Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

63. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

CA–10436

Washington, June 14, 1960.

At 2½ hour restricted session (principals and two advisers only) morning June 2 there was extensive and spirited discussion of New Zealand position on recognition Communist China with all other delegates, especially Philippines, Australia and Thailand attacking Nash and in varying degrees supporting U.S. position. There was also discussion initiated by Nash of military planning, considerable discussion of Indonesia and some of Laos and Cambodia. Thai also bitterly attacked Nash’s remarks at plenary on dictatorships. It was firmly agreed no information concerning restricted session would be given to press, not even subjects of discussion.

Nash opened meeting by statement on military planning to effect New Zealand does not oppose military planning but it should be strictly military without political commitments or political decisions and completely secret. Political decisions can be made only when situation arises which may require implementation of plan. There can be no automatic commitment to take action. Planning should stop short of entering into negotiations with other agencies such as making arrangements with oil companies for fuel supplies. This was particularly important in the present situation in Laos where other side may misinterpret SEATO purposes in engaging in military planning. It is important that “lead not be given to Viet Minh”. Careful attention should be given not to involve SEATO in arguments between groups within a country simply on the basis of government allegations opposition is Communist. SEATO should not set out to back government regardless of its quality. Election campaigns in Laos and Viet-Nam both very disturbing and possible both countries might be running into “South Korean type difficulties”. Nash very pleased intervention of Hammarskjold into Laos and agreed what was required there was not arms but rather the establishment of decent living standards.

Secretary replied did not feel there was any serious substantive disagreement Nash on subject military plan as obviously military planning could be only carried point that political decisions required. However, planning immensely important and valuable and must be engaged in by all nations and all alliances. Agreed that we could not reach pre-judgments on whether any particular situation involved external aggression or internal subversion as opposed to simple disagreements between parties within country. The U.S. never anticipated that advance political decisions could be taken on implementation of plan. It appeared that as of this moment Laos had achieved degree of stability but it would be wrong to judge elections all over the world by the standards of countries advanced in democratic processes.

Serrano, with obvious reference to Nash’s statements in plenary, deplored that statements made on SEATO record supporting Chicoms as Chicoms would take much comfort from knowing that their case had been advocated even within SEATO which dedicated to frustrating Chicom designs. Philippines stoutly supported policy non-admission Chicoms in UN and non-recognition not only because Chicoms still international outlaw but for solid reason of Philippines’ own national interest. If Chicoms recognized Chinese minority Philippines which very influential in industrial and commercial life would switch allegiance to Chicoms with most serious effect on Philippine security. Philippines also saw no material benefits to recognition and even though might be able to obtain some goods from Chicoms at cheaper prices Philippines preferred paying a little higher price to obtain from free world. Chicoms would undoubtedly make attractive market for Philippine strategic goods which would flow to China rather than free world. Also in present state maturity Philippine people, recognition would endanger internal stability of Philippines. This not question of political science but matter of national survival and national existence. Serrano suggested discussion Chicoms be deleted from record of plenary sessions.

With respect to Indonesia Serrano said Philippines doing best to improve relations and asked what SEATO members individually could do to influence three principal factors in Indonesian equation—Sukarno, Army, and West Irian. Although Sukarno still has upper hand his strength is diminishing and while emergence of army rule would be improvement it was not answer to situation. Philippines feared for future of Indonesia. West Irian was banner under which all Indonesians would rally and Serrano feared that Soviets would capture and capitalize on this movement which could have decisive influence on Indonesian attitudes. Of course, SEATO as such should not take any position, it rather question for individual countries. Referring to recent $150 million Soviet loan to Indonesia Serrano said it his impression that U.S. aid was of “experimental probing type” while Soviets were making more massive attack in aid field which might tend switch Sukarno more towards Soviets.

Menzies agreed Serrano observations on internal Indonesian conditions and said that during his visit last December Sukarno seemed entirely uninterested in true problems of country. While some Ministers seemed very concerned great tragedy was that Hatta² most able in economic field was in semi-retirement. Said Australia on good terms with Indonesia except for New Guinea. It Menzies’ understanding that Indonesian claim to New Guinea not based on juristic grounds and Indonesia had refused Netherlands’ suggestion refer matter to World Court. However, Sukarno had at time Menzies’ visit categorically asserted that force would not be used in West New Guinea matter and Australia hoped no military assistance would serve support Indonesia in act of aggression against New Guinea where Netherlands’ sovereignty not seriously challenged even by Indonesia.

