Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

215. Letter From Secretary of State Dulles to Foreign Secretary Lloyd⁰

Washington, October 24, 1958.

Dear Selwyn: In view of the interest of Harold and yourself in the Formosa Straits situation, I give you this information to supplement the public statements.

The Communist resumption of attacks on Quemoy, timed to coincide with my arrival and in breach of their announced two-weeks’ suspension, seemed to be deliberately calculated to make it more difficult to make progress on what might be called “peace” or “armistice” proposals. The Peiping radio last night announced that “the United States has met with defeat in her original plot to use the Chinese temporary suspension of shelling Quemoy to promote a permanent cease-fire”. We believe that the Chinese Communists, for the time being, want to keep the civil war at least intermittently active, and to use Quemoy as a sort of “whipping boy” to be lashed whenever there are “intrusions” by the United States or acts by the Chinese Nationalists which indicate lack of “repentance”.

The feeling in our intelligence community and also among the Americans on Taiwan is that the presently revived shelling is not designed primarily as a military operation to take the island, or even effectively to interdict its supply, but merely to harass and perhaps ultimately provoke the Nationalists.

I found that it is understandably difficult for the Nationalists to be subject to the Chinese Communists’ initiative in firing and stop firing whenever they, please, without any freedom to attack the Mainland except by relatively ineffectual counterbattery fire when the Communists have elected to bombard. Perhaps the Communists calculate that either the restraint or the morale of the Chinese Nationalists will break under their tactics.

I had many hours of conversation privately with the Gimo, with only an interpreter being present. I expounded fully my philosophy that the Nationalists should look upon their mission as an essentially peaceful one and should renounce the use of force in an attempt to reunify China. I pointed out that there had been such renunciations in the case of Germany, Korea and Vietnam and I thought that the position of the Government of the Republic of China would be much stronger in the Free World if it indicated a willingness also to renounce. The Generalissimo pointed out that this was very difficult, particularly since there would probably be no reciprocity, as was the case in the three other countries. Nevertheless, in the of appreciable political misgivings, he and his principal associates, notably the Vice President, agreed to make the statement in the communiqué to the effect that the Government’s principal means of achieving its mission would be to keep the Sun Yat Sen principles alive in the minds and hearts of the Chinese people and “not the use of force”.

I came away with the definite impression that there would be no insuperable obstacles on the Nationalist side to working out a reasonable program for tranquilizing the situation in the Taiwan area and greatly reducing the emphasis on militarization. I did not press the matter to a definite conclusion because the Communist attitude made it seem unrealistic. But already the Government is working with our military advisers on plans for a substantial reduction of forces in Quemoy and Matsu.

It seems that the Chinese Communists are out to get Taiwan and want to play a “cat-and-mouse” game with the offshore islands as a means to this end. They clearly do not now want to permit the situation to become stabilized and they seem to feel under no particular pressure from world opinion in this regard.

It seems to me, in the light of the foregoing, that it is important now to put all available pressure on the Chinese Communists to be ready to stop their military activities. I feel confident that if this disposition could be brought about, there would be reciprocity from the Chinese Nationalists.

I believe that the talks which I had with the Gimo with reference to the “mission” of Free China will prove in retrospect to have initiated a definitive and important reshaping of their policy. In this respect our talks were, I think, worthwhile, as well as my probing into what might be acceptable as their contribution to a cease-fire. We must hope that there will come about a change in Communist tactics which will give some significance to my explorations in this latter phase of the matter.

We can, of course, feel that there is less likelihood of the situation developing into general war if the Communist objectives are as I describe. However, we should not ignore the fact that their tactics are highly aggravating and humiliating to the Chinese Nationalists, given the restraints under which they are operating. I do not think we should count on the situation remaining indefinitely on its present one-sided basis. And, of course, the Communists may at any time shift to even more aggressive measures.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles¹

October 25, 1958.

P.S. Since dictating the foregoing, there has just come in this morning the new Chinese Communist announcement about not firing on the offshore islands on even numbered days and perhaps firing on odd numbered days.² This rather fantastic statement seems to confirm our analysis of the Chinese Communist attitude as being essentially political and propaganda rather than military.

0. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret. Drafted by Dulles and cleared by Robertson. Dulles gave the letter to Ambassador Caccia at noon on October 25. A memorandum of the conversation is ibid., Central Files, 611.93/10–2558; see Supplement.
1. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
2. Reference is to a message from P’eng Te-huai to “compatriots in Taiwan” issued by the PRC Ministry of National Defense on October 25. The statement also noted that refraining from shelling “is still conditional on not introducing American escorts.” (Peking Review, October 28, 1958, p. 5)