Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

498. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, December 31, 1960, 11:30 a.m.¹

Washington, December 31, 1960, 11:30 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• General Lemnitzer
• Secretary Merchant
• Secretary Douglas
• Assistant Secretary Parsons
• Mr. Allen Dulles
• General Cabell
• Mr. Steeves (State Dept.)
• Mr. Gordon Gray
• General Persons
• Mr. Hagerty
• General Goodpaster
• Colonel Eisenhower

The President opened by informing the group that he had been thoroughly briefed on the Laotian situation earlier in the morning² and asked if there were any new developments. General Cabell said he had just left a meeting of the Watch Committee, in which the conclusion had been reached that fairly sizeable forces were in operation in the northwest of Laos. About 1500–2500 troops were moving from the direction of North Viet-Nam into Laos. Although the origin of these troops is unknown, it is estimated that this force comprises about 5 Pathet Lao equipped battalions, with mortars. General Cabell and General Lemnitzer then showed the President a chart which indicated the areas of Pathet Lao resistance and the directions of the attack. This chart showed a large area of Pathet Lao-controlled territory north of Vientiane and an arrow from that area toward the east. It also indicated that Sam Neua Province is in the hands of the Pathet Lao, and another arrow drawn from that direction toward the west converges with the first at the town of Xieng Khouang. If these two forces join, they will cut Laos in half, isolating the north from the south. In addition to these two areas, a third direction of attack had its origin in Phong Saly Province southward into north central Laos. This last force appears to be exclusively Pathet Lao, although it can be well supplied from Dien Bien Phu in North Viet-Nam. It must be estimated that the entire Province of Phong Saly is in the hands of the Pathet Lao. Kong Le himself is north of Vientiane and Phoumi is commanding a force which is defending against the attack from Phong Saly. Identification of force is difficult, since North Laos is mainly mountainous jungle where tree cover is very extensive.

The President observed the possibility of creating great difficulties to operations by cutting the roads. He said that while we need more information before we can take overt action, we cannot afford to stand by and allow Laos to fall to the Communists. The time may soon come when we should employ the Seventh Fleet, with its force of marines.

General Lemnitzer then summarized the U.S. position as one of readiness Condition Two, meaning alert in place. The 503rd Airborne Battle Group is alerted on Okinawa, and 1400 marines are present with the Seventh Fleet Task Force. This Task Force includes the aircraft carrier Lexington, currently located in the Gulf of Tonkin, and the Bennington, a helicopter carrier in Subic Bay. Admiral Felt has asked for an augmentation of C–130s to increase his airlift capabilities. This has been granted and the aircraft will probably be sent to Bangkok.

General Cabell then told the President that CIA is watching carefully signs of movement of troops from an area south of Sam Neua to further cut the neck of Laos. If such materializes, it will then appear that the Communist objective is to take over the entire country rather than to create merely a Communist-occupied zone.

Mr. Merchant then informed the President that a message recently received indicated that Americans are evacuating Vientiane.³ Today’s courier flight from Bangkok to Vientiane has been cancelled. This seemed to him to be inconsistent with the actual situation, since there is no indication that Vientiane itself is being threatened. He said he intended to recheck this message. The President commented that people can get scared a long way back, and cited humorously the fact that some people were preparing to evacuate Paris during the Ardennes offensive.

Mr. Merchant then told the President that he and General Lemnitzer had agreed on the paramount necessity of identifying open intervention. He visualized our courses of action as threefold: (1) military action, (2) internal political action within Laos, and (3) broad international action. In the military area they agree that while open intervention must be proved before we can do much overtly, still we should not hold up on our military preparations. Mr. Merchant placed great weight on the necessity for effective action regarding the internal political situation in Laos. Boun Oum must be induced to allow his name to be formally confirmed by the Assembly as Prime Minister. Until this happens, the U.S. will be isolated in its support of Boun Oum. We must not threaten him with lack of support if he refused to accede, but we must use every kind of pressure short of that.

At this moment Mr. Merchant visualized no broad international action. He said Mr. Steeves had had a good talk with Hammarskjold at the UN, but at this time Hammarskjold was opposed to bringing the matter up in that body.⁴ Furthermore, the reactivation of the International Control Commission has been proposed and supported by the Indians, the USSR, and all members of the Communist Bloc. The British have found appeal in this course of action. We are not inclined to coerce Boun Oum into accepting the reactivation of that body at this moment; but perhaps this move will come later. Another proposal for which he has no brief is that of calling a meeting of those powers which met at Geneva in 1954. Finally, there is the proposal for overt SEATO Council action.⁵ This does not seem advisable as of today. Mr. Merchant feels that the Thais, the Filipinos, and the Pakistanis will probably stand by us in the SEATO Council; but the British and French will not support us in backing Boun Oum to the hilt at this moment. For now, Mr. Merchant recommends that we confine our activities to bilateral conferences with our friends.

To the President’s question, Mr. Merchant does not think that Boun Oum’s fears regarding unfavorable action of the Parliament are genuine. Indeed, Mr. Merchant thinks the Parliament would invest him by unanimous vote. His feeling is that Boun Oum fears losing face. When at Savannakhet, Boun Oum had declared Parliament dissolved. This statement makes him reluctant to place himself even for a short time at their disposal.

The President reiterated his feeling that Boun Oum must be induced to do so. He then mentioned his reply to a letter received from Prime Minister Macmillan this morning.⁶ The Prime Minister’s letter had dwelt on the necessity for legitimizing the Boun Oum government. In his reply, the President plans to emphasize the necessity for unified action, pointing out sharply that we had abstained on the “colonial” vote in the UN at the Prime Minister’s request for just this purpose.

