117. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 0
220101Z. T 34. So-called world opinion is made of many national views which are reflections of own self interests. Sometimes these interests are long-range and at other times they represent pressures of the moment. [Page 255] World opinion in SEA is based on cold assessment of actual danger to national existence. Leaders in that part of the world see the death of freedom in their countries if the United States backs down from her position of number 1 world power. As stated in my 260843Z Aug,1 the offshore islands are symbolic and this part of the world is waiting to see whether the United States will retreat. SEA leaders pray that we will not. We are their salvation. But they see in our willingness to talk at Warsaw and at the UN a first step towards abandonment of our principles. They are critical and say that Russia has once more shot her way to the conference tables where only the Communists can win.
On the other hand, I read in the Taipei newspaper this morning that Lloyd and Fujiyama2 are running for cover. I earnestly hope that when world opinion is assayed that pure gold can be distinguished from wooden nickels. The free Chinese will not evacuate the offshore islands. They have passed the critical point on the frustration curve concerned with material resupply. They are approaching the flash point on the morale curve but at resupply they are getting better. They are accepting American technical advice and have adopted a command responsibility which recognizes the stature of VAdm Ni in immediate command of convoy operations and who has CTF–72 constantly at his side. They are getting results with help of USN Beach Jumper unit, Beach Master and an advisor for ChiNat underwater demolition team. This is good but not cause for elation. The season of stormy weather and rough crossings is approaching. Deception to get boats the last mile into a beach is not of much use if they are swamped by heavy seas farther out. CTDC is keeping you informed on ideas involving Army bares, fishing junks and we are exploring several means of increasing air drop capacity—and are prepared to defend it.
As to morale, I believe the Chinese cannot tolerate the present situation indefinitely. On Kinmen, soldiers are abandoning cave life at night and are sleeping out in the open taking their chances with artillery fire. Despite concern about morale of troops on islands, general consensus is that tinderbox is public opinion on Taiwan. There is no doubt in any American mind here that ChiNats will kick over the traces and attack the mainland when the point of criticality is reached. Attack could be by either air bombardment or commando raid. I believe they will notify us but that the time will come when they can no longer exercise the restraint being urged upon them.
I recommend that the following letter be delivered by me to Gen Wang prior my departure from Taipei: [Page 256]
“Dear General Wane: The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted with satisfaction and admiration the soldierly restraint and reserve which you are exercising in these trying times.
They have asked me to tell you they understand fully how difficult the problem is and to express their appreciation for the calm and cool judgment you consistently demonstrate. In the heat of conflict, there are always differing opinions and advice. In the midst of these differences, your firm and measured adherence to the restrictions in current actions is most praiseworthy. I am privileged and pleased to transmit these views of my Chiefs to you and to add to them my esteem. Sincerely yours,”.3
In respect to future eventualities, I still believe that the Commies do not want war with United States. I think it is probable that they will not fire on United States ships or aircraft in the territorial waters of Kinmen if we announce in advance that we are going to use these waters. If they do fire on our ships or aircraft, the other side will be labeled aggressors in the eyes of the world and the world would then approve action of our forces in taking appropriate measures in their self-defense.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 40. Top Secret; Operational Immediate. Repeated to CNO, CINCPAC CP SMITH, and COMTAIWANDEFCOM(US). Received at 8:40 a.m. A copy is in Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands (Navy Tels), Sept. 5–Dec. 30, 1958. Admiral Felt was in Taipei as a part of a trip in which he also visited Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, and South Vietnam.↩
- Document 46.↩
- Japanese Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama.↩
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the draft letter to Wang in JCS 948430, September 23. (JCS 2118/121; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11–8–48), Section 40)↩