95. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1
1036. Eyes only Mr. Robertson. In his conversation with Durbrow Saturday, Diem said it was unfortunate Vietnamese public opinion was becoming more apprehensive about US support of Sihanouk who obviously tended favor ChiComs while Vietnam was true friend of US.
This question of relative worthiness of Vietnam and Cambodia to receive US support has beclouded real issue for months. On basis its record Vietnam is clearly the more worthy. However this is not question at issue nor has it been during last eight months.
Point at issue is that the Western objective of denying all of Southeast Asia to Communist control cannot be achieved without establishment of some modus vivendi among Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, but particularly between Vietnam and Cambodia. We have for months pressed on GVN necessity of coming to understanding with Cambodia during which time rumors of GVN intrigues in Cambodia have been rife in area. Intelligence [1 line of source text not declassified] two months after Stung Treng incident revealed GVN was even at that time planning coup d’état to overthrow Sihanouk and desisted only when it became apparent it would not have US support. Evidence of more recent GVN support to Sam Sary plot and now to Dap Chhuon is conclusive. The countries supporting Western cause in SEA have been in position of football team with two quarterbacks calling opposite signals.
We have similarly had policy differences with Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek and it has been necessary impose our point of view on them. I fervently believe a similar action is necessary with Diem and that it must be taken very soon if we are to avoid a disaster. As pointed out in previous telegrams, any hostile action against Cambodia originating in either Vietnam or Thailand would almost certainly be followed by a flood of protest notes from Peiping, Moscow and Afro-Asian capitals. Soviets will be able to bring issue to UN where we might be compelled take position against a SEATO ally. There would in addition be threat of Red Chinese military intervention lurking in background. Whether or not this threat became real would depend in large measure on unpredictable vagaries of Sihanouk’s behavior.
[Page 277]I am most anxious if possible have this issue resolved before my departure 10 days hence. On very day we received our important intelligence concerning Vietnamese activities in support Dap Chhuon, I had already asked for farewell audiences with King and Queen and other members Royal family and for departure interviews with Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I have passed point of no return as far as departure is concerned but I should be exceedingly distressed to have this issue hanging fire at time I leave.
Quite apart from this consideration, which is largely subjective, there is very real danger of revelations day by day which may cause an explosion. Discovery of Sam Sary plot by Soviets, Chinese, French and ourselves is adequate testimony to looseness of Vietnamese security. As far as Vietnam’s involvement with Dap Chhuon is concerned, there must be many people who know about shipment of mobile broadcasting station from Saigon to Siem Reap for use by Dap Chhuon in making his intended announcement to Cambodian people. Chances are that a considerable number also know about the shipment of the box of bars of gold to Dap Chhuon. The effort to increase Son Ngoc Thanh’s force in Thailand from 500 to 2,000 men cannot be done secretly. (In telegram yesterday2 I asked for review this problem with possibility additional representations Bangkok.) We may be faced any day by an RKG announcement of GVN involvement and with accompanying questions as to what we have been doing about it.
I believe we must insist in a most categorical manner that GVN break off all relations with Dap Chhuon conspiracy, including replacement of Ngo Trong Hieu, and that GVN simultaneously take positive steps for settlement of its principal differences with Cambodia.