The President then expressed the need for a detailed reconnaissance scheme to find out the exact nature of the military operations being conducted in northwest Laos. The aerial reconnaissance capabilities which were mentioned by the various members present included some C–46s as part of the CAT airline, some T–33s belonging to the Thais, which might be available tomorrow, and some U–2s presently located at Subie Bay. General Lemnitzer mentioned that the Lexington has a reconnaissance capability which could be exercised without overflight of North Viet-Nam. He pointed out that our best results thus far have come from the attaché plane which is accredited to the Laotian government, although it had been hit by gunfire a couple of days ago. This plane had actually secured pictures of the Soviets airdropping supplies. The President remarked humorously that for the first time in 50 years he had discovered the usefulness of an attaché. After some discussion, the President authorized the use of Thai aircraft and CAT aircraft for close-in tactical, visual and photo reconnaissance. He stated no objection to strategic reconnaissance but withheld permission for overflights of China.

General Lemnitzer then mentioned the necessity to stop the Russian airlift. The position of the Pathet Lao units is such that they can exist only on aerial resupply. Again the Thais possess a primitive type of fighter airplane called the T–6 which can be equipped with armament. It has a capability probably of shooting down an IL–14. The main difficulty is that the Laotian pilots are not yet trained and will not be for some weeks. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Douglas also mentioned that four B–26s which are not USAF planes, but belong instead to Thailand, can probably be available within the next few days. The President authorized the utilization of these aircraft [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as soon as possible.

Some discussion then transpired over our obligation to support Thailand in the event the Chinese retaliate, particularly in the light of the lack of diplomatic support we are receiving from our allies. Mr. Merchant pointed out that if Thai reconnaissance aircraft were shot down by Pathet Lao only, then we are merely helping a legitimate government in suppressing a rebellion. If shot down by Chinese, then we have indeed identified aggression. He visualized no problem on this matter. The President agreed and stressed once more the necessity to obtain identification of Viet-Minh or Chinese forces, so definite as to convince not only us but also our allies. General Lemnitzer pointed out that although personnel and equipment may not in themselves be identifiable, the fact of columns along the road just inside the Laos border will constitute evidence in itself.

The President then stressed the need for coordinated and decisive action. At this state of the game, since we are not in war, the State Department should chair our overall planning. Most important is to legitimatize Boun Oum and solidify our allies on our side. We should then see if we are faced with going into war. If war is necessary, we will do so with our allies or unilaterally, since we cannot sit by and see Laos go down without a fight.

Mr. Dulles pointed out the difficulties inherent in Souvanna’s present location at Phnom Penh. Here he is under the influence of Sihanouk, which is not helpful to our cause. Mr. Merchant said there are conflicting reports regarding Souvanna’s attitude; unfortunately, being rich, he is not subject to bribery. Mr. Parsons said the French have most influence with Souvanna, but are unwilling to induce him to leave the scene at this moment.

[1 paragraph (5½; lines of source text) not declassified]

General Goodpaster then pointed out our two more extreme courses of action, which consist of (1) sending in U.S. forces as in Lebanon, and of (2) putting on an air blockade. The President agreed that these courses of action are available, but emphasized caution in that we are almost alone in recognizing Boun Oum. He admonished the group to remember the necessity for identifying what the people of Laos want. General Cabell said that the mass of people in Laos are inarticulate. Furthermore, opinion is splintered, with true Laotians comprising less than half the population. Since many people are tribesmen, there is no true voice of the masses.

The President then summarized the actions we should take at this time. They are (1) induce Souvanna Phouma to resign as Prime Minister and possibly induce him to depart for France; (2) induce Boun Oum to allow his government to be legitimatized by the Assembly; (3) consolidate our positions with the British and the French; (4) alert the SEATO Council to the dangers which exist while not requesting specific overt action at this time; (5) make such changes and redeployments of our own forces as to maximize their usefulness in the event they must intervene against the North Viet-Namese. (Here the President recognized that new deployment must be accepted, but was satisfied when General Lemnitzer pointed out that we have three attack carriers available in the Far East.)

At Mr. Merchant’s suggestion, the President then authorized a serious approach to the Russians. He authorized Ambassador Thompson to tell Khrushchev that we view the situation with grave concern, that we are moving the positions of our forces to assure, if necessary, that the legitimate government will not be destroyed, and that in the event of major war we will not be caught napping. The President here half humorously suggested that perhaps we should begin to exercise our airborne alert.

As the meeting drew to a close, Mr. Dulles pointed out we had not discussed South Viet-Nam. Diem is undoubtedly very excited about this development. The President said he should think he would be. He authorized those present to tell the press that they had discussed the Laotian situation.

As the group left, the President reemphasized that we must not allow Laos to fall to the Communists, even if it involves war in which the U.S. acts with allies or unilaterally.

John S.D. Eisenhower

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Privileged. Drafted by John Eisenhower. According to another account of this meeting, the discussion lasted until 12:45 p.m. (Informal notes by Merchant, December 31; Department of State, Central Files, 611.51J/12–3160)
2. No record of this briefing has been found.
3. Telegram 1218 from Vientiane, December 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3160; included in the microfiche supplement)
4. The meeting on December 30 was reported in telegram 1866 from USUN, December 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3060; included in the microfiche supplement)
5. Brown raised this as a possible step by the Boun Oum government in telegram 1214 from Vientiane, December 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3160; included in the microfiche supplement)
6. Macmillan’s December 30 letter to Eisenhower and Eisenhower’s December 31 reply are in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File, Macmillan, and Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3160, respectively; both included in the microfiche supplement. Macmillan’s letter is also printed in The White House Years: Waging Peace, 1956–1971, p. 717.