Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

177. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, October 12, 1958, 5 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Senator Green
• Assistant Secretary Macomber
• Mr. Carl Marcy¹

After the usual pleasantries, the Secretary led off the conversation by giving Senator Green the news of the Chinese Communists’ announcement that they would continue the cease-fire for two more weeks.² Senator Green, after expressing his satisfaction with this development, asked the Secretary whether he had thought the Chinese Communists would do this. The Secretary said that he had been asked to wager on whether they would extend the cease-fire or resume the shelling of Quemoy, but had refrained from doing so. However, he had asked his intelligence people to prepare an estimate regarding the course the Chinese Communists would take at the end of the first week of the ceasefire. The intelligence report which he had read earlier in the day had predicted that the cease-fire would be extended for another period.³ The Secretary indicated that he, too, had thought this would probably be the course that the Chinese Communists would take, primarily because he could not see the advantage, to them of ceasing fire for a week then starting up again. The Secretary then read almost in its entirety a transcript of the Chinese Communist statement announcing the extended cease-fire.

Senator Green asked the Secretary what he thought the Chinese Communists were up to. The Secretary replied that he thought the objective of the Chinese Communists undoubtedly was to eliminate United States influence from the Western Pacific. In this connection, the Secretary pointed out that the Chinese Communists always lumped together Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu and took considerable pains to make it clear that their objectives were not limited to the off-shore islands.

In this particular phase, however, the Secretary thought that the Chinese Communists were conducting an operation which in many ways was similar to the Berlin Blockade. They were attempting with force, but with a limitation of that force, to capture Quemoy and Matsu. The same conditions prevailed in the Berlin situation. The Soviets could have brought to bear more actual force in that situation. They were evidently not prepared however to go beyond the measures that they took. They were hoping that those measures would accomplish their purpose; when these failed, they were not willing to risk a general war which additional measures might have precipitated. The Quemoy situation was similar in this respect. The Chinese Communists took certain limited measures, i.e., an artillery interdiction. The Chinese Nationalists, with our help, were able to meet this threat by developing the resupply system, to the point where the interdiction was not going to be successful. The Secretary explained that we had not completely conquered the resupply problem but had made great progress in this regard, and in his judgment were on the verge of mastering the problem. The result was that the Chinese Communists were faced with the problem of either continuing their rather expensive efforts to no avail, ceasing those efforts, or increasing them to a degree which might well precipitate a larger war. In this latter regard the Secretary pointed out that the logical step for the Chinese Communists to take if they wished to increase their efforts would be to begin to use air power against Quemoy. If this began, the Chinese Nationalist Air Force would attack the Chinese Communist bombers and would probably carry that attack to the air fields on which the Chinese Communist planes were based. If this happened the Chinese Communists would undoubtedly bomb Formosa itself, which in turn under our treaty commitment and the Formosa Resolution would bring the United States into the war. The Secretary felt that the Chinese Communists probably did not wish to take a step which would lead to these consequences.

Mr. Marcy, while expressing satisfaction that the truce had been extended, asked the Secretary whether he did not think that the basic issue remains; that the Chinese Communists could not back down in their demands to actually get possession of the off-shore islands and the Chinese Nationalists could not back down to the point where these islands were turned over to the Chinese Communists. The Secretary agreed with Mr. Marcy that the basic issue remained, but he pointed out that that issue had existed for a number of years now, and that he did not think that the issue had to be resolved in the immediate future. He pointed out that the Chinese have a different sense of time than others, and that they were willing to take a long range view of things.

Senator Green asked what the Japanese views were of this situation. The Secretary said that the Japanese were privately supporting a strong position on the part of the United States and had been quite helpful in the situation. He added, parenthetically, that the trouble with Japan as a nation was that it had real religion, and therefore it tended to be expedient rather than a nation dedicated to principles. He went on to point out that what the Japanese respect more than anything else is strength, and for this reason it is always important to show strength if we wish to keep the Japanese on our side. He added, however, that Kishi⁴ was the best Prime Minister they had had since the war, and that he had been helpful to us in this situation.

