Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

497. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, December 29, 1960—9:44 p.m.

698. Vientiane’s 1197, 1199 and especially 1200² present US Government with the most serious problem yet encountered in this long series of events Laos. In our effort to provide sympathetic international atmosphere for new provisional government of Laos and in our attempt to rally necessary free world support, present government’s delay in legitimizing status already highly embarrassing and if not consummated in the very near future can spell failure in this very crucial diplomatic effort.

RLG’s unwise act in illegally removing kip, talk of dividing the Kingdom and of throwing out the French could completely cripple our best efforts in bringing support, relief, military and political assistance to the present government which they must have if they are to survive.

Grave questions concerning legitimacy, responsibility and intentions of the new government already widely evident even in friendly capitals, being exploited to the hilt by our enemies and now beginning to emerge US domestic circles. Unless rapid forthright effort is made by the King and Boun Oum/Phoumi government to rectify this situation our current efforts to rescue Laos may be heading for disaster.

You are therefore instructed once again to bring these facts of life clearly to Phoumi and Boun Oum as well as any other cabinet members considered in possession of any influence and if feasible reiterate them to the King. Without threatening the withdrawal of all US support at this juncture you should seek immediate assurance that the following actions will be taken:

1. Restoration of kip to a suitable safe treasury in the capital in order allow US to continue to provide the necessary legal dollar backing.

2. Take whatever steps necessary to place unquestioned cloak of legality over present government so that all ambiguity erased with respect to government of Laos which will facilitate Herculean efforts US is making to gain international support.

3. To cease agitation or action directed toward removal of the French Military Mission until some future period when RLG-French relations can be discussed in much quieter time. To open feud with French at this moment would only ensure their opposition to the present regime and make our task of restoring order infinitely greater.

4. To give us unqualified assurance that government is working for a unified Laos with no thought of division into separate entities. If this idea gains credence much of what we are allegedly fighting for is nullified. If Vientiane is to be maintained as the administrative capital, government should establish itself there as rapidly as possible to lay to rest any idea that present regime is maintaining a reserve ace in the hole in Savannakhet.

5. Opportunity should be taken again to urge upon the RLG the absolute necessity of complying with our request previously submitted re protest to the USSR circularization to the UN members on external interference by communist forces in order that US is not charged with running unilateral show in Laos not endorsed even by the RLG.

6. To refrain from unwarranted and uncoordinated changes in military logistical structure which because of their budgetary implications would place US Government in untenable position in regard to future requests to Congress for aid funds. (Ourot Souvanavong former Ambassador here has vivid knowledge of problems faced by Department in past years in defending Laos aid program.)

7. To avoid gratuitous attacks on Geneva accords and statements of RLG attitude on them which will merely isolate RLG yet further.

While we feel most strongly on these and other collateral points we must leave tactics and manner of approach to palace and the government entirely in your hands. You should not however without further assessment threaten US withdrawal of support. It would be our suggestion that Lao, particularly leaders other than Phoumi himself, generally respond better to soft sell. Perhaps it might therefore be worth attempting you and CT arranging to meet with principal Ministers on informal basis and reviewing in suitably relaxed atmosphere present situation and foregoing points.

It appears to us you should stress US friendship for Laos and our consequent concern over present developments on basis their own self interest. They should realize that our information from capitals all over world indicates that RLG is extremely vulnerable and is in fact really only being fully supported by US, Thailand, Philippines, Viet-Nam and GRC. If Laos case were to come up before UN right now, Laos would find little sympathy. Thus it appears to us that their survival not only as a government but even as a nation depends on strengthening their position internally and internationally. All our advice has been to that end and in our eyes in interest of Laos and of themselves. On internal front you might indicate that one measure which might greatly strengthen RLG’s position would be an offer of amnesty not only to Kong Le troops but also to PL. PL who surrendered should be well treated. This measure might well serve to sap PL capabilities which as things going at present cause us grave forebodings.

If no results are obtained, then we are considering recalling you for consultation and informing Lao of reasons for this action.

For Bangkok. Believe Sarit should be told of these serious developments in Laos and of the essence of this presentation, asking him to use any channel open to him to assist us in convincing Phoumi of the wisdom of these actions.

For Paris. While general exchange of views will continue here in Washington including the French believe it may be profitable to impress upon the French that hesitancy their part wholeheartedly to support the King’s provisional government in Laos is in our opinion beginning to produce dangerous further deterioration French-Lao relations. Not only should they make haste to set to rest any continuing fears which Boun Oum–Phoumi government have of French intentions but they should go out of their way to restore Lao confidence.

Merchant

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–2960. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Steeves and Chapman, cleared by SEA and in draft by Merchant, and approved by Parsons. Also sent niact to Bangkok and to Paris and repeated to Saigon, London, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. In these telegrams, all December 29, the Embassy reported on political developments within Laos that were disturbing to U.S. policymakers. (ibid., 751J.00/12–2960, 651.51J/12–2960, and 751J.00/12–2960, respectively; all included in the microfiche supplement)