political considerations rather than technicalities and legalisms. Lloyd asked us come back in afternoon to discuss subject. This afternoon Lloyd said there were no new problems or new differences on China between us. He said US carried main responsibility to contain Communist China, that he appreciated what large responsibility this was and what tremendous burden it caused us. He said he wished to do nothing which would add to this burden.
In course of afternoon discussion Lloyd asked me point blank, “What is US China policy?” And I outlined in equally pointed terms our recognition GRC as legitimate Govt of China and our non-recognition of ChiComs. I stressed effects of any US change of policy on whole area. Lloyd asked about our long-term China policy and I said it was no different from what I had just described. This seemed to surprise him somewhat. At close of discussion he described British policy as continuing along present lines for indefinable period in hope that in course of time something would happen to improve situation.
Lloyd said there was UN corollary to US China policy and he questioned how much longer US thought moratorium procedure would be successful. He mentioned emergence of African states and probability that in time their influence in UN might turn balance. I observed that as long as UK and other US friends would assist us in upholding moratorium, we believed we might be successful. (I had previously in FonOff meeting urged early cooperative discussion of how to bring about favorable voting situation as regards African states.)3 Lloyd asked, if moratorium failed, whether ensuing vote would not be on straight majority basis, in which case ChiCom admission could be prevented (sic). Barbour and I were both of opinion that if moratorium could not be upheld, such vote immaterial as fight would be lost. Lloyd thereupon commented “You must continue to threaten to walk out.” Making reference to congressional opinion, Barbour and I again joined voices to impress on Lloyd (and Dalton4 and MacDermot5 who were present) seriousness of this issue in US view. Lloyd seemed impressed by our comments and remarked with wry humour that introduction of ChiComs into UN might at least be one grizzly way to wind up UN which he called a “sausage factory.”
In theory, Lloyd said he looked upon UN as universal organ and it was “a nonsense to exclude from it govt which had control of 650 million [Page 648] people.” But [garble] he said he recognized practical considerations involved and as long as ChiComs continued in alienating world opinion, continuation of UN without them did not cause him any great concern.
With reference to UK assistance in excluding ChiComs from UN specialized agencies, Barbour and I stressed that UK support of our position in specialized agencies would serve to prevent erosion at UN. We told Lloyd that UK support based on overriding political considerations rather than narrow legalisms was in best interest of both countries. Lloyd remarked that UK, insofar as it could, examined these issues with broad considerations in mind.
General tenor of conversation indicated no disposition to make life more difficult for us on China or related UN problem. On contrary he seemed to me to understand situation well and to appreciate importance US–UK collaboration wherever possible.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–860. Secret; Priority. Parsons visited London for talks with Foreign Office officials January 5–7. A memorandum by Embassy officer R.J. Ballantyne of the conversation summarized in this telegram is ibid., 611.93/1–760; see Supplement.↩
- Dated January 8, telegram 3398 from London pertained to Laos. (Department of State, Central Files, 379/1–860; printed in vol. XVI, pp. 175–176.)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 240.↩
- In a meeting on January 7 at 3 p.m., described in a memorandum of conversation by Ballantyne. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/1–760)↩
- Peter Dalton, Head, Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.↩
- D.F. MacDermot, Assistant Under Secretary for Far Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.↩