Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

77. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

Phnom Penh, July 25, 1958—4 p.m.

127. Department pass Defense. CINCPAC for POLAD. I saw Sihanouk 8:30 today, two hours after radio announcement recognition Red China.² Penn Nouth, DCM also present. (Cambodia and Chinese notes on recognition dated July 18 and 19 respectively.)

1. After reference announcement I said Department had been concerned some time over developments Cambodia; that I had been invited proceed Washington; that I would leave 27 or 28. I continued that for two years there has been sharp policy difference between US and Cambodia, US recognizing danger of new colonialism represented by Soviet and Chinese expansionism to newly independent nations that are determined to maintain their independence, while Cambodia had chosen position neutrality. I enumerated victims this colonialism. In spite substantial assistance US has given Cambodia it has never attempted force Cambodia adopt its point of view but has respected RKG choice neutrality policy. US had believed neutral position between two opposing blocs, particularly as regards recognition divided countries, was an essential feature Cambodian neutrality. Recognition Red China was to us important departure from policy long held, particularly since Cambodians had stressed it as, for example, Monseigneur himself in his article in this month’s issue of Foreign Affairs.

2. Sihanouk said there had been three factors in recognition decision:

(A) China is great country nearby and a reality; he said he understood our attitude on Taiwan and in particular its strategic importance to Western position but to Cambodia Taiwan was only a small island and mainland China is actually China; that Korea and Vietnam were truly divided but he did not consider China really a divided country; that he should have recognized Red China two years ago and it had been under consideration since Bandung and his visit to Peiping.

(B) He had delayed action on recognition two years since Cambodia was located between two countries committed to West and he had not wanted antagonize West, but when speaking of policy on divided countries he had never indicated that it was necessarily a permanent policy that would not be affected by events.

(C) Policy followed last two years had proved unsuccessful.

Cambodia had been criticized by everyone, particularly by “SEATO-ists” and seemed have no friends. At this point I pointed out Vietnam was not member SEATO, that he had initiated rapprochement with Thailand and there was no possible evidence that any remaining SEATO members were not his friends. He merely smiled and continued, saying, in particular, continued aggression on part RVN has led to demand on part all Cambodians for change. Ban Pak Nhay was merely “drop which made vessel overflow.” Despite fact French-defined boundary had been drawn in favor Vietnam, nevertheless Vietnamese had continued their efforts to take bits Cambodian territory. There had also been instances of interference inside Cambodia. He made it clear it was Vietnamese attitude over last two years which had caused change in policy on divided countries.

3. I said recognition was not fait accompli. Our policy of support for Cambodia, for monarchy, and for throne had been based on belief Cambodia, in spite policy neutrality, had sincere desire maintain its independence. I asked what the future held in this respect and whether or not effect of RKG action on Chinese community would not seriously limit Cambodia’s ability resist Communist subversion and maintain its independence. I pointed out that there has been a balance between pro-Communist and non-Communist elements in Chinese community; that recognition will strengthen pro-Communist elements and greatly discourage non-Communists; that it will further limit ability RKG continue its efforts control Communist teaching in Chinese schools particularly as regards use Communist text books and employment Communist teachers.

Hitherto there has been a Chinese Communist and a non-Communist [press]. Chinese Communist press has engaged continuously in violent polemics against West. I asked if we could not expect now to see stepped-up attacks against Western position not only in Chinese Communist press but also in Vietnamese.

4. As for Chinese community, Sihanouk said it was 99% in favor Peiping, only rich Chinese favoring Taipei.

As for schools, he said government recognized necessity preventing all external political maneuvers in country and Penn Nouth said that they had a plan for controlling Communist teaching. As for press, he said, “I could issue a decree banning all polemics” and although he repeated this to me as if to ask me if he should, I made no reply. I went on to say that Communist influence extended even to Official Press Bulletin. I reminded Penn Nouth that I had spoken to him about this matter twice during 1957 and he agreed; I added I had taken it up several times with Sim Var but no improvement had been noted excepting during period 3 months when Pung Peng Cheng was Secretary State for Information (and Penn Nouth was Prime Minister). Excepting for this time, I said AKP had had strong Communist slant. I referred specifically to quotes of Hanoi and Peiping broadcasts in Official Press Bulletin for which headlines are supplied by Ministry itself, invariably picking up Communist line of text and thereby adopting this line as line of Royal Government. I showed Sihanouk several recent examples and spoke with some emphasis and bitterness on this point saying that excepting for period Pung Pear Heng was in charge there had been much evidence of strong Communist influence in this Ministry. In one of examples shown, Americans are referred to as imperialists. I objected strenuously to such characterization US in headline in Official Press Bulletin. Penn Nouth tried twice during this conversation to interject belittling remarks, that journalists have their own slants, etc., etc., but Sihanouk did not buy this and gave me categoric assurance that he would not evade his responsibility in this matter. He said that from this afternoon on I would no longer see US treated this way in AKP and if I did I should bring it to his personal attention.

I next said there were other features of the Chinese situation which interested me: For example, had consideration been given to future of Bank of China. Sihanouk said that they had not thought of this yet but that position of bank would remain unchanged. Penn Nouth interrupted to say that this was a technical question which would have to be investigated and on which the advice of Governor of Bank of Cambodia and Ministry Finance would have to be obtained and Sihanouk deferred to him. It was clear no decision has been made on bank and for at least short time there will be no change.

I next said I had had strong conviction during my service in Cambodia that rapprochement between Cambodia and Vietnam was an absolute necessity; that I believed that it was even more necessary now than it had ever been; that I had been very much distressed by breakdown his own démarche but encouraged again by report Nhu was planning visit Phnom Penh. I asked him if he still expected Nhu.

Sihanouk replied he had ordered Cambodian representative in Saigon to approach Nhu to assure him he would be welcomed warmly as guest of Palace if he came to Cambodia and Nhu had replied that he would give five days notice of his plans.

At end this part discussion Prince reiterated that, despite US view, no Cambodian would ever believe Chinese were more dangerous than Vietnamese.

I remarked that I should like to have audience with King and Queen to take leave of them before departing for US and Sihanouk asked Penn Nouth to arrange it. I have received appointment for 5:30 26th.³

Strom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.02/7–2458. Confidential; Priority. Repeated priority to Saigon and CINCPAC, to Taipei, Hong Kong, Bangkok, Vientiane, Tokyo, London, and Paris.
2. Robertson discussed Cambodian recognition of China with Ambassador Nong Kimny on July 25 in Washington. (Ibid., 793.02/7–2558; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. Strom reported on his audience in telegram 144 from Phnom Penh, July 27. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.51H/7–2758)