Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

62. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions¹

Washington, June 1, 1960—10:35 p.m.

1507. Paris for Emb and USRO. SEATO Ministerial Council. At second closed session morning June 1 exchange views on matters affecting Treaty area continued with speeches by Pakistan, UK and US summarized below under I. Heads of all delegations commented on Military Advisers’ Report² which was duly noted (summary under II).

I

Pakistan

Qadir³ underlined need eliminate differences and disputes within Free World which Communists endeavoring exploit, e.g. Pakistan’s differences with India and Afghanistan. Communists have also shown their hand in Tibet, Northwest Frontier, Ladakh and Laos. Friendship proferred by Pakistan to India should be firmly grasped before it too late. China has real need for expansion which most likely to take place in Indochina, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Pakistan and India. In recent negotiations with India Chou might have got what he wanted, viz. time to consolidate position along India’s northern border. Commenting on statements yesterday by PriMin Nash, Minister said intentions of USSR do not look as innocent as Khrushchev had obviously succeeded in making Nash believe them to be. Soviet aspirations continue to include domination of areas giving access to Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea.

United Kingdom

Selwyn Lloyd assured colleagues of UK’s deep and continuing interest in Southeast Asia where there is prospect of steady deterioration. In Singapore UK had taken calculated risk in giving internal self-government. Present government is strong, left-wing but non-Communist and seeking to develop loyalty to Singapore not to China. However it beset by grave economic problems, unemployment and increase of population. UK feels cautiously optimistic. In Malaya situation is very satisfactory and in Burma satisfactory. With largest Communist party in SEA Indonesia is steadily deteriorating internally. President does not have obvious successor and his popularity has fallen as he tries to maintain balance between Army and Communist Party. UK has always supported Dutch juridically and has tried to bring about negotiated settlement of New Guinea dispute which must be settled peaceably. Only possible policy is to work with present government of Indonesia to try to keep it independent, neutral and aware of folly of armed attack on New Guinea. In Indochina situation is worsening and in Viet-Nam there is deterioration with insurgency likely to be stepped up but stopping short of overt aggression. Answer lies largely in determination and wisdom of GVN which with generous US aid and sufficient determination should be able to survive. One difficulty is balancing anti-Communist measures so as not to alienate non-Communist opinion. In Laos influence of DRV is being strengthened and RLG needs support. SEATO must be prepared to act in certain circumstances. UN presence one of most constructive ways of helping RLG and halting Communist influence. Important that RLG pursue moderate policies, not abandon neutrality and consult friendly governments. In Cambodia there would be quick improvement if relations with neighbors could be bettered. Despite failure of Summit general policy must be to try for relaxation of tension. China is not only in grip of Communism but there great deal of Nationalism. China will pursue truculent probing policy. It wishful thinking to imagine gap between USSR and China but interesting to note Soviets’ stepped up interest in SEA as evidenced by USSR’s attempts to impress Asians with Soviet superiority. As for propaganda offensives, there is question whether free world is acting effectively. Communists have given impression their aid to underdeveloped countries equivalent to free world’s while in fact actual delivered aid has been less than provided by UK alone. By such propaganda and by counting trade as aid Communists have been getting away with monstrous distortion of truth. They have also fostered impression they are only ones believing in disarmament. They must be convinced they will not get away with verbal pledges and uncontrolled promises. Re Mr. Nash’s remarks, we must remember many countries do not recognize Peiping which by actions in Tibet and India has not made it easy for governments to change nonrecognition policy. If agreement on nuclear tests is reached negotiations with China should take place. If there is world conference on disarmament China and West Germany must be represented. If we have general disarmament there must be a world authority with China included to keep peace.

