Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, China, Volume XIX

113. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, September 20, 1958, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Taiwan Strait Crisis

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Dulles
• Mr. Herter
• Mr. Murphy
• Mr. Robertson
• Mr. Reinhardt
• Mr. Parsons—FE
• Mr. Green
• General Twining
• Admiral Burke
• Mr. Sprague
• General Cabell
• General Whisenand¹
• Commander Allendorfer

The Secretary spoke of the gravity of the situation. Nothing is likely to come out of the Warsaw talks where U.S. and Red Chinese positions are too opposed for reconciliation. The talks nevertheless serve the purpose of providing a cover under which there might be some de facto easing of the war tension. They also create a basis for our showing up Peiping’s aggressive purposes and for making a more effective appeal for the support of U.S. and allied opinion.

The Secretary outlined three possible interpretations of Peiping’s aggressive actions in the Strait: (1) They could be shaping up to an open attack on the Offshore Islands and then on Taiwan itself, a variant on this interpretation being an open attack on the offshores followed by a period of waiting until the impact of the loss of the off shores had undermined the GRC permitting a Communist takeover by subversion perhaps accompanied by military efforts; (2) They could be limited to a Berlin Blockade type of operation, using limited but sustained military pressures to exact political and diplomatic gains; or (3) They could follow the 1954/55 pattern when, faced with a strong U.S. counterposition, Peiping gradually reduced its aggressive efforts to a point where there was relative quiesence.

The Secretary asked whether there had been any evidence to date of the latter trend.

General Cabell and General Twining replied that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the existence of any such trend. Admiral Burke nevertheless Felt that the Chicoms might be disposed to let up in the artillery barrage for a while at least in order to get out of the caves and gun emplacements for a short respite.

The Secretary said that if the Chicoms do let the tempo of battle die down, we must be sure to reciprocate by holding back one way or another. General Twining agreed this should be done.

The Secretary returned to interpretation (2) above regarding a Berlin Blockade situation. He asked if the Joint Chiefs Felt such a blockade could be broken.

General Twining and Admiral Burke pointed out as background that the Quemoy defenders have hoarded a fairly good supply of ammunition; and that the three howitzers landed yesterday at Quemoy would help, largely for psychological reasons. As to Matsu, it is well stocked and more defensible than Quemoy. General Cabell noted that Matsu is not reachable except by long-distance shore batteries at extreme ranges where accuracy is poor.

As to Quemoy’s defense capabilities, the Joint Chiefs reckoned it could hold out for at least two more months (two months at a resupply rate of 100 tons per day) but not indefinitely. They nevertheless considered it probable that the resupply rate could be improved to the 300 tons-per-day level necessary to keep the island going for a considerable period of time on an austere basis without build-up. The main problem would be sustaining the morale and preventing the exhaustion of its defenders who are experiencing boredom and crowded conditions underground. In the latter regard, troops cannot be rotated on Quemoy; they can only be replaced as required. The GRC will not order any net withdrawal of forces.

The Secretary then read aloud passages from Taipei’s telegram 452 of September 20 in which Ambassador Drumright reported his conversation that day with Premier Chen Cheng. Chen warned that GRC restraint had been taxed to the limit and that the time had come to use force to break the Quemoy blockade. Chen had also denounced any formal cease-fire or any demilitarization solution. He opposed the Warsaw talks and any UN consideration of this issue except a UN condemnation of the Soviet aggression.

The Secretary commented that the GRC apparently fails to appreciate that we have a serious public opinion problem here at home and that we have to keep our alliances together. The position we are taking in Warsaw and toward UN competence in dealing with this issue is precisely that which we took in 1954/55. We are perfectly aware of the futility of trying to reach solutions at Warsaw but it is an exercise we must go through. It is an exercise as much in GRC interests as in our own.

Mr. Robertson expressed full agreement and suggested that it would be helpful if the Secretary would talk to Ambassador Yeh along those lines.

