135. Telegram From the Commander, U.S. Taiwan Defense Command (Smoot) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt)0
270945Z. Conference with Minister Defense disclosed his growing interest in public opinion in the United States. He seemed satisfied that our present organization and efforts were directed toward that end and instructed his own PIO RAdm Liu1 to cooperate closely with our CIB.
In briefing from MND on Ta Tan and Erh Tan these points were made clear.
- (a)
- that it is MNDs determination to use every means possible to keep supplies going into Kinmen in general and to satellite islands in particular.
- (b)
- that if either fails or does not produce effective results there is no alternative, but to bomb the mainland.
One of the primary assumptions which form a point of departure for the whole briefing was the GRC position that these satellite islands will never be abandoned voluntarily.
The briefing was quite thorough covering all aspects of the situation and I left with the feeling that the military analysis does not disclose such an imminent serious situation as is being presented through the political factions. The MND briefing discloses a capability to holdout with present supplies for a minimum of 20 more days. In later private conference with Tiger [Wang] many indirect inferences lead me to conclude that Tiger recognizes the completely untenable position of these 2 islands that secretly he would like to evacuate but that he must follow his government’s directive to keep up the morale to maintain their combat effectiveness and to increase the resupply effort. He asked me a direct question. Do you think the islands are impossible to defend? I told him nothing is impossible. It just takes a little longer more effort and more imagination. He has many good ideas to increase the effectiveness of resupply and seemed receptive to my ideas of slowly reducing the Tan garrison to a strong versatile group and then developing a program of rotation by small units, of increasing supply effectiveness by delivery precooked food, solid fuels and water purifiers in continuous nite ops in rubber boats. The Tiger again assured me they will take no overt offensive action without prior consultation. He ended up by saying that next [Page 289] to mine his job was the worst in Free China. Comment. I believe Chinats will continue pressure me by threat of bombing mainland to relieve Tan Island garrisons but I believe they will use restraint up to situation desperate. I believe however if they were sure US would enter fight immediately to combat Commie air reaction they would initiate assault on mainland tomorrow. I believe they hope US will enter if Commies initiate massive bombing Kinmen complex but aren’t sure and even if they were sure are desperately concerned that the need for Presidential approval will introduce time delay of fatal proportions. I think there is grave doubts in their ranks that US takes serious view of Tan Island situation. I believe General Hu Lien could make more effective deployment his defensive and offensive forces if he knew US would repulse assault on southern beaches (the resupply area) of Big Kinmen. I know the answers I must give to these questions now and can handle situation on broad non commital basis and can gradually convince them this is long campaign with only solution being successful resupply.
Ambassador advises on basis his visits with Foreign Minister that thinking parts GRC appreciate
- (a)
- world at large is by no means all behind US in defending OSI.
- (b)
- US is certainly not unanimously behind it.
- (c)
- course we are taking is only one which will win for GRC. Any other means loss of US support and defeat.
This is tack I will take to relieve pressures of Minister Yu who as you know I believe is not in ruling clique but who serves effectively as American whip.