148. Editorial Note
At the 381st meeting of the National Security Council on October 2, 1958, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles discussed the Taiwan Strait situation during his briefing on significant world developments. The relevant portion of the memorandum of discussion by S. Everett Gleason, dated October 3, reads as follows:
“With respect to developments in the Taiwan Strait, Mr. Allen Dulles described the highlights of the conversation between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and Chou En-lai, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Allegedly, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese Communists would not be satisfied with anything less than the complete evacuation of the Offshore Islands. However, he is reported to have said that Taiwan was a separate issue which could be discussed subsequently with the U.S. Certain statements by Chou [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] prove that certain threats made by Chou En-lai on September 21 had proved to be false. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Dulles said that he knew of the conversation between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and the Chinese Premier. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Foreign Minister Lloyd had mentioned the conversation to Secretary Dulles three or four days ago in New York and Secretary Dulles thought that the conversation was a ‘plant’. Mr. Allen Dulles replied that if it was not a plant, the interview had been undertaken for propaganda purposes.
“Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the supply situation on the Offshore Islands had improved in the course of the last week but the daily average of supplies landed on the Islands was still below the minimum requirements of the garrison. Moreover, bad weather had forced the cancellation of three convoys last week. Mr. Dulles said that the Chinese Communists had not yet undertaken to tighten their blockade still further although they might do so if the supply situation of the Nationalist forces on the Islands continued to improve. In any event, they had the capability of tightening their blockade by a variety of means.
“[2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Secretary Dulles expressed the opinion that these bombers might have been brought to this base to serve as a decoy to induce the Chinese Nationalists to attack mainland Chinese airbases.
“General Twining informed the Council that he had talked with Admiral Felt earlier this morning with respect to the supply situation on the Offshore Islands. Felt expressed the view that Nationalist morale was quite high and the the Nationalist forces could hold out on the Offshore Islands for a very considerable period of time.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)