58. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Parsons) to the Acting Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Military Preparedness in the Far East
The breakdown in the Summit talks,2 insofar as it may bring a shift in Soviet tactics from alleged desire for a détente to greater bellicosity, would seem to enhance the likelihood of renewed Chinese Communist adventurism in the Far East.
The Chinese Communists have made it abundantly clear all along that Khrushchev’s efforts, for whatever reasons, toward a relaxation of tensions were not in accord with their judgment as to the best means of furthering the world Communist revolution—i.e., in the light of the present stage of their own revolution. To the extent that Soviet restraints have been imposed on the Communist Chinese—and we believe such have been present—they may be removed or even replaced by sanctions of Chinese Communist probes in their area of influence, depending on how far the Soviets go toward reversing their détente policy. Such disturbances could, in fact, be used as rationale for a later [Page 180] Summit meeting, even if all-out cold war is not resumed as a result of Khrushchev’s recent attitude. Khrushchev for some time probably hoped that threats, bluster, and dramatic space achievements with military implications, combined with efforts (spurious or not) toward relaxation of tensions, might bring him closer to a Soviet solution of the Berlin problem which he doubtless finds increasingly embarrassing. After finding no evidence of Western willingness to retreat on this score as a result of his tactics he may well have concluded that his best recourse was to sabotage the Summit, adopt pressure tactics in vulnerable areas and thereby regain support both of the more Stalinist elements at home and of his Chinese partners. If so, the chances of “hot” wars (albeit initially small wars) in the Far East are probably greater than they have been for some time.
There are several areas in the Far East which would be tempting to the Communists for probing actions if failure to progress with respect to Berlin causes them to turn to the East. The most obvious of these is the Taiwan Strait, where “war every other day” is already going on in a desultory fashion. The Chinese Communists have refused to renounce the use of force in their attempts to solve the “domestic” problem of Taiwan, have increased artillery fire power in the Strait area by some 25% over their 1958 capability, have increased the number of air fields within fighter range of Taiwan to 13, have an unknown number of MIG–19s in Southeast China, have completed their ground-control intercept (GCI) net, and have given evidence of appreciably better pilot performance than that exhibited during the former Strait crisis.
Pathet Lao insurgent activity in Laos continues on a reduced scale, but the potential is present for markedly increased activity wth DRV assistance. The nature of the terrain, the problem of disloyal minorities (with several ethnic strains on both sides of the border), the weaknesses of the young Lao Government and the difficulty of proving outside Communist aid to the insurgents across the ill-defined jungle border, make Laos perhaps the most promising of all Far Eastern targets to the Communists.
Viet Cong terrorism in South Viet-Nam has been gradually increasing for some months, with no very promising solution yet in sight. This situation has somewhat eroded the prestige of Diem’s government. Meanwhile, DRV regular forces twice the size of the GVN’s are poised across the demilitarized zone.
The recent upheaval in the ROK has so far not lent itself to Communist exploitation, but until a new, strong government fully responsive to the people emerges, the Communists will be especially watchful for opportunities to turn popular dissatisfactions to their purposes.
[Page 181]Even before the Summit collapse FE was deeply concerned at the prospect of a possible drastic cut by the House Appropriations Committee in the requested Military Assistance appropriation for 1961. Recent studies have tended to indicate that with increasing Chinese Communist military power we might well be unable to turn back a determined Communist thrust in any of the above threatened areas short of the use of nuclear weapons, which we believe would bring virtually prohibitive political costs. Furthermore, at least in Laos the use of nuclear weapons would appear to be unprofitable in any event, and we could be faced with the necessity of striking elsewhere in order to relieve the pressure on Laos if it were persistent and great.
Particularly disquieting is the possibility of our having to fight on more than one front in the Far East. The Sino-Soviet side, with its continent-based military might, has the capability of presenting us with the need to fight more than one “small war” at a time. Even with the use of nuclear weapons our relative capability, considering the size and nature of our forces, our relatively more vulnerable positions, and the near-critical aging of most of our ships, is getting to the point where the need to fight on more than one front at a time would seriously embarrass us both from the standpoint of transport and of total military force available to the area without drawing from NATO or other commitments.
In effect, we are perforce at present counting on the ability of indigenous forces to hold an initial attack until UN and/or other mechanisms can “put the lid back on” before the maneuverability and adequacy of our own forces are tested in larger, multi-frontal conflict. If now, through appropriation cuts, we should be faced with the choice between modest modernization of indigenous forces, with concomitant sizeable cut-back in force levels, or maintenance of present force levels without modernization, we are in the present Far Eastern climate inviting risks which could imperil our position in the Western Pacific. Indeed, in view of continued Chinese Communist build-up of military power there begins already to be some question whether our basic security policies and NSC directives with respect to the Far East are fully realistic in terms of our ability, and that of our Asian allies, to back them up. Further cuts in MAP would almost certainly require a new appraisal of our broad commitments in the area.
There are, of course, arguments to support the thesis that trouble in Asia is not any more likely now than before. The Communists are doubtless aware that events at the Summit have prompted a higher degree of Western solidarity than has obtained for some time, and that this would probably be reflected in more ready support of Western efforts against Communist expansionist efforts in Asia. Too, if the “danger” to Peiping of a détente has passed for now, the regime may not feel the same compulsion to cause trouble in the Far East with a [Page 182] view to sabotaging détente efforts. Moreover, in the last few months, although not entirely successful, Peiping has made efforts to improve its image among non-Communist Asian countries. To this end it has signed border agreements with Burma and Nepal, and sent Chou Enlai to New Delhi to negotiate with Nehru despite earlier Peiping insistence that the meeting take place at a “neutral” capital. While these negotiations ended in failure, Chinese Communist propaganda did its best to cover up the fact. Furthermore, Chou’s most recent sortie to Cambodia is believed to have produced appreciably favorable results for Communist China’s prestige and influence. Peiping may hesitate to reverse this policy abruptly with bellicose moves of the type which caused widespread reaction against it in 1959. Finally, US policy on the Far East has shown no signs of weakening and this policy has been the major deterrent to Chinese Communist use of force against its vulnerable neighbors.
The fact we have not yet indicated any flagging of our determination in the area, and the resulting confidence and trust this has produced in Free Asia, is in itself the strongest argument for our being prepared for the worst—for by so doing can we best avoid the worst. Certainly if any people can “afford” the demands of preparedness, we can.