476. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1081. CINCPAC for POLAD. Addressees pass interested agencies.
- A.
- Situation moving very rapidly but many key elements still
confused.
- 1.
- Phoumi has apparently captured Pak Cadinh and is moving on Paksane in pursuit retreating Vientiane forces.
- 2.
- Phoumi has now designated Kouprasith as principal coordinator various coup efforts Vientiane with Boun Oum as political advisor. Indications are various coup activities well under way.
- 3.
- Meanwhile government forces have got wind of some impending attack on city, possibly based according French sources on reports Phoumi forces sighted across Mekong. Security precautions have been tightened. Operational contacts with Kouprasith, Ngon and others becoming increasingly difficult for us.
- 4.
- PL radio is claiming LP surrounded and Souvanna told Addis his troops hold hills around LP. Souvanna told me however he had withdrawn his troops from LP and Bounleuth’s intelligence [document number not declassified]2 confirm this. CH/PEO and ARMA believe Phoumi forces now LP have capability hold city successfully against PL forces presently reported in vicinity LP. Phoumi apparently shares this view, to extent at least that he is willing withdraw first paratrooper company from LP for use against Vientiane.
- 5.
- Problem exfiltrating deputies growing increasingly difficult with tighter security in Vientiane, seven key deputies under varying degrees surveillance, and torn between feeling their part they can best serve here and fear or hesitation take physical and political risks for selves and families involved in departure now especially since Phoumi advance on Vientiane seems hold out hope its early liberation.
- 6.
- King continues reluctant act, presumably hoping Phoumi capture of Vientiane will get him off hook and avoid necessity his taking any categoric action.
- 7.
- Phoui, though probably still useful as negotiator, has not shown himself effective force. At last reading, he seemed favor coalition government with PL and retention Souvanna as Prime Minister.
- B.
1. It thus appears that a series of events, some of our own doing, have created a situation which is now largely out of our control and which is carrying us down the road of a military solution rather than our preferred path, that of a political solution.
2. Our posture until today was that Phoumi should stop and consolidate his positions at or just north of Nam Cadinh. In lieu of asking Soviet military aid Souvanna has asked me tell Phoumi stay south this river. I have reminded Phoumi of JCS directive. Phoumi now authorized move northward in support of coup activities Vientiane as advised by CH/PEO and subject my concurrence.
3. I see little prospect on horizon of a negotiated solution or action by assembly which will legally transfer power quickly to a new government. Even if we successfully urge Phoumi stop at or before Paksane, Souvanna has said no meeting at LP. Phoumi certainly will not come Vientiane. Quick exfiltration sufficient deputies to get quorum outside Vientiane unlikely. Petition for assembly meeting LP signed by majority deputies is more likely, though whether King, now beguiled by prospect Phoumi capture Vientiane, will act on it is doubtful. Such action is however only hope negotiated solution.
4. Prolonged stalemate (whether political or military) also has serious risks. It gives time for Souvanna to ask and receive military aid from Soviets, though he is reported [document number not declassified]3 thus far to have refused to do so. It gives chance for request or offer of aid from ChiComs. It uses up the precious time during which we do not have to breach Souvanna’s request not give military aid to Phoumi. We could at any time be confronted by request remove PEO personnel.
5. Through all this, Souvanna shows not slightest sign of resigning, nor Phoumi of waiting for negotiations.
[Page 993]6. Military action has its disadvantages, chief among them loss of Lao life. It will force us into increasingly difficult decisions on degree of support to Phoumi forces. Unless very quickly successful, it could well lead to de facto situation of two governments with US supporting one and everybody else the other. It could lead to call for UN intervention, or to request for forces from Commie bloc if and when our support to Phoumi becomes unmistakably intervention. (We are receiving increasing evidence of careful preparation of case (UN or World Court) establishing US interference through collection specific examples. Many of these are false. But some, unfortunately, are true.) It can precipitate PL attacks with concomitant series of difficult support decisions for us.
- C.
1. Though there is no really satisfactory solution to situation, best practical possibility would appear to be combination Phoumi pressure on Vientiane forces accompanied by successful coup Vientiane as contemplated by JCS directive 9868524 with which I fully concur. This could permit Phoumi forces walk in relatively peacefully and should lead to resignation government through vote of Assembly backed by King. Considerable trouble with PL here and elsewhere would however be likely. There is unfortunately not much we can do to help with coup except pass messages, which we are doing.
2. We should try keep Phoumi from open attack Vientiane city until after coup and refrain from overt support his forces such as CAT aircraft for troop lifter or supply forward areas.
3. We should also continue efforts encourage signatures petition for LP Assembly meeting and exfiltration where possible, though this getting increasingly difficult as surveillance grown.
4. We should again send message King urging King call Assembly meeting LP and pointing out again that transfer power to new legal government is essential permit full and open US support. If quorum deputies cannot get [out] LP we should then urge King to act himself to dislodge Souvanna and appoint someone else, despite fact this could lead to two governments with US not freed from recognition of one to recognize the other.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–760. Top Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, London, Canberra, Phnom Penh, Saigon, and CINCPAC.↩
- Not found.↩
- Reference is to the document cited in footnote 2 above.↩
- Not found.↩