207. Memorandum of Conversation0
REAT MC–15 [(Taiwan)]
PRESENT
- President Chiang Kai-shek
- The Honorable John Foster Dulles
- Ambassador George Yeh (Interpreter)
I said that I desired to discuss further my talking paper which I presented the morning before with particular relationship to the defense of [Page 439] the offshore islands. I felt that while such defense should be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, the whole fate of Free China should not be identified with the holding of a few square miles of real estate located in a highly vulnerable position. The President had said that if Quemoy was lost, that would carry with it the loss of Taiwan and the end of Free China. I did not think that this relationship ought to be accepted. I recall that when the Generalissimo was defending Free China against the Japanese he did not identify his cause with Peking, and Nanking, or Hankow, or even Chungking. Great causes are not to be identified with the holding of particular territorial positions.
The President replied that in his opinion Taiwan could not be held long after Quemoy fell. He said that there were plenty of Communist agents on Taiwan and that they would see to it that the authority of the Government was so damaged by the loss of Quemoy that it could not long survive. There had been reports that the Chinese Communists were willing to make a deal whereby they would, in exchange for the Quemoy and Matsu Islands, agree not to use force against Taiwan for five years. They would not need five years. The Government could not survive five months. He went on to say that he could “guarantee” the successful defense of Quemoy given the level of assistance which the US was rendering. I said that while I had great respect for the military judgment of the Gimo, I did not think that anybody could “guarantee” the indefinite defense of an island situated as was Quemoy.
The President raised the question of whether measures could be taken to limit the attacking power of the Communists and to end their “on again-off again” tactics which were very disturbing to morale. I pointed out again, as I had the prior evening, that it was highly dubious that the Communist fire power could be substantially diminished by conventional fire whether from ground, ships or planes, and that the only effective measure was the use of nuclear weapons with ground bursts and that this would not really defend Quemoy but probably lead to the obliteration of all the inhabitants through lethal fallout.
The President said that my references to the Mainland fighting are not relevant because at that time they had plenty of land to trade for time. I then recalled Churchill’s statement that they would fight on the beaches, etc., but that if the British Isles were conquered, they would still go on fighting from any overseas positions that were available. He had not identified the survival of Free England with holding even any part of the British Isles.
I then brought up the question of the size of the garrison on Quemoy and hoped that this could be reduced both as a political gesture and also a gesture which was consistent with sound military policy. The President indicated that he would be prepared to move in this direction if there were a suspension of hostilities. It was virtually impossible for him to do [Page 440] so under fire. I said that I understood that plans were being discussed for a change in the number and character of divisions and for some improvement of weapons which would reduce the Quemoy garrison by between 15,000 to 20,000 persons. I said that I hoped an opportunity could be found shortly to bring this about.
The President said that he wished me to convey to President Eisenhower the assurance of his complete loyalty and of his determination to cooperate in any views we might hold. He would however hope that as part of such cooperation there could be consultation so that the GRC point of view would be at least taken into account before decisions were made. He did not insist that the GRC point of view be accepted but only that it should at least be considered. After that they are prepared to go along. He did however hope we would not do anything which would tend to depreciate his prestige and hurt him before his people. (The reference was, I think, to some recent press conference statements by the President and myself.) I said that I would convey this assurance and I was sure it would be received with gratification by President Eisenhower and that we would hope to cooperate fully in confidence and with adequate consultation. I said that press conferences were difficult because questions were put with the deliberate purpose of creating a predicament whichever way the answer was. I hope, however, that the considered state papers would be regarded as more authoritative than impromptu responses to “loaded” questions at a press conference.
I expressed the view that I thought a very important milestone had been passed by the position to be publicly announced by the GRC in its communiqué shifting the emphasis from military to political efforts vis-à-vis the Mainland. I felt that it was essential that free world countries, while always being willing to accept war rather than retreat, should not use or risk war as an instrument of promoting their own policies. There was perhaps in this respect a “double standard” but that the free world nations did have a higher standard than the Communists and it was necessary to live up to this standard. I felt that the position of the GRC to be expressed in the communiqué, particularly if it was followed up by deeds, would help to maintain free world support for the GRC.
- Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Dulles. The conversation was held at President Chiang’s residence. Other copies are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 1136.↩