The Secretary turned to interpretation (1) above, inquiring if there were any evidence of an impending assault operation. Admiral Burke said such evidence was lacking. The Chicoms probably realize that this would involve U.S. sea and air action against shore batteries and assault craft, which would defeat the assault. General Twining pointed out in this connection that a special White House paper of September 6, initiated by the President, gives the JCS standing authority to oppose an assault by using conventional weapons against artillery positions and naval targets.²

General Cabell was asked by the Secretary to comment on the military implications of the latest Khrushchev letter to the President.³ General Cabell replied that it was his agency’s estimate that the Soviets will not become actively involved in a war in the Taiwan Strait unless U.S./GRC activities extend beyond the Strait area. The Soviets, he noted, are not taking the type of alert measures they took during the recent Middle East crisis. They do not appear to be making any unusual preparations. The very vehemence of their note connotes that they are relying on words rather than contemplated military action.

The Secretary interposed that the Khrushchev note nevertheless carried the tones of an ultimatum, vowing that unless we withdrew our forces from Taiwan there was no alternative but expulsion of those forces by the Chicoms with USSR support.

General Cabell drew attention to the fact that “support” could mean minimal logistic support; or again, it could be full operational support, but he didn’t think that the latter was the Soviet intention at least at present. Admiral. Burke added that the Soviets seem to be saying that their support will be along logistic lines unless we use atomic weapons, against which they will then retaliate in kind.

The Secretary concluded from what the Chiefs and General Cabell had said that the Quemoy situation is tolerable from our standpoint provided (a) we are prepared to oppose an assault, and (b) we can keep Quemoy resupplied on at least an austerity basis. He wondered, however, whether the GRC would tolerate this situation, bearing in mind, moreover, that the GRC may view it as a golden opportunity for recovering the mainland as the outcome of a war between the U.S. and Red China. The Secretary said he did not wish to imply deliberate GRC disloyalty to its U.S. ally, for the Gimo is honorable and loyal and has always shown good faith. However this sentiment pervades the thinking of many people on Taiwan. It is understandable by their lights.

Discussion followed of various measures which might be taken to induce better GRC understanding of the military realities of any war involving Taiwan.

On the question of a GRC air attack on shorebatteries, General Twining stated that this would not knock out the batteries. Furthermore, it would directly invite Chicom air retaliation at least against Quemoy, which in turn would place the GRC and ourselves in a worse position than now.

Note was taken of the superior performance of GRC pilots in their several recent aerial encounters with the Chicoms. General Twining commented that the GRC has an excellent air force and that the GRC, like the Chicoms, has exercised restraint.

Mr. Robertson asked how essential it was from a military viewpoint to continue our convoy escort operations to a point nearer than, say, 20 miles of Quemoy. When the Chicoms see U.S. vessels involved, does that tend, for example, to induce heavier battery fire against the convoy? Admiral Burke replied that our vessels presented the same visual profile and effect on radar as GRC ships, so that the convoy would draw the same fire whether or not the escort ships were U.S. He thought U.S. escort ships were essential.

Mr. Robertson inquired about a report that airdrop missions are limited due to a shortage of parachutes. Admiral Burke denied this report. He added that aerial resupply, though limited, had done pretty well. No planes had been lost in the air, and air dropped supplies had been recovered without destruction by artillery fire.

At Admiral Burke’s request, Commander Allendorfer described LVT operations. We have 153 LVT’s, he said, each capable of carrying between 2 and 3 tons. Since an LST carries 17 LVT’s, it can carry about 43 tons when LVT-loaded. These LVT’s are effective in this operation because they are not stopped by the beach profile of Quemoy and are elusive.

Admiral Burke remarked that the Navy was gaining good experience in this crisis but it was costing the U.S. Navy about 3 million dollars above normal.

Mr. Sprague said that he had just reported to Mr. Dillon and General Goodpaster that the 50 million dollar NDAP program for the GRC this year would have to be raised to 200 million dollars. He agreed with Mr. Dulles, however, that this was inconsequential in terms of the political issues involved.

The Secretary asked if it didn’t emerge from this discussion that this is essentially a Berlin Blockade type of operation, in which we must exert maximum efforts to keep Quemoy going, while at the same time (a) being ready to act against a Chicom assault and (b) continuing to urge the Chinats to act within the present ground rules, for any extension of the rules could bring about a net worsening of the situation as far as the U.S./GRC is concerned.

