121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State0
465. Admiral Felt, Admiral Smoot and I had more than an hour’s conversation this morning with President Chiang. Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Chief of General Staff were also present. Conversation centered mainly on military matters affecting offshore islands. Admirals Felt and Smoot will be reporting military aspects in detail.1
Chiang stressed need to solve convoy problem satisfactorily within next two weeks. Otherwise Kinmen supply situation would deteriorate progressively. Citing letter from Kinmen defense commander dated yesterday, Chiang spent some time describing perilous state of defenders of two Tan Islands. Drinking water situation was reported as serious and resupply efforts and living conditions were described as extremely difficult. Chiang appeared to believe amphibious assault on Tan Islands is likely. He said categorically such an attack would be met by all Chinese resources. Chiang suggested indirectly would appreciate direct US airlift to Kinmen along lines Berlin Airlift. Morale of Kinmen defenders was discussed at some length. Discussion brought out that morale is naturally suffering most on Tan Island and Small Kinmen and is relatively good on Big Kinmen. However, Chiang felt it would be useful step if US advisors at Kinmen could be instructed to reassure Chinese commanders US would support defense if Kinmen attacked by Communists.
Chiang stated that if Kinmen is attacked by Communist air force he will have no option but to retaliate. He attempted to draw out admirals on what US would do if Chinese Communist Air Force attacks Kinmen.
Both Chiang and Premier spoke on difficulties with public opinion on Taiwan. Premier stressed need to solve convoy problem quickly. He also urged need for full understanding between US and GRC. President assured me we would have GRC’s full cooperation. I spoke of difficulties we are having with American public opinion along lines Deptel 2552 and said we needed more time to explore all avenues toward peaceful settlement. Chiang said he understood our position and indicated his willingness to be helpful although he had no confidence talking with Communists would achieve useful results.
[Page 266]Toward end of conversation Premier produced copy of Yeh’s account of conversation with Robertson last Saturday3 Premier said Yeh’s report indicated US Government might not have full appreciation of situation and GRC attitude. At this point Premier showed passage in Yeh’s telegram to Chiang who apparently had not seen message previously. After reading passage President said he would prefer to withhold comment until he had studied message. I said in reply to Premier’s observation that if there was any misunderstanding in Washington it must be owing to some omission on my part since I have tried to report fully and accurately.
Comment: I draw conclusion from this conversation that pressure to resort to general retaliation as set forth in Premier’s talk with me last Saturday is for moment somewhat abated. Essence of Chinese position this morning was that assaults on any or all offshore island would invite GRC retaliation. Same would be true in case of any appreciable bombing of offshore islands. Fact that conversation centered to considerable extent on convoy operations is encouraging. If convoy operations can be stepped up within next two or three weeks to 300–400 tons per day, perhaps we will have more time in which to seek peaceful solution.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2358. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:56 a.m. Repeated priority to CINCPAC.↩
- Telegrams 231403Z from CINCPAC to JCS, and 231448Z from COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US) to CINCPAC, both September 23. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 40, and Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/9–2358, respectively; see Supplement)↩
- Document 116.↩
- See Document 116.↩