93. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State1

802. CINCPAC for POLAD. I refer to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports Soviets and ChiComs have informed Sihanouk of Sam Sary plot2 with implication US tacitly supporting.

In my opinion this plot had at best very slight chance success. Soviet and ChiCom revelations reduced that to zero. However, they place US under suspicion which Soviets and ChiComs will undoubtedly cultivate. Our immediate problem is protect our position in face of efforts Soviets and ChiComs will surely make to involve us and to portray themselves as true friends this country. First public repercussion appeared in Sihanouk’s speech at Kampot Saturday,3 reported that evening on radio in Cambodian and noon today in French. Clearly referring to Thailand, he said military chief neighboring country trying stop progress Khmer nation; suppported by “who knows what giant”, this country encourages opponents of regime within and without Cambodia in attempt divide people.

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[1½ lines of source text not declassified] However, in view Soviet-ChiCom letter to Prince, I believe we must take every step convince [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] GVN of utter folly continuing support plot. Not only should we obtain their assurance that they are no longer sponsoring it as governments but it should be pointed out our common interests require they police their respective territories to prevent continued development this conspiracy within their borders. It seems to me complete suppression of plot offers us best possibility protecting our position in Cambodia, which is in common interest of US, GVN [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

It should also be pointed out to GVN [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that their own crude security practices have undoubtedly been responsible for this leak. They should be warned to examine their security precautions carefully to avoid any further revelations to our enemies.

Sihanouk’s reference to “who know what giant” in his Kampot speech Saturday was a thinly-veiled accusation that we are at least silent partners in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] GVN Sam Sary plot. We should probably ignore it if no more reference is made to it. However, if more is made of it, I believe I should go to Sihanouk to ask what he had in mind when he made statement attributed to him on radio. I would propose in such a conversation to say that I have heard rumors of plots to overthrow regime on and off during my whole stay here; that I have consistently believed they represented more wishful thinking of disgruntled exiles; that I believe regime too solidly entrenched to be in danger from such plots, if they exist; that I am nevertheless deeply disturbed if anyone believes any such plot to be supported by US; that I wish to affirm without reservation our continued support of Royal Government;4 that I deny categorically any and all rumors that we have lent any support to any plot to overthrow it; that I believe this affirmation of position to be clearly supported by our record of performance in this country over period of several years; and that it is my opinion that persons who spread rumors casting doubt on this position are deliberately trying to poison atmosphere of SE Asia and isolate Cambodia from West.

Instructions requested Niact.5

Strom
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/1–1259. Secret; Niact; [distribution indicator not declassified]. Also sent niact to CINCPAC and to Vientiane and repeated priority to Bangkok and Saigon.
  2. Sam Sary was a former Cambodian Ambassador to the United Kingdom. After being recalled from London under a cloud of personal scandal, he went into opposition against Sihanouk and became a proponent of pro-Western neutralism. After Sihanouk’s Kampot speech, Sam Sary escaped to Thailand, and the Cambodian Government arrested many of his followers. On February 3 and 7, President Eisenhower was alerted to apparent coup plotting and Sihanouk’s knowledge of it and his intention to denounce it as Western-inspired. The President was informed that a coordinated South Vietnamese and Thai effort expected Dap Chhuon, “a war lord in Western Cambodia,” to join the plot. (Synopsis of Intelligence and State material prepared by John Eisenhower, January 3 and 7; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries; included in the microfiche supplement)
  3. January 10.
  4. Ambassador Johnson queried whether it was wise to assure Sihanouk of contined U.S. support in light of his involvement with China. He recommended a categorical denial of U.S. support for Cambodian dissidents. (Telegram 1713 from Bangkok, January 13; Department of State, Central Files, 751H.00/1–1359; included in the microfiche supplement)
  5. Instructions were sent to Strom through non-Department of State channels to inform Sihanouk that the United States not involved in Cambodian internal affairs. These instructions are summarized in a briefing memorandum from Kocher to Robertson, January 16; Department of State, FE/SEA (Cambodia) Files: Lot 63 D 73, Coup Plots Jan–Dec 1959; included in the microfiche supplement)