General Twining agreed, but Admiral Burke thought we might consider all-U.S.-manned convoy operations. He spoke of the difficulties involved in U.S.–GRC convoy command arrangements.

The Secretary said he thought there were two angles to be covered in talking with the GRC: (1) to ask for restraint and (2) to explain that any talks at Warsaw or in the UN are not designed to give anything away. We have not the remotest idea of success at Warsaw but we must take a posture which will elicit the support and understanding of our allies for whatever we may have to do. Sentiment in the UN is running against us. 90 percent of the representatives there feel that these offshore islands amount to nothing except trouble for us and provocation of the Communists. They say we and the GRC should disengage and defend from Taiwan.

In a sense they are right, but there are other elements in the equation. There is, for example, no way to bring about a withdrawal from the offshores without engendering a collapse of the GRC and a take-over of Taiwan by subversion possibly combined with subsequent attack. We would end up by losing Taiwan just as surely as if we had handed it over to the Communists.

General Cabell, in agreeing, cited further factors in the equation—the effect on overseas Chinese communities and on Southeast Asia.

There was general agreement that the latest Khrushchev letter to the President was a pressure effort employing an obvious threat. If we succumbed to this kind of threat, our prestige would plummet in free Asia where so many stand with us because we are strong. It would start a chain of events we couldn’t stop, leading to the withdrawal of the U.S. defense line more than half way across the Pacific to Alaska-Honolulu.

Mr. Sprague questioned the wisdom of our taking this issue to the UN as proposed in the President’s TV address. He thought we would find little support there. He said it would be helpful to the Pentagon to have a clearer picture of how the State Department proposed to handle this issue in the diplomatic field.

The Secretary said he would anticipate that the Warsaw talks would drag on almost indefinitely, except that the meetings would be more spaced out than at present. Possibly the Chicoms would issue an ultimatum over continuing the talks, but he and Mr. Robertson were inclined to anticipate the talks getting into the same old ruts we saw at Geneva. The Secretary estimated that the Chicoms are not bent on a military showdown, for they asked for talks which would be nothing but a liability to them if they pursued new military initiatives.

As far as the UN is concerned, the Secretary pointed out it is not a question of our proposing that the issue be raised or not raised in that forum. The issue is bound to be raised by someone; in fact there are plenty of resolutions already circulating on that subject. However, the matter probably won’t come up for debate on an actual resolution for a month or so unless the Warsaw talks break off. When the issue is raised in the UN we would want to get in a resolution asking for a ceasefire, the renunciation of the use of force and an examination of measures to tranquilize the situation. The Chinese Communists would not accept such a resolution in all likelihood. They would say this is a civil war and that they would not come to the UN to discuss any resolution other than one condemning U.S. “aggression” and “intervention” in the area and U.S. “occupation” of Taiwan. The Secretary therefore concluded that he didn’t anticipate any solution emanating from the UN, although conceivably we could gain the necessary support for passage of a resolution the Chicoms would not accept.

UN consideration of the issue poses a further dilemma in that the GRC takes a similar view that this is a civil war, and the Chinats seek to have Soviet aggression in this affair condemned by the UN.

General Twining said that his staff had prepared a paper⁴ opposing UN consideration of the issue. He subsequently read the paper aloud.

The Secretary reiterated that the issue simply cannot be debarred from UN consideration. Moreover, it would be consistent with the position which President Eisenhower took in 1955 to welcome UN consideration of this Offshore Islands issue. We are committed to that proposition. Of course, it would put the GRC in a difficult position if it refused to accept UN jurisdiction.

We are aware that a resolution introduced in the UN calling for a UN Trusteeship over Taiwan and the seating of Red China would be responsive to the real feelings of some ninety percent of the UN membership. It is pressure by the US that prevents that view from prevailing. Obviously there are dangers in UN consideration, but we can’t keep it out. It is just a question of whether it is better for us or for someone else to take the initiative.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/9–2058. Top Secret. Drafted by Green. The meeting was held at Secretary Dulles’ residence. See also Document 114.
1. Brigadier General James F. Whisenand, USAF, Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. See footnote 4, Document 71.
3. See Document 110.
4. Not further identified.