Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

287. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State⁰

Taipei, July 13, 1959, 2 p.m.

34. Following highlights one hour conversation with Foreign Minister Huang July 11.

1. I said we had received inquiries from Washington re CAF– ChiCom air battle of July 5.¹ Indicating US concern, I urged care be exercised to avoid provocation or appearance of aggressiveness. Minister said he had received query from Ambassador Yeh and had discussed matter with competent military authorities. He had been assured flight was non-provocative, CAF planes had not flown over Communist-held territory and CAF pilots had engaged to defend themselves. Minister said Gimo and Vice President insist that great care be exercised to avoid provocation.

2. Huang stressed “Tiger” Wang’s removal was in way related to GRC attitude toward US; it signified no change whatever in GRC relations with US. He said Wang’s downfall derived mainly from arrogance and poor personal relations with colleagues and indiscretions. Minister inferred Wang had habitually by-passed Defense Minister Yu who would be “more active” with Peng Meng-chi as Chief General Staff. Minister said he could assure me Peng would be just as cooperative with US military authorities as Wang. Minister expressed belief Yu Ta-wei would continue as Defense Minister and Chou Chih-jou as Governor.

3. Like Gimo (Embtel 32),² Minister expressed serious misgivings about Khrushchev’s reported remarks to Harriman re alleged Soviet grant of rockets to ChiComs and Soviet willingness to support Communist attack on Taiwan. He believed we had to assume there would be another attack anytime. He said he had instructed Ambassador Yeh to discuss Khrushchev’s statements with Department. Minister said while hard intelligence is lacking, he believed Soviets would logically have to supply ChiComs with rockets and nuclear weapons to cope with US nuclear capability in Pacific and missile installations (Nike Hercules and Matador) established on Taiwan. In any case he quoted an old Chinese proverb that “it is better to believe they exist (i.e., missiles on mainland) than to believe they do not exist”. Asserting GRC authorities are concerned re Taiwan vulnerability to nuclear weapons, Minister said he would be glad to know what plans US had in event it developed Soviets had provided ChiComs with nuclear weapons. I said we had no information Soviets had so equipped ChiComs. I thought it possible Soviets may have given ChiComs some small, conventional rockets, but I doubted whether Soviets would entrust ChiComs with unconventional weapons.³ Without going into details, I said US is continuing modernization of GRC forces—especially CAF—but I had no knowledge of any plans to provide GRC with nuclear-delivery capability. I added if Communists attacked with unconventional weapons, we would probably have to rely on Seventh Fleet and SAC for retaliation.

4. Minister expressed deep concern over Senate action in cutting military funds to GRC and other East Asian powers and said he had instructed Ambassador Yeh to voice concern to Department (Deptel 28).⁴ I took much same position as Parsons in his talk with Yeh and urged GRC to abate concern and further action pending outcome of Senate–House conference on appropriation authorization.

Drumright

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–1359. Secret. Repeated to CINCPAC.
1. Telegram 14 to Taipei, July 7, requested the Embassy’s comments as to whether a July 5 encounter between Chinese Communist MIGs and GRC F–86s, in which five MIGs were destroyed, reflected a more aggressive GRC posture. (Ibid., 793.00/7–759; see Supplement) The Embassy replied in telegram 22 from Taipei, July 8, that it did not reflect a deliberately provocative gesture but might reflect “GRC restiveness re aerial reconnaissance restrictions and desire to expand reconnaissance to pattern observed in pre-Strait crisis period.” (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–859; see Supplement)
2. Telegram 32 from Taipei, July 10, reported a conversation with Chiang Kai-shek concerning news reports of Harriman’s June 23 conversation with Khrushchev (see Document 285). (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/7–1059; see Supplement)
3. Telegram 37 to Taipei, July 16, summarized Khrushchev’s remarks to Harriman on this subject and commented: “We have no evidence to prove or disprove statement concerning placement of rockets within range of Taiwan and continue doubt that USSR has placed nuclear warheads at Peiping’s disposal.” (Department of State, Central Files, 661.93/7–1059; see Supplement) The Embassy reported in telegram 53 from Taipei, July 18, that it had conveyed the substance of telegram 37 to Huang. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/7–1859)
4. Telegram 28 to Taipei, July 10, summarized a conversation that day between Yeh and Parsons on this subject. (Ibid., 793.5–MSP/7–1059)