Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

314. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State⁰

Washington, undated.

CHANGES IN PATROL PATTERN IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

On September 14, 1959 was Seventh fleet was authorized, without prior consultation with the Department of State, to resume the patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait which had been in existence prior to the crisis of the fall of 1958.¹ At that time ships and planes had been required to stay further offshore in order to avoid possible incidents and the risk of accidentally triggering hostilities involving U.S. forces.

The Department of State points out that changes in the established patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait in an inshore direction could, if they became known, easily be regarded by friendly nations as unnecessarily “provocative.” Free World support for our policies in the Far East stems in part from confidence that the United States, as a peace-loving nation, will adhere strictly to a posture of restraint vis-à-vis the Chinese Communists and eschew unnecessary actions that could lead to, or give a plausible pretext for, Communist counteraction. Careful consideration must therefore be given to such changes and their timing, if possible embarrassment to our foreign policy is to be averted.

There is no need to alter the patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait merely for the purpose of establishing that the United States does not recognize the Chinese Communist regime’s claim that its territorial waters extend 12 miles from a base line connecting all the offshore islands along the coast of mainland China. The United States has informed the Chinese Communist representative in the Warsaw talks of its rejection of this claim and the spokesman of the Department of State has made this position public. Furthermore, even under the patrol pattern that was observed during the crisis, United States ships and planes did not remain entirely outside Communist claimed waters. The Chinese Communists themselves do not consider that we accept their claim; and since September 1958 they have accused the United States of “intruding” into their claimed waters or airspace in the Taiwan Strait area over 60 times.

The Department of State wishes to make clear that it recognizes that changes in the patrol pattern in the Taiwan Strait may be necessary and desirable. However, it considers that such changes should be made only to meet actual military needs and only after the possible non-military consequences have been taken into account. It is therefore requested that in the future, the Department of Defense inform the Department of State of any contemplated change in the Taiwan Strait patrol pattern in an inshore direction sufficiently in advance that its political implications may be fully assessed and given due weight in the final decision.

0. Source: Department of State, FE Files: Lot 61 D 6, Burke, Adm. Arleigh A. Confidential. Drafted by Bennett and Kahmann and cleared by Steeves and Parsons and with the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Special Functional Problems. Enclosed with a November 13 letter from Secretary Herter to Admiral Burke.
1. A memorandum of October 16 from Parsons to Murphy stated that he had learned that day of the Seventh Fleet’s reversion to the pre-crisis patrolling pattern, under which ships were authorized to approach Chinese Communist territory as close as 10 miles and Nationalist-held islands as close as 3 miles. (Ibid., ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1959) A memorandum of October 28 from Steeves to Parsons reported that the Navy’s primary concern was that observance of the 12-mile limit would be interpreted as de facto recognition of that line. (Ibid., Central Files, 794A.5/10–2859) Both documents are in the Supplement.