Office of the Historian

225. Memorandum by Secretary of State Dulles0

Washington, October 29, 1958.
1.
I emphasized to the Gimo that free world public opinion was running against him because it was feared that he was, in fact, bound to policies which would invite hostilities which in turn would probably involve the United States and thus the whole world. I emphasized that if he wished to maintain the loyal support of friendly non-Communist governments, he owed it to them to clarify in a public way what his real policy was and that it did not involve reliance on offensive or provocative force.
2.
It was not easy for the Gimo to do this. His Government and Army are largely dominated by “Mainlanders” and they and many of the overseas Chinese do not like anything which seems in any degree to diminish the chances of getting back to the Mainland. Quite possibly some of them, at a low level, do, in fact, look forward to a war in which the United States would be involved. Many Koreans feel that way. Nevertheless the Gimo and other top officials recognized the validity of our presentation and made the self-denying declaration. It has attracted some public criticism already on Taiwan.
3.

The clinching arguments were the arguments which I made, based upon the other three countries divided by Communism. In Korea and Vietnam there are armistices which, although never signed by the Governments of the Republic of Korea or Vietnam, nevertheless are acquiesced in by these Governments. Then there is the declaration which Chancellor Adenauer made at London on October 3, 1954, that “the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany”.

This does not involve a “two China” policy any more than there are “two Korea”, “two Vietnam” or “two Germany” policies. In each of these cases we and most of the free world recognize the free governments as the only lawful governments and we do not deal with the other regimes except on a limited de facto basis.

4.
We do not accept the present Communist regime in China as permanent. How quickly it will change, I do not know. But that it will change, I do not doubt. The present reports about what the Communists are doing there are shocking. They seem to be turning the entire population into slaves under the most barbaric system, completely disrupting the family life and denying all personal possessions. That cannot, I think, but bring about powerful opposition.
5.
I was impressed by the caliber of the men in the Chinese Nationalist Government in addition to Chiang. It is by no means a one-man affair. The Vice President and others whom I met are men of real ability and character and they were fully consulted by President Chiang during the course of our talks there. I am convinced that the Free China Government will not disappear if Chiang should die.
6.
The conditions on Taiwan are good and the people enjoy the highest standard of living of any country of Asia except Japan. The Taiwanese have never been so well off. They have a large amount of local self-government and, according to reports, are on the whole quite contented.
7.
The Chinese Communist policy contrasts sharply with that of the Chinats. They will not reciprocate in a renunciation of force to reunite China their way. They publicly boasted that by resuming the firing, while I was en route to Peiping, they “defeated my plot” to bring about a “permanent cease-fire”. Their shelling of Quemoy for avowedly non-military purposes is mere sadistic terrorism. (See my press conference comment.)1
J.F.D.2
  1. Source: U.S. Mission to the United Nations, USUN Files, Formosa (1949–1962). Secret. A copy is filed with a covering note of October 29 from Dulles to Lodge, which indicates that it was background material for Lodge to use in discussions with Latin American representatives at the United Nations.↩
  2. Of October 28; see footnote 2, Document 223.↩
  3. Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.↩