Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

486. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, December 14, 1960—11:02 p.m.

641. Paris for Merchant and Parsons. High level JCS–State conference² just concluded in which there was thorough review of the political, military situation in Laos based upon recent communications and intelligence estimates. Particular attention centered on Vientiane. There follows a résumé of most important considerations on which your and Merchant, Parsons early comment is solicited:

1. With formation of new anti-Communist provisional government we now have much greater freedom of action than previously existed under which certain limitations and restrictions were imposed upon us. This fact facilitates our action in cooperation with the RLG in meeting the urgent problems which now face us.

2. For purposes of clarity and appropriate use in certain forums, especially for press purposes, it would be very helpful if the RLG could make a public pronouncement referring to the threat to her integrity which exists and of the request for assistance which she has consequently made of the United States.

3. Note was made of the need for additional artillery. Information indicates that supplies in Thailand are adequate to meet requirements and the JCS is taking action through CINCPAC to facilitate delivery as expeditiously as possible.

4. In discussing the use of special Thai forces it appears that the situation now in Vientiane does not require their utilization in this situation. However, their employment should be kept in mind if subsequently required, especially should such key points as Luang Prabang require emergency assistance.

5. In view of the changed political situation no restrictions should be imposed on the utilization of CAT civil aircraft for the ferrying of supplies or troops of any type to any point required.

6. As under para 5, there would likewise seem to be no prohibition to the use of US aircraft being utilized in direct support of our military and economic aid operations to Laos.

7. From here it would seem that one of the most urgent requirements for Vientiane may be medical assistance. Preliminary checks reveal that there are field hospitals in readiness for airlift from Thailand which could be supplied in response to immediate request. If required this request should be initiated.

8. In addition to possible medical requirements similar action may be required for emergency lift of supplies and personnel and [for?] disaster relief. If early estimates of magnitude can be supplied this would assist for planning purposes.

9. The whole question of reconnaissance for intelligence purposes came up for intensive review. In view of the fact that the next most immediate danger may be a buildup of dissident elements within the country or preparations for assistance from across the border, aerial reconnaissance is deemed imperative. Whether this operation carried out by US or Thai aircraft, it would appear impossible to restrict operations to the Thai side of the border.

10. In view of somewhat restricted mission PEO who in past confined activities to training mission responsibilities should include military advice to FAL. Presume present staff adequate for this purpose.

11. Consideration given to appropriate steps which may be taken in the United Nations citing Russian interference. A separate message covers this action.³

12. Strong response to Russian note of protest being prepared and should be ready for release tomorrow.⁴

Following JCS meeting, General Goodpaster was given account, which he communicated to President, saying purpose mainly to acquaint him with questions which might be upcoming but that his specific views regarding use of Thai and American aircraft would be helpful.⁵

President replied that he felt broad governing principle should be to be as firm as we can within framework of legality. He saw no problem re use of either Thai or American planes for delivery of military or non-military matériel. He would be inclined approve Thai reconnaissance over Lao territory if question raised. Re use of Thai forces, concept of their use to relieve Vientiane was attractive but he understood immediate decision not required. Finally, he suggested that if Phoumi forces successful and some fillip to maintain morale of troops would be helpful, he would be glad use emergency fund for purpose.⁶

Henderson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–1460. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by Steeves, cleared by SEA, and approved by Hare. According to Hare, it was cleared by Goodpaster. Repeated niact to Paris and Bangkok and to London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and CINCPAC for POLAD. Merchant and Parsons accompanied Secretary Herter to Paris where he attended the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting.
2. An account of this meeting, which took place at 4 p.m., is in a memorandum for the record by Colonel E.F. Black, Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2170; included in the microfiche supplement)
3. See Document 488.
4. The translated text of the Soviet note of December 13, charging U.S. and SEATO intervention in Laos’ domestic affairs, and the text of the U.S. note of December 17, rejecting that charge and blaming the Soviet Union and its allies for “the present fratricidal war,” are printed in Department of State Bulletin, January 2, 1961, pp. 15–17.
5. See infra.
6. That “fillip” took the form a bonus of one month’s pay for each of the soldiers of the 10 battalions engaged in taking Vientiane. The cost, $232,000, was paid by the Embassy in Vientiane out of counterpart funds in early January 1961. (Memorandum from Stoessel to Goodpaster, January 13; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Files, Laos)