Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

223. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 29, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Reaction to GRC–United States Joint Communiqué of October 23

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Yeh, Chinese Ambassador
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary, FE
• Mr. Martin, Director, CA

Ambassador Yeh said that the reaction of the overseas Chinese to the joint Communiqué of October 23 had been uniformly bad. He cited the Kung Shang Jih Pao owned by Sir Robert Ho-tung which had carried several editorials attacking the policy set forth in the Communiqué regarding return to the mainland. He said even the Central News (which is Government-owned) gives the impression that this policy is dubious. The Chinese press in New York and San Francisco had also reacted adversely to the Communiqué. The common point of the concern expressed by these newspapers centered on the question of use of force.

Ambassador Yeh said that Foreign Minister S.K. Huang had been requested by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Legislative Yuan to make an appearance (presumably to report on the Dulles–Chiang talks). Huang had asked that his appearance be postponed until after the United States elections on November 4. In a preliminary discussion as to what Huang would say, Ambassador Yeh suggested that he indicate that the GRC had not given up its intention to restore freedom to the mainland but would carry out its intention 70% by political means and 30% by military if and when necessary. If a revolution occurred on the mainland, there was nothing to prevent the GRC’s going back to the mainland to assist, if so requested.

Ambassador Yeh thought that this line might take care of the internal situation. But there was still the problem of overseas Chinese reaction. On the advice of his staff he was thinking of making a trip around the country to talk to overseas Chinese communities. He would assure them that GRC policy remained unchanged in regard to going back to the mainland. The joint Communiqué had simply clarified the stand of the GRC that this objective would be achieved primarily by building up psychological bases on the mainland. It was important to differentiate the GRC from the Communists, who used force to achieve their objectives. Before he decided on such a tour and what line he would take, however, Ambassador Yeh wanted to consult further with S.K. Huang.

Ambassador Yeh pointed out that the GRC relied on the support of its overseas communities more than a Government usually does, and therefore it was disconcerting to have this adverse reaction from these communities. He felt the United States Government would want the GRC to enjoy overseas Chinese support. The question was how to dispel their fears and to raise the GRC’s prestige among them. The overseas Chinese had gotten the impression from the headlines that the GRC would not use force under any circumstances.

Mr. Robertson agreed that newspapers do distort particularly in the use of headlines, and pointed out the example of the distorted headline given by the New York Times to Ambassador Yen’s statement from Taipei about the use of force. Mr. Robertson emphasized that the joint Communiqué had been very favorably received in the United States. The position of the GRC with regard to return to the mainland had in the past been distorted by the press, and this impression had been helped by the Generalissimo’s annual statements about going back to the mainland. Such statements were in sharp contrast to statements by Chancellor Adenauer of Germany that he would not use force for unification. The GRC was losing support in this country especially among Democrats, and there would probably be a Democratic Congress after this election. Some Democratic leaders such as Fulbright were hostile to the GRC. Against this background, the Communiqué had been extremely helpful and reaction to it here has been very fine. It would be dangerous to do anything which would put the GRC back into the old perspective. If Ambassador Yeh were to make statements all over the country tending to deny the reality of the Communiqué, public support for the GRC would suffer badly. It is all very well for the overseas Chinese to say that the GRC should take back the mainland by force, but in the face of the strength of the Chinese Communist army and air force, there was no way in which this could be done by the GRC unless with United States support. The overseas Chinese in other words wanted to commit United States forces to recapture the mainland. The United States, however, was not going to use its forces offensively for such a purpose. We are interested in strengthening United States ties with the GRC. But this can’t be done if the Generalissimo is presented as a warlike figure bent on dragging the United States into a war. No one here thinks that the GRC should renounce the use of force for defensive purposes, or in case of a revolution on the mainland. It should be made clear, however, that the GRC would not initiate offensive action to reunify China. Anything which looks like a repudiation of the joint Communiqué should certainly be avoided, in order not to ruin the favorable effect it has created.

Ambassador Yeh said he had told the Generalissimo that the overseas Chinese would never be satisfied until the GRC gets back to the mainland. He must balance the adverse reaction of overseas Chinese opinion against the favorable reaction of world opinion. Ambassador Yeh mentioned that he had been under attack in Taiwan for the part he had played in persuading the Generalissimo to agree to the policy set forth in the Communiqué. He said that the attack on him wouldn’t matter much if he were still in Taipei, but it would take some time to kill in Washington. Mr. Robertson said that Ambassador Yeh had done a very good job for his country.

