59. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State1

SCW D–4/11

MPO PLAN (5/C) TO COUNTER COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN LAOS

(To be used only if question raised at initiative of other Council Members)

Expected position of other SEATO members:

New Zealand, because of Prime Minister Nash’s strong personal views, is adamantly opposed to any political decisions being taken on Military Planning Office Plan 5/C, which is a military contingency plan for countering Communist insurgency in Laos. The MPO referred [Page 183] the plan to the Council Representatives for decision on certain matters requiring governmental level decisions. With the exception of New Zealand, all other Council Representatives have informally agreed on replies to most of the questions and the MPO is proceeding on the assumption that those replies would, if necessary to implement the plan, be affirmed by the Council. New Zealand’s objections extend to approval of the plan itself, naming an “appointed nation”, and agreeing on a command structure. While Mr. Nash has been willing to acquiesce in allowing the Military Planning Office to work out the wholly military details, he adamantly refuses to agree to any decisions in the Council Representatives. The U.K. would like to complete the plan, but is dubious about taking further political steps primarily because it does not wish to force Nash into a corner, but also out of distrust of Thailand, with its special interests in Laos, as “appointed nation”, and fear of Thai security leaks. The French are somewhat distrustful of Thailand for the same reasons. Australia, though it would like to complete the plan, does not want to collide head-on with Nash, and plans, together with the U.K., to approach Nash before the meeting with the proposal that Plan 5/C not be discussed at the Council meeting. Pakistan would like to make the remaining political decisions, as would the Philippines. Thailand would like to see the plan completed, but is not prepared to accept its role as “appointed nation” before a cost-sharing formula is agreed upon.

U.S. position:

Apart from Prime Minister Nash’s general position, recent political developments in Laos, which have increased the influence of Thai Prime Minister Sarit’s nephew, General Phoumi, in Laos, have led New Zealand, the United Kingdom and France to question the desirability of having Thailand as the appointed nation. Since the introduction of the topic may thus lead to an exchange of recriminations and expose these suspicions, we prefer that the topic not be discussed at the meeting, but if it is raised by Mr. Nash we believe the issue of whether the SEATO organization is to engage in meaningful military contingency planning must be squarely faced.

It is therefore recommended that any discussion of Plan 5/C be referred to the Military Planning Office, which is currently seized with the problem. Should it be necessary nonetheless to deal with the question, it is recommended that you stress that (a) effective planning is necessary as long as there is a possibility that military intervention might be required in Laos, (b) the knowledge that planning is going on has a healthy deterrent effect on potential aggressors, and (c) possible leaks, though deplorable, must not be allowed to stand in the way of planning.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1689. Top Secret. Drafted by Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., Special Assistant for SEATO Affairs in FE. Cleared in the Department of Defense, FE, and C. Prepared for the Sixth Meeting of the SEATO Council, held in Washington May 31–June 3.