289. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State 0

66. During past few weeks Admiral Smoot, General Dean and I have discussed growing restiveness on part of President, Foreign Minister, [Page 573] and high military authorities over checks imposed by US on aerial reconnaissance. As I reported in several recent telegrams, Khrushchev’s alleged remarks to Harriman appear to have given impetus to desire to resume CAF reconnaissance. Problem approached climax yesterday when Minister Yu informed Admiral Smoot it may be necessary any time for CAF to initiate aerial reconnaissance covered by fighter escort, with or without US concurrence. Yu also told Admiral US has moral obligation to permit GRC to procure information re reported rocket sites on mainland or get such information for GRC. Problem reached climax this morning when CAF acting A-3 informed General Dean MND had just directed CAF to photograph gun positions on mainland coast opposite Kinmen and airfields in immediate vicinity.

Admiral Smoot, General Dean, General Doan and I discussed this development today, following which it was agreed that Admiral Smoot would see Minister Yu immediately, protest order, and ask its withdrawal, while I would Lodge similar protest with Foreign Minister. Admiral Smoot saw Defense Minister about 3 p.m. and obtained assurance from him that order had been rescinded. I called on Foreign Minister at 5:30, recounted developments, pointed out dangers of provoked reconnaissance, including adverse repercussions to GRC interests throughout world, and urged patience pending further consideration of reconnaissance problem. Minister appeared surprised to learn categorical order had been issued by Defense Minister. He said he could assure me GRC would not carry out provocative actions.

Comment: In full discussion of this problem at yesterday’s country team meeting, consensus was that if authority could be given to use high performance reconnaissance craft already available or soon to be available on Taiwan in selected unescorted reconnaissance, then GRC pressure to carry out escorted reconnaissance would be dissipated. A recommendation to this effect is going forward through military channels with which I concur.

There have been suggestions that GRC’s real objective in pressing for aerial reconnaissance with escorts is to send flights over mainland that will provoke air clashes. However, I believe Chinese are genuinely concerned to obtain current intelligence in areas opposite Taiwan and have resorted to actions reported above to test US position on aerial reconnaissance. Best way to deal with problem is to maintain strong line [Page 574] against provocative escorted flights but to permit unescorted flights in hope this will supply GRC and our own requirements.1

Drumright
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/7–2359. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.
  2. Telegram 64 to Taipei, July 24, stated that the Department agreed with the country team consensus set forth in the penultimate paragraph and instructed Drumright to maintain a “strong line against escorted flights.” (Ibid.; see Supplement) A letter of August 10 from Martin to Drumright stated that a Department of Defense message had been sent to Smoot providing that a number of high-performance RF 101 reconnaissance planes should be turned over to the Nationalists for reconnaissance flights over coastal areas. The flights should be unescorted, undertaken only for strictly intelligence purposes, and only to the extent dictated by military necessity. (Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Military Action Against Mainland; see Supplement)