With respect to Chinese Communists Menzies endorsed Serrano’s statement and said while problem could be approached from legal point of view, the real question was political rather than legal. It was plain that no argument with Chicoms was going to be settled unless Taiwan was handed over to Chicoms, who had made it categorically clear that they rejected the two Chinas concept, and that their admission to UN inevitably involved exclusion of the GRC. This would represent superb diplomatic triumph for Chicoms. SEATO’s reason for existence is prevent relatively small nations being grabbed up by Chicoms and if SEATO countries took course of action which made Taiwan a pawn and handed it over to Chicoms, what becomes of SEATO? For SEATO it would be “ecstasy of suicide”. If legal claim of Chicoms to Taiwan was recognized Chicom attack on Taiwan could not be considered aggression. Therefore entire question “should be put back into refrigerator, not to be preserved but rather to be frozen under”. This was no time to seek a change of policy.

With respect to military planning Australia expected planners to prepare plans on alternative assumptions. Not least probable form of aggression in Treaty Area would be internal subversion. There might be merely internal contending parties or internal strife might be “deadly manifestation of Communist tactic.” It would be a calamity if plans including logistics not made and instantly available. Australia was not embarrassed by outside knowledge planning was going on.

Couve de Murville said he did not consider question recognition Communist China was matter for discussion now as realistically “no change could be expected in the near future”. He questioned Serrano’s implication that SEATO countries should support Indonesian claims West New Guinea so as to preclude Communist capture of this issue. He felt this dangerous game and there was not sufficient ground change in policy at present time. If this is done, what becomes of that portion of New Guinea not held by Dutch, Timor, etc. New Guinea is not really national question but rather a national slogan built up by Sukarno as diversion from domestic problems.

The Secretary commented that it seemed clear one common interest was to do all possible to assure that Indonesia did not attempt to use force in West New Guinea and Couve de Murville urged that influence be exercised on Indonesia to maintain calm and take no action.

Under Secretary Dillon set forth philosophy of U.S. program in Indonesia pointing out it was one of largest and most extensive technical assistance programs of USG and while it was not spectacular, but rather designed for long-range help, Indonesians seemed to like it and wanted to have it continued. Our military program was deliberate looking to the future along the lines set forth by Serrano, we seeing in army only possible stabilizing force in the country. Our earlier military aid program to Indonesia, which involved training for several hundred officers in the U.S., had paid big dividends and provided a wide area of intellectual support in army for its anti-Communist posture. He stated our present modest program of military aid primarily for army was limited to equipment that would not be helpful in any major aggressive action and that was required by internal security considerations. It was very much appreciated by the Indonesian Army, and Indonesia had readily and repeatedly given assurances it would not be used for an attack on West New Guinea or for any other aggressive action. The remainder of our assistance was given primarily under the DLF and Exim Bank, there having been 5 or 6 relatively small projects in the field of airlines, ports, railroads, and a cement plant. The primary problem in Indonesia has been its slowness in developing projects and while its financial position is very poor, we have avoided getting into the morass of budgetary support. As far as Soviet projects are concerned the Indonesians had not yet planned projects even for use of $100 million previous Soviet offer and recent $250 million Soviet offer will be implemented only when specific projects are worked out. However, for the first time Indonesian Government now appears to be undertaking beginning steps in some economic planning. Mr. Dillon did not therefore feel it was quite correct to term our programs there as being just probing in character.

Selwyn Lloyd said he had little to add on what had been said on Indonesia, it being U.K. policy to keep the line open to Indonesian Government. The U.K. had sold some Navy aircraft in Indonesia and obtained assurances they would not be used in any attack against New Guinea.

With respect to Chicom representation Lloyd agreed perhaps that it had been a pity it was talked about at the plenary session yesterday. He did not feel that there had been any real difference of opinion between him and the Secretary at that session. Theoretically, Communist China should be in the UN but practical problem at present was only that at appropriate time Communist China be committed under any nuclear test agreement or disarmament agreement. Lloyd agreed that question of Chicom recognition and admission to UN is political and that it should be so handled as not to diminish the chance of survival of small countries on its periphery. With respect to military planning Lloyd agreed with Nash that governments should not be politically bound by such planning and it was necessary to have military approval of the assumptions on which that planning might be based. He cited Lebanon as instance in which massive outside support to what had been internal dispute required quick and effective intervention to save situation. He pointed out that it was no good making political judgments if there were no military plans to implement those judgments.

