Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

162. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China⁰

Washington, October 6, 1958, 7:56 p.m.

304. Text of Acting Secretary’s statement re Peng statement sent you by Deptel 302¹ was drafted after very careful consideration at highest level and after consultation with Ambassador Yeh. You should immediately pass text this statement to President Chiang, pointing out that it in no way commits GRC but indicates US in close consultation with GRC, and leaves open subsequent US course of action. You should also assure him in strong terms of continued US support his Government. In your discretion you may inform President that Communist move was not discussed in Warsaw talks and US had no advance knowledge thereof. In last Warsaw meeting Communists remained as intransigent as ever in their rejection of US ceasefire proposal.

You should emphasize that it is of utmost importance that US Government marshal public, and especially congressional, opinion to support of its policies. This is particularly true when questions of war and peace are involved. Since President and Secretary have repeatedly stressed importance of cessation of hostilities by Communists in offshore island area as prerequisite to restoration of peace there, it imperative that US make positive response to present Communist move in this direction, regardless of Communist motive and even though such move may be temporary. Failure to do so would seem to belie sincerity US call for ceasefire and would not be understood by Congress and other public opinion leaders.

You should note with approval statement by spokesman of Ministry of National Defense indicating GRC had not in past taken initiative in hostilities and would not do so now.² As US has frequently indicated in past it is important that onus for any hostilities remain with Communists and GRC should continue refrain provocative actions. US fully understands importance of not letting down our guard. There is no weakening in US intention of refusing to give way to threat of force and resumption of hostilities by Chinese Communists would find US no less determined to come to assistance of GRC than in past. In fact if Chinese Communists resume hostilities following positive US response to their temporary cessation of hostilities US action in aid GRC would have stronger support in domestic and world opinion than previously.³

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–658. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Martin, cleared by Parsons and Robertson and with S/S, and approved by Herter.
1. Telegram 302 to Taipei, October 6, transmitted the text of Herter’s statement that day (see footnote 2, Document 159). (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/10–658)
2. In a statement released by the Government Information Office on October 6 commenting on Peng’s statement; text was transmitted to the Department in telegram 551 from Taipei, October 6. (Ibid., 793.00/10–658)
3. Drumright reported in telegram 555 from Taipei, October 7, that he had sent Herter’s statement to Huang, who had informed Chiang. Drumright had subsequently met with Huang, informed him of the substance of this telegram and telegram 306 (Document 161), and told him that Smoot had withdrawn convoy escorts. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/10–758; see Supplement)