Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

191. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 16, 1958, 11:59 a.m.–12:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Taiwan Straits Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• His Excellency Sir HAROLD CACCIA, British Ambassador
• The Viscount Hood, Minister, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. LaRue R. Lutkins, Deputy Director for Chinese Affairs

The Secretary opened the conversation by saying that he wanted to inform Sir Harold in advance of his plans to fly on to Taiwan after attending the Pope’s funeral ceremonies in Rome. He will arrive in Taipei Tuesday¹ morning and will spend two to three days discussing the situation with President Chiang. Their talks will presumably touch, among other things, on the level of GRC forces on the offshore islands. The Secretary plans to discuss this point within the context of the desirability of the GRC’s developing and maintaining a posture which would tend to increase support and acceptance of it by the free world generally. There is a need, he emphasized, for the GRC to comport itself so as to take greater account of world opinion. It has a tendency to be too self-centered and to ignore outside attitudes and developments. The Secretary said that the United States believes a strong GRC on Taiwan is a key factor in our overall position of strength in the Far East. Moreover, the fact that the GRC has a seat in the United Nations constitutes a very important factor preventing a possible process of deterioration in the United Nations to the point where it might become Communist-dominated. It is noteworthy in this connection that Peiping enjoys great influence in the Asian-African world, much more so than the Soviet Union. Illustrative of this influence was the recent action of a group of Asian-African countries in immediately discontinuing their efforts to bring into the United Nations a resolution on the Taiwan situation when the Chinese Communist Foreign Minister expressed the regime’s displeasure regarding it to their representatives in Peiping. This type of influence would become even greater if the Peiping regime were to be seated in the United Nations.

Sir Harold said that the UK is certainly in agreement with respect to the Secretary’s point that the GRC should comport itself in a way which takes world opinion into fuller account. The question of the offshore islands is relevant in this respect. The fact that the UK believes that on juridical grounds and because of their geographic location the islands are properly part of the mainland puts it in a difficult position in seeking to maintain a joint stand with the United States. The UK, therefore, is most hopeful that this problem can be resolved.

The Secretary said that he did not expect any immediate decisions or solutions to come out of his talks with President Chiang. Any decisions or actions regarding the problem cannot seem to have been made under pressure and must appear to have been made by the GRC on its own initiative.

Commenting that he had never been quite sure of the precise nature of the United States’ long-range interest in Taiwan, Sir Harold asked whether we want to have the island available as a base in the event of war. Or is it rather that our interest is the negative strategic one of wanting to deny the island to the Communists? The Secretary responded that the latter was probably the principal consideration, since Taiwan was not conceived as an essential strategic base for offensive operations. However, he doubted that it could be effectively denied to the Communists without the maintenance on it of the GRC and its strong military forces. It could probably not be neutralized or demilitarized without paving the way for a Communist take-over. In this connection, he pointed out, the thing that stands out most clearly in the Warsaw talks is the absolutely uncompromising position the Communists have taken that Taiwan belongs to them and that we must get out of the entire area. We have tried in the talks to discuss the offshore islands, the level of forces on them, and alleged provocations from them against the mainland. The Communists, however, have refused to discuss these matters and insist on limiting discussion to what they say is the only international question involved, namely the presence of United States forces in the area. In response to a query from Sir Harold, the Secretary stated that the arrival of Huang Hua² had not changed the nature of the Communist line of argument in the slightest. The Communists continue to deny that the crisis in the Taiwan Straits area is in any way an international problem except for the alleged interference of the United States in China’s internal affairs. They argue that the comparison of the U.S.–GRC treaty with the treaty between them and the Soviets is an invalid and improper one, saying that the latter represents the justified action of two sovereign governments whereas the former involves a relationship between master and puppet. The talks so far have served no useful purpose except insofar as they provide a channel through which we can get across our view to the Communists.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1658. Secret. Drafted by Lutkins. The time of the meeting is taken from Dulles’ appointment book. (Princeton University, Dulles Papers)
1. October 21.
2. Chief of the Western European Department of the PRC Foreign Ministry. Wang told Beam at the September 30 meeting that Huang would replace Wang’s advisor Lai at the next meeting and that at subsequent meetings, either Lai or Huang would be present, depending upon the pressure of other business on each. Beam reported this in telegram 492, September 30; see footnote 1, Document 145.