81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia0

3207. Embtels 40281 and 4063.2 Following points should be made to Djuanda and Subandrio:

1.
We appreciate frankness their discussion with you and would welcome any additional comments or suggestions they may care make. We agree that best method for eliminating any misunderstandings which may exist or arise is through such talks.
2.
Reassure them that US objectives are an economically viable, politically stable, united, free and independent Indonesia, and not a split or a communist dominated or influenced Indonesia.
3.
Pass to them statement made by Foreign Minister Yeh (Taipei No. 909 repeated Djakarta as 12)3 in reply to approach by our Ambassador (Deptel to Taipei No. 694, repeated Djakarta as 3185)4 made in reply to Subandrio’s request (Embtel 3965).5
4.
US has no control over bombings by rebels or adventurers whom rebels may have hired. As regrettable therefore as these bombings are there is nothing we can do to stop them.
5.
As to “evidence” of US involvement cited by Subandrio you should inform them that:
(a)
if C–47s were indeed turned over to the rebels in Singapore as alleged US has no knowledge of and US Navy issued no instructions for such transaction in Singapore or anywhere else. If Indonesians have “documents” you can assure them they are false.
b)
in addition to points already made by you re Hirsch cable that
(1)
American Sales Company is not registered with Department of State as arms dealer;
(2)
Company has made no application for export licenses for any types of arms;
(3)
7.35 mm semi-automatic rifles not manufactured in United States nor used by United States armed forces.
6.
Assure them Clark Field not being used as base for assistance to rebels, and therefore no build-up taking place there as alleged by Djuanda.
7.
Inform them US is prepared to sell Indonesia 35,000 tons of rice (Deptel 3101).6 Expect instructions for conclusion this agreement along lines Embtel 39997 will be sent you today but there is no reason why our willingness proceed with this deal should not be made known and capitalized upon as a gesture on our part in line point made by Subandrio in earlier talk with you (Embtel 3966).8
8.
We are seriously concerned over Aidit message to you (Embtel 4018)9 because a) it demonstrates ability representative of political party, and especially communist, address threat to representative of friendly foreign government, and b) of implications contained in threat. You should protest strongly and ask what action Government intends take.
9.
Make point in paragraph numbered One of Deptel 2635.10
10.
You may wish also point out to them invitations extended Indonesian Armed Forces to send observers to Oceanlink11 and weapons demonstration sponsored by CINCPAC12 as indication our desire establish close working relations with those Forces.
11.
We welcome Djuanda’s assurances that steps will be taken to curb growth of communism. You may wish point out that would make your mission and decision by U.S. Government much easier if such steps were actually taken on the basis of which further discussions could then take place.

FYI. We are considering your recommendation for issuance statement. Will advise separately. End FYI.

Herter
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–658. Top Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Mein, cleared with Cumming and Robertson, and approved by Herter. Jones summarized this telegram in Indonesia: The Possible Dream, pp. 134–135.
  2. Document 78.
  3. Document 80.
  4. Telegram 909, May 5, reported that during a conversation with Foreign Minister Yeh that afternoon Ambassador Drumright was informed that the Republic of China had given no clearance to any of its Air Force planes to go to Indonesia and that it had not cleared ammunition shipments to any place abroad. Yeh said the United States could inform Subandrio of these facts. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–558) See Supplement.
  5. Telegram 694, May 4, asked the Embassy in Taipei to inquire about Indonesian charges of GRC pilots and arms shipments aiding Indonesian dissidents. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–458)
  6. Document 74.
  7. Dated April 25. (Department of State, Central Files, 411.56D41/4–358)
  8. Dated May 2. (Ibid., 411.56D.41/5–258)
  9. Document 75.
  10. Telegram 4018, May 3, transmitted the text of a letter from PKI Chairman D.N. Aidit to Jones concerning U.S. assistance to rebels in Indonesia. After citing proof of help by “American adventurers to the rebels” Aidit continues: “As your government probably knows, so far our party has not been propagating that action be taken against USA economic interests in Indonesia, but if aid, both open and covert of weapons from your country to rebels is not immediately stopped then we will deem it necessary to consider starting of campaign on actions against USA economic interests in Indonesia.” (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/5–658)
  11. Telegram 2435 to Djakarta, March 15, suggested specific points for Jones to make in his meeting with Sukarno. The first paragraph suggests that if Sukarno requests additional aid, Jones should point out that difficulties of U.S. public and Congressional opinion preclude additional aid until a non-Communist government comes to power and is able to take action against the Communists and reach solutions to Indonesia’s internal problems. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 990) See Supplement.
  12. A SEATO naval exercise was held May 1–14.
  13. The Department of Defense was planning to conduct a weapons demonstration and symposium for delegations for 18 Pacific powers in mid-May under the auspices of CINCPAC.