Office of the Historian

477. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1

Vientiane, December 7, 1960.

IN 13693. Ref: Out 50265.2 To Asst Sec State Parsons from Ambassador Brown. As appears from Embtel 10813 I fully concur idea your mesasge to King. Phoui, however, now in Savannakhet. Will try to arrange his travel Luang Prabang. If he is not available would you object have message delivered by Khamphan Panya or most effective interlocutor Methven can find? Hope my suggested revision of your note as oral message from you to King, thought necessary in order permit its delivery by other interlocutor than Phoui, is not violation your basic intent.

I believe it would help to have Phoumi’s immediate support and with your permission will request Corcoran or Hasey brief Phoumi orally and suggest his strong support.

Discussion here brought out two suggested modifications:

(1)
It was thought advantage could be gained through playing up RLG inability administer aid effectively and lack prospect thereof.
(2)
Reftel indicates (A) our lack confidence in King’s ability obtain Assembly quorum outside Vientiane, (B) our belief coup would provide most preferable alternate means establishing and legitimizing new govt and (C) possible necessity if neither (A) or (B) works that King appoint Royal Govt. The message has been revised to suggest this sequence. Events may of course overtake and render sequence obsolete.

Substance message to be passed orally to interlocutor follows and your instruction requested:

1.
Should be asked convey Sec Parsons’ personal respects to His Majesty and say that Sec Parsons recalls with pleasure audience granted him his recent visit.
2.
Should continue by indicating Mr. Parsons’ expression strong interest of United States in helping the Kingdom preserve its independence and in continuing the economic, military, and moral aid to the Kingdom necessary to that end.
3.
His Majesty, Sec Parsons hopes, will understand that the United States continues desirous as always give support to anti-Communist Laos but this will require urgent political action on part of King [Page 995] and other anti-Communist Lao because point has now been reached where government, which is widely recognized as government of country, has formally requested that anti-Communist forces, who are regarded legally as having status of rebels, be deprived of arms and ammunition which they need if they are to defend independence of the Kingdom. It remains for Lao patriots to decide if this is fate they wish for Army and for their country.
4.
Sec Parsons appreciates that His Majesty will have noted that the existing conditions, particularly in view of the government’s note of Dec 2,4 make the rendering of effective assistance virtually impossible without placing the United States in an internationally untenable situation. It appears extremely doubtful that the present government can any longer hope to re-establish conditions under which the Kingdom at large can receive the benefit of American aid. Even with such aid as is being rendered it appears unlikely that the government will be able to maintain the independence of the country.
5.
If His Majesty wishes such aid as the United States can provide be continued we strongly hope that His Majesty will deign to call a meeting of the National Assembly and non-Communist Lao leaders at Luang Prabang at the earliest possible moment to bring about a government which will permit the effective distribution of American aid, and at the same time take a firm position against further PL encroachment and further dependence upon Soviet Union and international Communists.
6.
Sec Parsons understands that the possibility exists that the National Assembly and non-Communist leaders might not be able to assemble a quorum in Luang Prabang. He understands further that rumors have been reported of intentions on the part of certain patriotic leaders, if the convocation of the Assembly in Luang Prabang is prevented by force, to meet force by force to establish a new government in Vientiane, better able to guarantee the free exercise of Constitutional procedures.
7.
Should, in their turn, such intentions not materialize, Sec Parsons hopes that His Majesty, considering the dangers which each delay greatly augments, will not hesitate to exercise that responsible leadership which a people expect their Monarch to assume in times of national crisis, by appointing directly an effective government of His Majesty’s own choosing, which could be subject to approval or revision by the Assembly once the Kingdom has been effectively reunited by this government.
8.
Sec Parsons wishes to assure His Majesty of the continued respect and confidence which the people and government of the United States place in His Majesty and their hope for the privilege of continuing their aid to his Kingdom in its struggle to maintain its integrity and independence.

  1. Source: Department of State, FE/SEA (Laos) Files: Lot 65 D 169, 350 POL Affairs, Dec 1–10, Laos. Secret; Operational Immediate. Also sent to Bangkok. This telegram [1 line of text not declassified]. The source text is undated but was presumably sent on December 7.↩
  2. Not further identified.↩
  3. Supra.↩
  4. See footnote 2, Document 475.↩