Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII

106. Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State⁰

Tokyo, November 20, 1959, 5 p.m.

1607. CINCPAC exclusive for Admiral Felt and POLAD. COMUS/Japan exclusive for General Burns. Naha exclusive for General Booth. Deptel 1217.¹ On instruction from Kishi and Fujiyama who were tied up in Diet, Vice Foreign Minister Yamada met with me yesterday to discuss (1) Article III islands (Okinawa) and (2) indirect aggression.

• 1.

  Okinawa. Yamada made very strong pitch for a draft agreed minute which would confirm that Ryukyus would come within purview of Article V of new treaty as they are restored to administrative control of Japan. He proposed following language for agreed minutes to be made public:

  • (A) “Japanese plenipotentiary:

    It is my understanding that those territories of Japan presently not under its administration would as a matter of course come within the purview of Article V as they are restored to the administrative control of Japan.

    United States plenipotentiary:

    It is also my understanding.”

    I told Yamada I would be obliged strongly to oppose any such formulation and urged him to reconsider and drop this matter. I said if Japan wished to issue a unilateral statement that was their business but we could not agree to any minute along lines he had proposed. After some discussion Yamada agreed to recommend withdrawal of above proposal but said it was essential that there be an agreed minute which could be made public indicating the concern of GOJ for safety of Ryukyuans if these islands were “attacked” and desire of GOJ to be helpful to them. After considerable further discussion he then proposed that we accept the following agreed minute dealing with this aspect:

  • (B) “Japanese plenipotentiary:

    While the question of the status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and other islands mentioned in Article III of the Treaty of Peace with Japan (excluding the Amami Islands) has not been made a subject of discussion in the course of treaty negotiations, I would like to emphasize the strong concern of the Government and people of Japan for the safety of the people of these islands since Japan possesses residual sovereignty over these islands and the islanders are Japanese. If an armed attack occurs or is threatened against these islands, the two countries will of course consult together closely under Article IV. In the event of an armed attack, it is the intention of the Government of Japan to explore with the United States measures which it might be able to take for the welfare of the islanders.

United States plenipotentiary:

In the event of an armed attack against these islands, the United States Government will consult at once with the GOJ and will take the necessary measures for the defense of these islands, and will do its utmost to secure the welfare of the islanders.”

I saw Yamada again last night and he said Kishi and Fujiyama agree to withdrawal or proposal 1 (A) re return of administration to Japan.

Comment: While I believe I have killed Japanese efforts to have an agreed minute regarding inclusion of Ryukyus in treaty area after the restoration of administrative control, I also recognize they must show some interest in the security of the Ryukyuans since latter are Japanese nationals. In my judgement agree minute proposed by Yamada which makes clear Article III islands were not a subject of discussion in course of treaty negotiation is minimum Japanese need with respect to this problem and I recommend, unless General Booth has cogent reasons to contrary, that we accept this formulation (which does not seem to impair our basic interests) thus disposing of this problem.

2. Indirect Aggression. Yamada said GOJ feels it is extremely important also to have an agreed minute to be made public with respect to indirect aggression. Japanese leaders feel that such a minute will serve as a real deterrent to Communists if they are tempted at some future date to try to instigate a massive Communist insurrection in Japan since knowledge that US stood ready to aid Japan in event of such aggression would be powerful deterrent. Kishi and Fujiyama have carefully considered this matter and propose following agreed minute which would also be made public:

(A) “Japanese Plenipotentiary:

The phrase ‘an armed attack’ in Article V of the treaty is taken out of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. Obviously, purely internal disorders or revolutions would not be considered armed attacks. However, if a revolution were aided and abetted by an outside power such assistance might possibly be considered an armed attack. It is understood that, if so considered by the two governments, the United States will be prepared to assist Japan to meet such indirect aggression by taking such measures as may be practicable at the request of the Japanese Government.

United States Plenipotentiary:

In such a case the United States Government will be prepared to take such measures as may be deemed practicable.”

Comment:Yamada said substance of first sentence of above minute is taken from record of Secretary Acheson’s press conference on day NATO treaty signed. Substance of second and third sentences are from Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on NATO treaty.

Since agreed minute along above lines is extremely important to Kishi and Fujiyama and since our judgement is that it would also be a deterrent to Communist insurrection I recommend we accept since it does not commit us to take any action unless we consider insurrection “an armed attack” and even then we are only committed “to take such necessary measures as may be deemed practicable”.²

MacArthur

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11–2059. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to CINCPAC, COMUS/Japan, and Naha.
1. Document 104.
2. In telegram 1623 from Tokyo, November 22, MacArthur reported that the Japanese Foreign Office wished to make two changes in the draft concerning indirect aggression: (1) to delete from the final sentence in the statement of the Japanese plenipotentiary the phase “by taking such measures as may be practicable”; and (2) to amend the statement of the U.S. plenipotentiary to read: “In such a case, the United States Government will be prepared to do so by taking such measures as may be deemed practicable.” MacArthur recommended acceptance of both changes. (Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/11–2259)