Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

487. Memorandum for the Record of a Telephone Conversation Between the President and the President’s Staff Assistant (Goodpaster), Washington, December 14, 1960¹

Washington, December 14, 1960

I phoned the President at Walter Reed Hospital² at about 7 PM on December 14th concerning the development of the situation in Laos. Secretary Douglas, Admiral Burke, and Deputy Under Secretary Hare had discussed the situation with Colonel Eisenhower and me for about an hour prior to this time, and were present during my talk with the President.³

I told him that the discussion had brought out that, while the situation in Laos was not clear, there seemed to be several major favorable trends and developments. The capital city, Vientiane, had been taken in large part by the pro-Western forces of Phoumi. Also, a pro-Western government under Boun Oum had come into power by apparently legal processes. Two points were giving concern—the airport at Vientiane which is of key importance for the Soviet support of pro-Communist elements has not been taken by Phoumi, although he asserts it is “neutralized,” and there are reports of pro-Communist movements on Luang Prabang.

The development of the situation has given rise to several questions regarding U.S. policy and action. First, what would our policy be concerning the use of Thai aircraft for transport of military and non-military supplies into the area, and perhaps the movement in of a military hospital. Second, what would be the position regarding U.S. delivery in U.S. aircraft of limited military and non-military supplies, disaster relief supplies, and the Thai military hospital, should such transportation prove necessary, i.e., should the Thais be unable to handle the job. A third question is whether we would favor the use of Thai land and air forces to take or to hold the airfields, one at Vientiane now under pro-Communist control, and the other at Luang Prabang under control of Phoumi’s forces; the idea would be for our representatives in the field to have authority to agree with the Thais upon this action, should it be deemed necessary on the spot. Finally, what would be our position regarding reconnaissance of Laos by Thai aircraft, and of North Vietnam by U.S. aircraft?

I mentioned two related points. The first is that the proposal to use Thai or U.S. transport aircraft for support is dependent upon gaining control of the airfield at Vientiane, even if briefly. Phoumi has made a request for some 20 105-mm Howitzers with ammunition. The second point is that Sarit has stated that, if Thai combatant forces are used, he would want a firm commitment from the U.S. to come to his support should he be “jumped” by the Chinese or the Russians.

The President said that, in the situation described, he wanted to be as firm as we can be. He thought we should act vigorously, now that we have the cover of legality, in that we are responding to the request of a legally constituted government. He noted that we are committed through the SEATO pact to maintaining the security of the area of Laos, even though Laos is not itself a member. He said he was completely in favor of the use of Thai transport aircraft, and U.S. transport aircraft as well. He asked if we had such aircraft available in the area, and I told him I understood from Mr. Douglas that we do have one or more C–130s there. I told the President I thought the other questions could and should await further developments, and the group present agreed. The President suggested that an immediate check of feasibility be made as to the possibility of using high-altitude reconnaissance equipment to reconnoiter North Vietnam. Mr. Douglas undertook to do this.³

The President further suggested that an immediate check be made of the possibility of giving a bonus to the troops of Phoumi to reward their success and inspire further effort. He said he would be agreeable to using emergency funds for this purpose. Mr. Douglas undertook to look into this at once.

I communicated the foregoing to Mr. Douglas, Mr. Hare and Admiral Burke.

G.
Brigadier General USA

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on December 16.
2. President Eisenhower was at Walter Reed Hospital all day on December 14 for a physical examination.
3. See supra. Burke’s account of the meeting with Goodpaster and Colonel Eisenhower and the telephone call to the President is in Naval History Center, Burke Papers, Originator File, Laos.
3. An undated plan of operations for photographic and electronic: reconnaissance of Laos, North Vietnam, and South China by U–2 aircraft was submitted to Goodpaster, who wrote the following note on the plan: “No action unless new recommendation submitted. G” (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Intelligence Matters)