Office of the Historian

305. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0

Taipei, October 2, 1959, 6 p.m.

330. (Copy this telegram handed CINCPAC.) Yesterday Secretary McElroy1 had an hour’s conversation with President Chiang at which Defense Minister Yu, General White, General Doan and I were present. Admiral Smoot was at airport meeting Admiral Felt.2

Partly in response to McElroy’s questions and partly on own initiative Chiang expressed following views:

1.
ChiCom actions except in minor matters dictated by Soviet Russia. Possibly ChiComs had gone further against India than Soviets desired, but ChiComs would not press India further now. Joint Soviet-ChiCom aim is to continue instability in Southeast Asia. Free world should have no illusions as to peaceful intentions of Soviets or ChiComs. Laos, then Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam are early objectives.
2.
Khrushchev’s efforts to pose peaceful posture (disarmament, trade, cultural exchange, et cetera) are temporary diversionary tactics. They constitute no change in Russia’s aim to dominate world. Present tactics have been used before.
3.
Communists will continue probes to develop weak spots in free world defenses. Probes will be in Asia and spearheaded by ChiComs at instance of Russia. Probes will not be military in nature, but will make use of indirect methods and indigenous elements. Laos is current example. Unless free world maintains firm line Communists will continue advances.
4.
Basically, present free world policy has effect of slowing down but not eradicating Communist disease. Inflamed appendix of free world is in Southeast Asia, but ChiComs have larger one in mainland China. Need is to bring about “explosion” on mainland. With US assistance this can be accomplished without using troops to invade mainland. [Page 604] But US Government apparently gives this possibility no consideration, has no plans to make use of “visible forces” on mainland. Thus it left to GRC to take small, limited steps to bring about explosion on mainland. Earnestly hope GRC and US can reach understanding whereby GRC can assume more active and prominent role to bring about upheaval on mainland. If revolution is to succeed, revolutionary efforts must be created, risks taken. Cannot sit back and expect revolution on mainland to come of itself. Already US and GRC failed to cooperate in Tibetan uprising with grievous losses. Other opportunities will present themselves. There is urgent need for full US–GRC consultation, understanding, cooperation. US Government spends much money wastefully attempting put out fires on periphery of mainland China. Urgent need is to work with and through GRC to deal with source of trouble—Communist China. US could help from “outside” and GRC from “inside”.

Comment: Chiang was not specific about program he has in mind and there was inadequate time to probe deeply, but appears he envisages a broad-based, intensive infiltration, psychological warfare program directed to mainland. When reminded of existence of such program, Chiang dismissed it as minor “intelligence” effort and wholly inadequate for purposes he has in mind.

Secretary McElroy was generally noncommittal.

Full account of conversation with comment will follow by despatch.3

Drumright
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–259. Top Secret; Limit Distribution.↩
  2. Secretary McElroy visited Taiwan September 30–October 3.↩
  3. Telegram 331 from Taipei, October 2, reported that in a conversation with Felt later that morning, Chiang made a plea for special consideration in respect to military assistance, stressing the Nationalists’ need to maintain qualitative superiority over the Communist air force. (Ibid., 793.5–MSP/10–259; see Supplement)↩
  4. Sent as an enclosure to despatch 184 from Taipei, October 5. [text not declassified] (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–559)↩