78. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 5, 19581
SUBJECT
- Cambodian Recognition of Communist China
PARTICIPANTS
- Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- J. Graham Parsons, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
- Carl W. Strom, Ambassador to Cambodia
- Brig. General Hartshorn, Chief of MAAG, Viet-Nam
- Alvin Roseman, Chief of USOM, Viet-Nam
- Capt. B.A. Robbins, USN, Regional Director, Far East, OASD/ISA
- Gardner E. Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Economic Affairs
- Eric Kocher, SEA
- Alfred le S. Jenkins, SEA
- Joseph A. Mendenhall, SEA
The purpose of the meeting was to examine Cambodian recognition of Communist China, its consequences and the U.S. response to this action.
Reason for Recognition. Mr. Robertson noted that Sihanouk had stated that recognition had been under consideration for two years. He said that he personally did not accept the view that the recent border incident between Cambodia and Viet-Nam had led to recognition. Ambassador Strom said that the Cambodians considered the Vietnamese, not the Chinese, as their great enemy, and that he believed that the series of incidents between Cambodia and Viet-Nam triggered recognition at this time.
Importance of Cambodia. General Hartshorn said that CINCPAC considered Cambodia as the hub of the wheel in Southeast Asia in view of its location south of Laos and on the flanks of Viet-Nam and Thailand. Mr. Robertson asked Captain Robbins about the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the strategic significance of Cambodia. Captain Robbins replied that there has been no formal expression by the Joint Chiefs, but one of them had recently expressed informally a view identical with that of CINCPAC’s.
U.S. Assets In Cambodia. Ambassador Strom and General Hartshorn agreed that the Army, which has been considered the best anti-Communist asset in Cambodia, is loyal to the throne and to Sihanouk and would follow wherever Sihanouk led. Mr. Robertson asked whether there was any awareness in the Army of the Communist threat, to which General Hartshorn replied that in general he thought there was no real recognition of the danger. Ambassador Strom and [Page 245] Mr. Roseman listed the following as U.S. assets: (1) [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had sent a message to the Ambassador after recognition of Red China that he was loyal to the monarchy and to Sihanouk, but that he was a patriot above all and loved his country more than either of these.2 [2 line of source text not declassified] (2) A middle level governmental official informed Ambassador Strom at a secret meeting just before the latter’s departure from Phnom Penh that an anti-Communist group had just been formed among young government officials who desire American assistance for their program. (3) Cambodian business men opposed to the Communists also represent an asset. (4) The police administration, in which we are involved in depth with our aid program, is also an asset, but in a show-down its loyalty to Sihanouk might prove superior to anything else.
Ambassador Strom stressed that he does not agree with President Diem that there is any serious opposition to Sihanouk within Cambodia.
U.S. Aid to Cambodia. Ambassador Strom’s view was that the U.S. should not eliminiate or reduce its military or economic aid to “punish” Cambodia. We should proceed with the substantial reductions already contemplated on economic grounds, but should continue to support Cambodia’s military forces and economic development on a gradually declining basis so long as Cambodia in fact maintains its independence and does not begin to act like a Communist satellite. Mr. Roseman explained that it had already been planned to cut military budget support by 10% a year for the next five years, and, after the completion of the big investment projects in the program this year and next year, to cut back economic assistance to about $5 million per year, largely in technical assistance. He noted one possible new capital project is under discussion—a technical high school. He felt that the possibility for politically motivated cuts did not really exist, since a cut of $1 or $2 million would simply cause projects to be shifted to the Communist aid program. General Hartshorn said that CINCPAC believes that Cambodia should be given a warning which would consist of notification that the aid program is being re-examined and that we are carefully observing Sihanouk’s course following the recognition of Communist China. CINCPAC considers this necessary because of Cambodia’s neighbors who are watching the U.S. reaction to this development. CINCPAC further believes that if there is any cut in military assistance—which it would prefer to avoid—the reduction should be in hardware, and not in force maintenance items. In this connection, General Hartshorn stated that the Cambodians generally do not know what is in the projected FY 59 Military Aid Program.
[Page 246]Mr. Robertson summarized the Country Team position as being that, to the extent possible in light of appropriations, the U.S. should carry on its aid program in FY 59 as it has in FY 58. He said that we are all agreed that we should not terminate our aid program as a result of the recognition action since that would mean abandoning Cambodia to the Communists. He also noted that Sihanouk would not live forever. He said that we are all agreed that we should not now decide on changes in our aid programs in Cambodia for political reasons, but should allow the normal process of reductions because of appropriations and pre-existing Country Team’s plans to take place. He added that it may be necessary to re-examine this question on the basis of the results of Sihanouk’s visit to Peiping.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/8–558. Secret. Drafted by Mendenhall on August 8 and cleared by Kocher and Robertson.↩
- Reported in telegram 139 from Phnom Penh, July 26. (Ibid., 793.02/7–2658)↩
- This course of action was sent as a policy instruction in circular telegram 150, August 11. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/8–1158)↩