United States

Secretary praised opening remarks of PriMin Menzies and emphasized utmost importance of fostering community spirit throughout SEA. Secretary then gave chronological review Summit Conference from which he reached certain tentative conclusions. Khrushchev’s demands represented fixed Soviet position from which he could not have had authority to depart while in Paris. There indications Khrushchev had concluded there little likelihood of having his way particularly in regard to Berlin and also that his conduct of foreign policy including visits to US and France was being questioned if not opposed within Soviet hierarchy. Also logical that some opposition raised by Chinese Communists found sympathetic response in Moscow probably among military. Khrushchev’s post-Summit behavior interesting for despite violent invectives there was no threat of particular actions and planned mass meeting in East Berlin was cancelled with Russian unilateral action toward East Germany postponed. While indications Khrushchev does not plan any rash action for time being we must keep our guard up. In China, there is no doubt failure of Summit was cheered. Since Chinese Communists had opposed Khrushchev’s line of personal relationships and peaceful coexistence it now likely there will be further probing actions particularly in Far East and possibly in Middle East. As for PriMin Nash’s statements that we have ignored the ChiComs the fact is we have had considerable negotiating experience with them at Korea and Indochina Conference and at Ambassadorial talks. In 97 Ambassadorial sessions no progress whatsoever has been made. In dealing with disarmament and nuclear test ban US has always envisaged discussions in Geneva would inevitably have to lead to inclusion of other nations including Communist China. But Chinese have made it quite clear that recognition of Communist China would require complete abandonment of Government in Taiwan as prerequisite to acceptance of membership in UN. ChiComs’ policy is to neutralize Japan, evict US from Pacific and to continue probing. Adherence to UN Charter involves acceptance of Charter’s principles. Communist China is still an outlaw before UN and still an aggressor. If ChiComs were recognized should Outer Mongolia, North Viet-Nam and North Korea be treated equally? What would be effect on overseas Chinese? Views of UK might be heard in restricted session tomorrow re what advantages have been gained by recognition of China.

II. Comments on Military Advisers’ Report

Thailand. Plans appear adequate but new developments elsewhere may necessitate revisions lest SEATO be caught unprepared. Exercises have been successful but there danger of relaxing and leaving initiative to enemies. In view deteriorating situation in area vigilance necessary. Given limited communications and transport facilities SEATO telecommunications network should be set up soonest and direct circuit Bangkok–Singapore established.

New Zealand. Military Planning Office has made good progress. Exercises have continued to be successful and provide visible earnest of concern for defense of area. Military Advisers do not determine policy but must plan to give effect to what Council desires. Work of planners very much appreciated. (Minister indicated he would seek certain further information in restricted session tomorrow.)

Pakistan. Good progress made in military planning. Exchange of confidential information with CENTO satisfying. It logical that there be closest possible cooperation and integration of plans between NATO, CENTO and SEATO.

United Kingdom. Planning especially important this year; program for coming year will be taxing. Difficult delicate work last year handled with great competence. Various SEATO organs are becoming increasingly interdependent. Threat assessments should be reviewed more frequently and there is need for military to work closely with Council Reps on many matters. Publicity given exercises must be looked at from political point of view; arrangements being made for consultations between Military Advisers and Council Reps welcome. Joint exercises demonstrate SEATO allies working together and are visible deterrents. However sense of balance needed lest they inflame delicate situations. Objective is to gain maximum defensive advantage and give opponents minimum propaganda advantages.

France. As planning based on many assumptions and unknown factors it must be flexible but specific enough to be realistic. MPO should have enough authority to function smoothly as study group rather than general staff, which has to take account views of eight nations.

Australia. Military planning has both intrinsic value necessary to reality of SEATO and extrinsic value in that planning and exercises have impact on others including some neutralists who may gain comfort from this work. Re publicity, difficult to know how far to go and when to stop. Happy balance must be struck. This work well enough known so that more publicity can be directed to economic and cultural fields.

Philippines. If military plans have to be implemented Philippines will do its allotted share and count hopefully on other members wherever it is deficient.

United States. Progress recorded by Military Advisers gratifying and those taking part in exercises complimented. Secretary General asked to record unanimous commendation of work of General Thornton and welcome to new officers. Re previous remarks on public relations, it gratifying to note close relationship between Military Advisers and Council as to degree of publicity to apply in specific exercises—a matter to be determined by joint action with political considerations receiving predominant consideration.⁴

For Paris Topol: Above may be used in your discretion at NAC.

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1688. Secret. Drafted by Daniel V. Anderson, cleared in FE and with Johnson, and marked for approval by Howard Jones. Sent to Ankara, Bangkok, Canberra, Karachi, London, Manila, Paris (also to USRO), Wellington, and CINCPAC for POLAD and pouched to Phnom Penh, Saigon, and Vientiane.
2. This report to the SEATO Council forms Annex H to the Report of the Twelfth Military Advisers Conference. (Department of the Army, SEATO Subregistry (Microfilm) Files, Reel S–3–60; included in the microfiche supplement) The Military Advisers’ meeting was held in Washington May 25–27.
3. Manzur Qadir, Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
4. A third closed session of the SEATO Council, held the afternoon of June 1, dealt with budgetary matters and technical, economic, and cultural programs. A summary is in circular telegram 1506, June 1. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1688; included in the microfiche supplement)