Thanat Khoman said that he had opportunity for many conversations, particularly with Subandrio, during his visit to Indonesia last March and he did not feel that Indonesia would constitute a threat to Southeast Asia. He did not feel the present leaders of Indonesia are showing proclivity for Communism and cited the measures taken against Chinese minority. As to whether West New Guinea was a national slogan or a genuine national issue, all countries have such foibles. Indonesia showed great understanding of Thailand’s position and had told Thanat that if they were in same geographical position as Thailand they would probably have done the same with respect SEATO, etc. However, they had said they “could afford” their policy because are separated by wide water barrier “from the main threat”. Thanat said Indonesia undoubtedly has difficult internal situation and the PKI is strong. Major powers should give careful study to most suitable approach to the Indonesia question. Situation in Indonesia may well worsen but in any event will be heavily dependent on overall free world relations.

Thanat said he found it difficult to follow Nash’s arguments on Chicom representation feeling it paradoxical on one hand to discuss Chicom subversion and infiltration and on other hand to advocate recognition. Thailand internal situation is more acute than that of Philippines, Chinese minority population being much larger. Question of recognition of Chicoms was considered very weighty by Thais. Also Thanat thought Chicoms did not particularly care whether they were recognized by Thailand or other small countries. The big point for Chicoms was whether they would be recognized by U.S. However, from standpoint of Thailand he saw no gain and only great trouble from recognition. The two million or more Chinese in Thailand would tend to shift their allegiance from Taiwan to the Chicoms. There was also question of families of overseas Chinese in Communist China. He was absolutely certain the moment that any country in Southeast Asia recognized Chicoms Chinese residents in that country will shift their allegiance to Chicoms.

With respect to military planning Thailand pointed out poverty of its resources if action to be taken in SEA. However, whatever Thailand has will be placed at the disposal of SEATO if and when danger threatens especially if it is in the area of Thailand.

Thanat then went on setting forth Thai position with respect Cambodia, saying some members may not know all facts. Thailand had established and maintained good relations with all its neighbors except for Cambodia. After Cambodia broke off diplomatic relations, Thailand tried to restore relations on a normal level and Thanat visited Cambodia for this purpose in his attempt to create a climate of stability and harmony. Thailand was successful for a short period of a few months but since that time matters have become worse and worse. Cambodia is engaging in heavy propaganda in radio and press attacks against Thailand playing the role of a victim of Thai imperialism. Fact is Thailand does not covet one inch of Cambodian territory. With respect to the issue of disputed temple, this had been brought before ICJ by Cambodia and Thailand had accepted this, hiring lawyers, and taking steps to defend case in ICJ. It is evident that by playing the role of the victim Cambodia expects more sympathy, both material and psychological from both sides. He is sorry to say that this game seems to have succeeded to considerable extent. Thailand considered statements issued at time of recent Chou En-lai visit as very ominous and feared that Cambodia would be a base for further Communist operations against Thailand, even open attacks. Thailand sought the understanding of its friends and reiterated that threat of attack did not come from Thailand. Thailand particularly hoped that the press and “official circles” among its friends would understand Thai position.

Thanat then made bitter attack Nash’s statements at plenary on dictatorial regimes in the area, while expressing appreciation for understanding shown by Menzies. Thanat said that while Thailand lacked number processes of representative government, Thailand has not forsaken democratic principles and respects rights of people including freedom of speech, worship, travel, etc., including the “pursuit of happiness”. Thailand thought it better not to attempt at this time to have elections than to have them and cause turmoil in the country. It is Thailand’s intention to prepare firm and solid ground for representative Government and remarks thrown out by “some” in plenary session had deeply hurt. If Thailand’s presence SEATO group is objected to because of its form of government Foreign Minister would have no choice but to report back to his government so that it could consider whole situation.

Qadir stated that he had not interpreted Nash’s remarks in exactly the same sense as Thanat but with respect to Nash’s remarks on Chinese Communists he said that even though Pakistan had recognized Chinese Communists he wanted to ask what would happen to Formosa if Chicoms recognized by U.S. and admitted to UN. Was there any solution or any way out?

Nash responded at considerable length stating that he had never said Formosa should be handed automatically to Chinese Communists but should be totally demilitarized and neutralized and come under protection of international guarantees, possibly UN. It should be governed by its own inhabitants rather than by Chiang Kai-shek even though because of U.S. aid he understood GRC was doing good job. It would be necessary that Chicoms make concession on the position of Formosa if they are recognized. Nash then repeated at length and practically verbatim statement made in plenary with respect to Chicoms. Referring to the statements by Philippine and Thai representatives on Chinese minorities in their countries, he said that although New Zealand experience with Chinese was limited and the Chinese population in New Zealand is very small he was convinced that if the Southeast Asian countries recognized Communist Chinese it would make it easier for them to obtain loyalty of Chinese. The Chinese in New Zealand had worked very hard and they fine citizens. While recognition cannot be given now it must be given sometime. Arguments are heard recognition cannot be given when there is a crisis, and then when things are quiet it is said that it is not necessary. It is important to think the matter through and be prepared to “move forward” at some appropriate time when things are quiet.

