22. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Acting Secretary of State Herter 0
SUBJECT
- Comment on Moscow’s 223 of July 241
Ambassador Thompson, in his telegram 223 of July 24, states that, if the proposed summit meeting is held under Security Council auspices, he hopes we will not reject the desire expressed by Khrushchev for discussions outside the Security Council. In the Ambassador’s opinion, [Page 36] Khrushchev obviously wishes to meet privately with President Eisenhower, though what he wishes to raise with the President is open to speculation.
Ambassador Thompson goes on to say that he is much intrigued by the possibility that Khrushchev’s primary objective may be to discuss certain questions relating to Red China with the President. He advances two lines of reasoning in support of this thesis: (1) various so-called indications of Sino-Soviet differences; (2) that there is no other “fully satisfactory” explanation for Khrushchev’s apparent belief in the magic of a meeting with the President.
The indications of Sino-Soviet differences cited in the telegram are not very convincing, as the Ambassador readily admits. I would add to his reservations that similar evidences of Sino-Soviet differences have been cited repeatedly in the past, only to be belied by subsequent events. It is true that Peiping in recent months appears at times to have taken a tougher line than Moscow toward Yugoslavia. However, as DRS and EE have pointed out, these are differences of tone and interpretation and not of substance and can be explained by the existence of more pressing internal problems in Communist China and by the inhibiting effect of the USSR’s broader international obligations.
On the other hand, Khrushchev might find it expedient for Moscow and Peiping to drop little hints, such as those the Embassy seems to have picked up, of Sino-Soviet differences in the hope that the United States and other countries would be misled and drawn into false policy conclusions. This has been done before, and it is certainly possible that another attempt to deceive us on this point is being made.
Ambassador Thompson goes on to say that Communist China can hold little threat for the Soviets so long as it lacks nuclear weapons and that, in his view, it must be a cardinal objective of Soviet policy to prevent Peiping from obtaining atomic weapons. I agree that the Soviet Union has reason to be disturbed over the prospect of Red China possessing an atomic weapons capability, but there is no reason to suppose that Moscow would be more fearful over Peiping’s acquiring nuclear weapons than ever, say, France’s acquiring such weapons. Even assuming that Khrushchev is disturbed at the possibility of Peiping’s becoming a nuclear power and a threat to the USSR, why should he turn to the U.S. for assistance? In view of Peiping’s military and economic dependence on the USSR, it is the Soviets, and not we, who are in a position to check Chinese Communist ambitions in the nuclear field.
The Ambassador says that his main reason for speculating that Khrushchev desires to raise the problem of Red China with the President is that there is no other “fully satisfactory” explanation for Khrushchev’s apparent belief in the magic of a meeting with the President. While I am in no position to fathom the inner workings of Khrushchev’s mind, I [Page 37] scarcely think it likely that Khrushchev would wish to discuss with the United States any troubles he might be experiencing with his Chinese Communist partners. To bare these difficulties before the United States would be a sure way to risk disclosure of fatal weaknesses of the whole Communist empire, and to undermine the objective of Bloc solidarity to which Khrushchev is dedicated. To bare these difficulties would also tend to confirm to the United States the wisdom of continuing present policies relating to these questions.
In conclusion I would like to reemphasize a basic point which I fear is often obscured in speculations over potential rifts between Moscow and Peiping. That point relates to all the important factors holding Moscow and Peiping together. Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders are wholly dedicated to the cause of international Communism under the leadership of Moscow. They slavishly follow the twists and turns of Moscow-directed orthodoxy. They never fail to acknowledge the Kremlin’s supremacy, unlike the Yugoslav Communist nationalists. Not only are the two great Communist powers of China and Russia bound by ideological ties, but they are dependent upon each other militarily, both offensively and defensively, as they pursue their common long-term goal of bringing about a world order under Communism. Red China’s military and economic dependence on the Soviet Union is, of course, extensive. I allow that this interdependence may give way some day to serious differences. But in the absence of any real evidence that Moscow and Peiping are drifting apart, it would be dangerous, even fatal, to base our policies or actions on the shifting sands of hopes and speculations.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/8–158. Secret. Drafted by Marshall Green, Regional Planning Adviser in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Josiah W. Bennett, Officer in Charge of Political Affairs in the Office of Chinese Affairs; and Lutkins. A notation on the source text reads: “Noted. C.A.H.”↩
- A copy was attached to the memorandum but is no longer attached to the source text. (Ibid., 396.1/7–2458; see Supplement)↩
- Telegram 124 from Taipei, August 4, commented that in the Embassy’s view, “little credence should be placed in reports of Soviet-Chinese Communist ‘divergences’.” (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1/8–458) Thompson replied in telegram 345 from Moscow, August 6, that although he remained convinced that “there are important frictions and lack of confidence between Moscow and Peking,” he agreed that “neither government is likely to allow these to get out of hand or to break their unity at present time.” (Ibid., 661.93/8–658) These documents are in the Supplement.↩