The Secretary mentioned the Philippines and said they too favored a strong policy on the part of the United States in this matter. He added that the Garcia Government⁵ gave him considerable concern because it was weak and corrupt. He expressed his regret that Magsaysay,⁶ whom he considered an outstanding leader, had passed from the scene.

At this point the Secretary mentioned to Senator Green our intention to explore, with the Japanese, the possibility of negotiating a new security treaty. The Secretary pointed out that the present one was rather one-sided and reflected Japan’s weakened position following World War II. Senator Green made no specific comment, but he seemed to understand the need for revision of the treaty.

Senator Green asked about the future of Formosa and particularly the Taiwanese. The Secretary said that he thought there were evolutionary forces at work there, and that the Taiwanese would have an increasing influence in the government and policies of Formosa as the mainland Chinese grew older. He pointed out that a number of the mainland soldiers were leaving the army because of their age and that their places were being filled in increasing numbers by Taiwanese. He felt that in time this development would reflect in the policies of the Formosa Government and indicated that the Taiwanese would be less interested in going back to the mainland than the present rulers of Formosa. In this connection, the Secretary indicated that one of the reasons that the original efforts in resupplying Quemoy had not gone off better was because we had not trained the Nationalist Chinese on amphibious operations. The Secretary felt, however, that the existence of Chiang and his army would be very useful in the future if there should be a revolution on the mainland. He pointed out that if there had been a free Hungarian Army on the borders of Hungary at the time of the Hungarian Revolution, the outcome might have been quite different.

Senator Green asked whether we had made any commitment to defend the off-shore islands at this time. The Secretary said that he did not think that under the Formosa Resolution we had the authority to make any commitment in advance of an actual attack on the off-shore islands. Senator Green agreed with this point, but asked whether or not any commitment had in fact been made. The Secretary replied that no commitment had been made.

Mr. Marcy asked whether we had any indications of what the Russian attitude had been in this situation. The Secretary replied that while we could speculate what their attitude and influence had been, we had no hard information to go on.

Senator Green said that if we were about to get involved in a war, in view of Congress’ responsibilities he hoped that they would be called back. The Secretary replied that we were aware of Congressional interest in this matter, but that Congress had already debated the issue and had set the policy when they passed the Formosa Resolution. Under modern conditions there might not always be time to get Congress back before a war starts. He said it was similar to the NATO situation, that he himself had been in the Senate at the time the NATO Treaty was debated,⁷ and that he had made the point that there might not be time to act before the war started. The Secretary had pointed out that they were having the debate then, in advance of such a contingency, so that American policy would be defined ahead of time. (On this subject I spoke to Mr. Marcy privately later and indicated that the Administration did not at this time plan to call Congress back into special session. We did plan, however, if war seemed imminent to call back the Congressional leaders, if time permitted.)

As the meeting was ending, the Secretary made one further point to Senator Green. He said that there was a limit to how hard we could push the Chinese Nationalists. He said that if we push them too hard they might feel they were being abandoned and had no choice but to make an arrangement with the Chinese Communists. If this happened, Formosa would be lost to the West. The Secretary pointed out this is the type of a thing that cannot be discussed in public, but nevertheless was very much in our thinking and something that had to be taken into account in planning our moves in the area. He concluded by saying that he did not wish the Senator to think that we were just being stubborn and difficult in this situation, but that after the most careful thought and thorough consideration of all the alternative courses, we felt that the position we were taking was the best one under the circumstances and the one most calculated to prevent a major war.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Senator Green produced a draft statement which he suggested he might give to the press regarding this truce with the Secretary. The Secretary approved this statement with one or two minor changes.

The meeting then concluded, after a brief discussion of one or two non-official matters.

(A copy of the statement issued [by] Senator Green at the conclusion of the meeting is attached.)⁸

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Macomber. The conversation was held at the Secretary’s residence. A copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1258.
1. Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
2. A copy is attached to a memorandum of October 12 from Cumming to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–1258; see Supplement) For excerpts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 1174–1175.
3. Reference is to a memorandum of October 10 from Arneson to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 693.94A2/10–1058; see Supplement)
4. Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi.
5. Philippine President Carlos P. Garcia.
6. Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines from 1953 until his death in 1957.
7. In 1949.
8. Not printed. Drafts showing Dulles’ revisions are also attached but not printed.