With respect to Governments in area Nash said that he honestly believed that Pakistan was better governed by Ayub and recognized that Pakistan had a long journey to go to reach democracy, 81 percent of the people being illiterate. With respect to Thailand, when he was there a few years ago he saw progress under plan of increasing number elected representatives to Parliament but “then someone came along and seized power”. Important thing was that Governments be freely chosen by the people. Thought should be given to problem of governments which give no representation to those who differ from them and in this regard he thought particular attention should be paid to situation in Laos and Viet-Nam. He thought if elections in both those countries had been straight the Governments could still have won. However, the elections were not straight, problem now is what we should do. He did not intend to imply that Thailand should leave SEATO, perhaps it would be better if New Zealand would do so as it seems to be in minority of one.

Serrano then said that Nash’s position on Formosa took too many things for granted. He failed to recognize that existence of Formosa depended on three elements: U.S. support, support of the overseas Chinese, and support of other free peoples. If Chicoms were recognized and attempt made to establish a dependent and neutral Formosa a chain reaction would set in that would inevitably result in national death of Formosa. It was impossible for him to conceive of a separate Formosa.

Menzies then said that he could not agree with Thanat’s statement that Chicoms would attach no importance to recognition by small countries. He said nothing would suit Communists better than to isolate the U.S. on this policy so as to make issue appear as not one of freedom vs Communism but rather an issue of power politics between the U.S. and Communist world. If Communists succeeded in this it would be a disaster for all free world.

The Secretary heartily agreed Menzies’ remarks and said that he understood that Nash also agreed that now was not appropriate moment to consider recognition of Communist China. It seemed to him that question was whether Chicoms were going to change or whether we were going to change. After all it was up to Chicoms to redress the situation they themselves had created. Just as in Berlin case, which was entirely manufactured by the Soviets, why was it up to us to find a solution to problem which Soviets themselves had deliberately created. The logic that 600 million people could not forever be barred from representation in UN was irrefutable but it was clear that this was not the time and that we could not permit the Chicoms to crash their way into the United Nations.

The Secretary then referred to press reports that Soviet Union had made some disarmament proposals and speculated that the manner in which this was done indicated that the Soviets were attempting to move out of Geneva forum and to take disarmament into a new arena.

There was then considerable discussion of striking from the verbatim record of plenary statements made by various delegates on Communist China. During the course of discussion it was evident that several members of Council had not realized that a verbatim record had been kept of plenary. In reply to a query, Deputy Secretary-General said that 190 copies of record were distributed to the member governments under classification of “SEATO–Secret”. It was consensus that no attempt should be made at this time to remove remarks on Communist China from the verbatim record of plenary but that Council Representatives should discuss handling of record of political discussions in future meetings. It was noted that no record of political discussion was kept in CENTO but that NATO maintained verbatim record. Possibility of having Secretariat make summary record of political discussions was discussed as was possibility of having all such discussion in restricted session.³

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1688. Secret; Seato; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Johnson and marked for approval by the Secretary. Sent to Bangkok, Canberra, Djakarta, Karachi, London, Manila, Paris (also for USRO), Phnom Penh, Saigon, Taipei, Vientiane, Wellington, and CINCPAC.
2. Dr. Mohammed Hatta, Vice President of Indonesia, 1950–1956.

3. The Sixth Meeting of the SEATO Council concluded with a brief session on the afternoon of June 2. A summary is in circular telegram 1513, June 2. (Ibid.; included in the microfiche supplement) For text of the communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, June 20, 1960, p. 983.

   A memorandum by Parsons of a conversation between the President and Prime Minister Menzies of Australia on June 3 reads in part: “Mr. Menzies said that this had been a good conference and he was pleased that Prime Minister Nash had not got by with some of his remarks about Formosa and about the need to deal with the Chinese Communists.” (Department of State, Central Files, 379/6–360; included in the microfiche supplement) Another memorandum of the Eisenhower–Menzies conversation, by Colonel John S. D. Eisenhower, is in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Dairies.