187. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander, Seventh Fleet (Kivette)0
141244Z. As cease-fire goes into its second week operations here returning to normal except for increased US military stature which should be maintained until indications firmer ChiComs are going to keep the offshore islands in the political arena and more particularly until they [Page 403] show this intent by reduction their military posture opposite Taiwan. Fundamentally there is no benevolence in any action proclaimed or actually undertaken by ChiComs and we must constantly keep our guard up on this premise. As I look back over the tension created by artillery bombardment of Kinmen 2 facts become clear to me. First the resupply problem was in fact never a problem. The panic was created not by the military but by the GRC using the incident to involve the US in their never to die hope of returning to the mainland. Within the framework of the foregoing however the major effort undertaken was not so much related to tonnage and it never need have been. It was related to the morale factor of demonstrating that resupply could be accomplished and that it could be done by GRC forces alone with US backup so disposed as to be never directly involved in the actual warfare. This purpose was achieved, fingers came off the panic button and GRC finally realized the importance of US and world opinion.
Under the circumstances resumption of ChiCom activity in the same pattern would achieve no further purpose either for the ChiComs nor the GRC. In addition since the ChiComs have made their appeals to “friends on Taiwan” I do not believe firing will be resumed in the near future. If it is it will be accomplished by actions more provocative and on another plateau which might inevitably lead to US involvement. This too I believe unlikely unless one of two things happens. First if the ChiComs begin to foresee a political defeat in the offshore island situation they will resume force and resume it with greater intensity. Secondly if the GRC even suspects US negotiations or intentions which would prejudice their sovereign rights they might deliberately initiate provocative acts designed to renew the conflict and thoroughly involve US. Therefore I believe US must stand firm, must let the GRC know it is standing firm and must concede nothing in negotiations which would involve a reduction of strength on the offshore islands. We should not let the GRC know that there are certain islands we do not consider worth defending. Any steps we take which will create misgivings or doubts in the minds of the GRC as to our intentions either to partially abandon or to meddle with their internal affairs to their disadvantage can do nothing but play into the hands of the Commies.
There are certain military arguments which I can initiate out here provided you concur. They might be quite far reaching but it is remotely possible they could have the ultimate effect of achieving a considerable reduction on the offshore islands and be agreeable to the GRC. They are purely military in nature and to me they make sense.
I would argue this way to Tiger and Minister Yu. Your President has said you are not using the offshore islands as a stepping stone to return to the mainland. Your tremendous artillery capability on the islands is designed to neutralize enemy artillery on the mainland for this purpose. [Page 404] This purpose no longer exists. 500,000 shells landing on Kinmen did very little damage. What damage could you do in the overwhelming expanse surrounding Kinmen with the relatively little artillery you can maintain there. Why not remove this great artillery capability and devote your military effort on the offshore islands purely to the concept of designing it against an invasion. Artillery serves very little purpose in this type of a defense. You need recoilless rifles, you need the well armed modernized flexible defensive types of warfare equipment. Let US streamline your offshore islands for this purpose. Let US build up your navy to adequately provide modern patrol and escort ships and an amphibious capability for resupply. This is really all you need since the President has said that the proper way of returning to the mainland is not by military campaign but by political campaign. End of argument.
Meanwhile however I cannot too strongly recommend against any suggestion of reducing the offshore island garrisons as a political measure designed to bargain with the Commies and I see no point to be gained in telling the GRC that we do not support them in the defense of certain of the small offshore islands.
One thing we do know about the GRC they are implacable enemies of communism. Everything we do should nurture that asset to our benefit.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1758. Secret; Priority. Also sent to CINCPAC and repeated to CNO. Received at the Department of the Navy at 5:53 p.m. The source text includes handwritten corrections, apparently made at the Department of the Navy. It is filed with a covering memorandum of October 17 from Reinhardt to Dulles stating that the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that Smoot’s proposed line of argument set forth in paragraph 4 made sense in general but that they disagreed with his argument that the artillery capability on Kinmen served little purpose.↩