Ambassador Yeh said that the GRC must work more closely with the overseas Chinese community. He thought the GRC should invest in some newspapers. They control one paper in Thailand but they should control more. He said he would like to discuss this further sometime. Mr. Robertson replied that we would be glad to talk about it.

Ambassador Yeh said he would also like to talk about the request for increased economic aid which his Government was making as a result of the emergency situation. Mr. Robertson emphasized that the amount of Mutual Security funds already spent because of the emergency was over $200,000,000. This had knocked the worldwide distribution of such funds out of kilter. Ambassador Yeh said he was not talking about military aid funds but economic funds. Mr. Robertson said that there was only so much money appropriated (and this was less than had been requested) and a terrible problem was created by the special demands made upon these funds. Mr. Robertson assured Ambassador Yeh, however, that we would be glad to have his comments on an emergency economic aid program.

Mr. Robertson then raised the question of what Ambassador Yeh should say to the press. He felt it was important that Ambassador Yeh not say anything which could be interpreted as repudiating the joint Communiqué. He suggested that Ambassador Yeh might emphasize that the GRC was not going to take any offensive action against the mainland, although it was not going to give up its right of self-defense or its right to help people on the mainland in case of an uprising.

Ambassador Yeh agreed that care should be given as to what was said on this subject but pointed out that you couldn’t control the headlines. The text of what he had said in Taiwan had been reported accurately, but the headlines had been distorted. He said he was not going to say anything until he and Huang had agreed on a draft. His purpose would be to strengthen the Communiqué and to dispel unfriendly reactions to it. Mr. Robertson said it was terribly important to do this. He said if possible he would like to see a statement before it was made.

Ambassador Yeh said he had some information he would like to pass along. He had read the Chinese Communist newspapers and the three statements by Peng Te-huai. He had come to the conclusion that there was considerable disagreement between the Communist generals before the second cease-fire announcement was issued. He said that GRC agents had reported a telephone conversation between Mao Tse-tung and Peng in which Mao had shouted that the extension of the cease-fire had to be carried out. Peng opposed this decision but Mao shouted at him “you don’t understand, you don’t understand.” This was the origin of the paragraph in Peng’s statement of October 13¹ extending the cease-fire containing the sentences, “we don’t understand! we don’t under stand!”. In Ambassador Yeh’s opinion it was quite evident from the wording of Peng’s statement that it did not come from one person. Peng is alleged to have told Mao that there was considerable opposition among the military to the continuation of the cease-fire. Yeh noted that two Communist regimental commanders in the area had been changed.

Mr. Robertson asked the Ambassador what he thought about the tactics of firing every other day. Yeh replied that it showed that the Communists had no sense of dignity or propriety.

Mr. Robertson said he thought the Communists were losing ground while the GRC had gained ground by the issuance of the joint Communiqué. Ambassador Yeh emphasized that the GRC did not like to have it said that the Communiqué represented a reformulation of GRC policy. He thought the best way to describe the Communiqué was as the Secretary had done in his press conference on October 28,² when he said that the GRC had put its emphasis on political means of recovering the mainland. (The Secretary said “it (Communiqué) was important in putting the emphasis upon winning through peaceful processes rather than through attempts to win by force”.)

Mr. Robertson pointed out that as far as people in this country were concerned the Communiqué did appear to be a fresh public formulation of the GRC’s position. President Chiang had been accustomed to saying every year that “this year” would be the year in which the GRC would go back to the mainland. These statements had been counter-productive as far as the public here was concerned. Ambassador Yeh said that these New Year messages of the Generalissimo had been quite an ordeal for him. He felt in the last two or three years they had been much better. While he was Foreign Minister he conscientiously avoided using the word “reconquest” in connection with GRC’s going back to the mainland. He had stressed that the GRC could only go back to the mainland in response to the desires and wishes of the people. Mr. Robertson said that unfortunately this had not been made clear and the people in the United States and other countries had not been aware of this position.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–2958. Secret. Drafted by Martin.
1. See footnote 2, Document 177
2. For a transcript of the Secretary’s news conference, see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1958, pp. 768–773.