Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XVI

474. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, December 2, 1960—7:48 p.m.

578. For Ambassador Brown from Parsons. Re Embtel 1042 and 1043.²

1. I have been deeply distressed by situation which developed consequent to JCS 986140 of November 21³ which dispatched after high level State-Defense decisions communicated Deptel 539.⁴CINCPAC’s subsequent directives have been within authority then granted but this does not mean we condone violation of principle that major decisions should be communicated through Ambassador and Chief of PEO.

2. CINCPAC’s 282316Z⁵ closed with request for JCS confirmation. You will note confirmation not yet forthcoming. This is because State Dept. has been obdurate and has threatened go to top unless JCS response explicitly makes clear that operations must in present circumstances be limited and that CINCPAC directives regarding them must be referred to Washington for prior approval.

3. Foregoing should make clear that all of us here agree with your concern “not to have someone else giving orders on matters of major importance” bypassing Ambassador. Deptel 572⁶ expressed this concurrence. At same time you must realize that even if we could accept good faith of Souvanna decision not to attack Luang Prabang such decision can and probably would be taken by others despite him, i.e. Pathet Lao and associates. Military posture and action therefore extremely important and we here agree that diversionary effort to prevent concentration against Luang Prabang is important. We also agree that if attack occurs southern forces must move fast toward Vientiane. However we also agree with you that despite extreme difficulty and delicacy of coordination as between military and political moves former must not be allowed destroy chances for political solution which we are seeking and that Souvanna and Pathet Lao should bear onus for initiation civil war.

4. Difficult or perhaps intolerable as it may seem to you in peculiar fragmented Lao circumstances, we do have to live with need to reconcile civil and military sides of our Government. Should, despite all our efforts, there be civil war, CINCPAC and JCS will bear brunt of whatever follows and we cannot afford ignore their views on matters on which they are best qualified. Nevertheless I repeat that Ambassador and Department must not be bypassed and we have fought major battle on this issue these past 72 hours. I hope JCS message, which may clear out tonight, will be satisfactory on your point A and that it plus Deptel 572 as well as this message will give you (and also Heintges) some comfort on point B.⁷

Dillon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–260. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted by Parsons and cleared with SEA and Merchant.
2. Document 472 and supra.
3. See footnote 5, Document 464.
4. Document 464.
5. Not found.
6. See footnote 3, Document 472.
7. In telegram 1048 from Vientiane, December 3, Brown expressed appreciation for the Department’s support of him and Heintges. He added: “Revised JCS directive received today and appreciated.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–360) The JCS directive has not been found.