Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

96. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Cambodia¹

Washington, February 18, 1959—5:21 p.m.

712. From Robertson. Your 1036.²

1. I understand and share your concern over damaging effects GVN involvement Cambodian coup plotting. [7½ lines of source text not declassified]

2. Although not convinced GVN will stop all support Dap Chhuon, I believe that US representations already made at various levels will discourage GVN for the moment and induce further caution as indicated by Diem reference to Hieu taking leave. Lacking further evidence continued GVN interference Cambodia and view alleged Sihanouk press statement reported Djakarta’s 2558, repeated Phnom Penh 20,³ another approach to GVN now promises have little additional restraining effect, but might easily antagonize Diem to detriment US interests.

3. On broader plane, added US pressure to coordinate Thai and Vietnamese policy toward Cambodia with that of US most likely to founder on age old regional animosities and sensitivities regarding national sovereignty, which equally as strong in Thailand and Viet-Nam as in Cambodia. Furthermore, US arguments in favor dealing with Sihanouk frequently undermined by Sihanouk’s erratic and emotional behavior which particularly over past year has served merely confirm Vietnamese and Thai distrust. Thailand and Viet-Nam are not amenable to US policy dictates, particularly on matters close to home which they feel themselves better qualified to judge than US. Vietnamese in particular hold view that Sihanouk drifting rapidly toward Communist bloc, that US efforts to stem trend unsuccessful, and that prompt removal Sihanouk regime only hope avert Communist satellization Cambodia.

4. I fear we cannot dissuade Vietnamese from these opinions which shared in large measure by Thai. Recent Sihanouk statements Djakarta will undoubtedly serve reinforce Thai and Vietnamese antagonism.

5. For time being we can expect at best to restrain Thai and Vietnamese from ill-advised moves involving high risks international complications. I believe our representations at Bangkok and Saigon have reached optimum pitch at present to achieve this result.

6. I fully appreciate your wish settle this vexing problem before leaving Phnom Penh. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] I would welcome your further comments after weighing all available information including import of Sihanouk’s Djakarta declarations and of cabinet resignation. However, I fear that we must reckon with this problem for a long time to come.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/2–1659. Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Drafted by Askew, cleared by Kocher and by Robertson and Parsons in draft, and approved by Cumming.
2. Supra.
3. In this telegram, February 17, the Embassy reported an interview with Sihanouk in Djakarta on February 14 in which Sihanouk charged SEATO with “gross and open interference in Cambodia” and named Ngo Trong Hieu as the “head of foreign subversion in Cambodia.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/2–1758)